

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



DALASP SUMMARY REPORT

BY
JAMES JOHN TRITTEN

OCTOBER 30, 1992

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Prepared for: Naval Intelligence Command
NIC-12
4600 Silver Hill Rd.
Washington, D. C. 20389-5000

Intelligence Plans & Integration
Directorate
DAMI-PII-T PNT Room 2C475
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence
Headquarters, Department of the
Army
Washington, D.C. 20310-1063

Feddon
L 308 1412
NIPS-NS-92-011-PP

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

Rear Admiral Ralph W. West, Jr.
Superintendent

Harrison Shull
Provost

The research reported here was funded by and prepared for The Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12) and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-PII-T).

Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.

This report was written by:

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF REPORT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE				
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) NPS-NS-92-014PR			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If Applicable) NS/TR		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
6c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) MONTEREY, CA 93943-5100			7b. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) MONTEREY, CA 93943-5100	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If Applicable) NIC-12		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) 4600 SILVER HILL RD. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20389-5000			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. MIPR NO MIPR R0	PROJECT NO. 001592W 9X026
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) DALASP SUMMARY REPORT				
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) TRITTEN, JAMES JOHN				
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL		13b. TIME COVERED JUL 92 TO OCT 92		14. DATE OF REPORT (year, month, day) OCTOBER 1992
15. PAGE COUNT 182				
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION				
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) RUSSIA COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES UKRAINE	
FIELD	GROUP	SUBGROUP		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) (8 A-C) ADDITIONAL SPONSOR, INTELLIGENCE PLANS & INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE (DAMI-PII-T, PNT ROOM 2C475) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-1063. (16) THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PAPER ARE THESE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICY OR POSITION OF ANY DEPARTMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FINAL AND COMPREHENSIVE PROJECT REPORT DOCUMENTING RESEARCH ACTIVITIES OF NPS FACULTY AND STUDENTS THAT VISITED RUSSIA, ESTONIA, AND THE UKRAINE FOR THREE WEEKS DURING JULY 1992. CONTAINS INITIAL TRIP REPORTS, MAJOR OBSERVATIONS, DRAFT ARTICLE FOR PUBLICATION, REVIEW OF TRIP ITSELF, DOCUMENTATION OF ALL SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS, A REPORT ON INCIDENTS, AND REVISED COURSE MATERIALS RESULTING FROM THE TRIP.				
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL JAMES JOHN TRITTEN			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (408) 646-2143	
			22c. OFFICE SYMBOL NS/TR	

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

NPS(NS/Tr)
October 30, 1992

MEMORANDUM

From: Associate Professor James Tritten (NS/Tr)
To: (1) Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12)
(2) U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-PII-T)

Subj: DALASP SUMMARY REPORT (NPS PROJECT REPORT)

Ref: (a) Navy DALASP application dated February 24, 1992
(b) Army DALASP application dated March 13, 1992

Encl: (1) DALASP and QofA trip reports
(2) Observations on a Recent Trip to the Former Soviet Union
(3) "Touring" Russia and Ukraine
(4) Administrative section
(5) Substantive research findings
(6) Special section on incidents
(7) Course outline for NS 3450
(8) Notes for lecture on Svechin's *Strategy*

1. Reference (a) requested funding from the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12) for my participation in the Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program (DALASP) for research in Russia and the Ukraine during July 1992. Additional applications were submitted and four Navy officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) undertook the same research activities. Reference (b) requested funding from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-PII-T) for DALASP research by one Army officer student at NPS. DALASP participation was approved by these sponsors, funding was provided to NPS, and the trip was undertaken as a joint Navy/Army faculty/student research project under the auspices of the Dean of Research. This project report is provided to the sponsors, and a few additional interested government offices and parties, to complete the reporting on activities undertaken during this research project. Prior to release, it was reviewed by the Navy sponsor and other relevant Navy offices.

2. Enclosure (1) contains the initial trip reports of the research conducted by myself, the four Navy and one Army officers funded by DALASP, as well as the activities of three Air Force officers who traveled under the Air Force Quality of Analysis (QofA) program. These are reprinted herein since not all of the offices being provided with copies of this project report will have received these initial trip reports.

3. In accordance with my request for DALASP funding, I agreed to provide a more in-depth summary report of my research results in addition to the overview trip report. Enclosure (2) contains an overview of the research results that have been previously and separately distributed. They form the basis of briefings that have been provided to various parties when I have been asked to speak about the experiences of the research activities. I did not document the sources of my information in this brief report. This report is reprinted herein since copies were not provided to all offices which will receive this project report and inclusion serves to complete this project report as a complete package.

4. Enclosure (3) is a draft of an article to appear the *Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly* that reports on the activities of the researchers. A slightly edited version should appear in late 1992 or early 1993.

5. Enclosure (4) contains an in-depth report of my activities, the names and addresses of all the tour participants, and those Russian and Ukrainian individuals with which I had contact. This section is merely an administrative accounting of activities as well as certain in-depth observations without substantive analysis.

6. Enclosure (5) contains my raw substantive research findings with initial analysis. The sources for all my research is either what I was told by Russians and Ukrainians or what I observed myself. The analysis of the information that I was provided or what I observed is my own. During most of the trip, I did not openly take notes when I was conversing with the Russians or Ukrainians. I did this to facilitate open and in-depth conversations. Where I openly took written notes, this is noted. In either case, I converted written or mental notes to notes in the computer which we purchased and took on the trip to aid us in writing our reports. This section is limited to a discussion of the major seminars that were held during the trip.

7. Enclosure (6) contains in-depth reporting of what I observed or was told by various Russian and Western individuals regarding a series of incidents that involved our group. Virtually all of this information is known to the Russians since they either participated in them or were directly involved with conversations that resulted. Unless otherwise indicated, none of this information was held in confidence.

8. Copies of a draft project report were provided additionally to each of the officer student researchers so that they could use it in the preparation of their own individual reports. The officer student researchers were told to not include anything in their own reports that was covered by mine or would be covered in the final version of this project report.


9. Each student that traveled to Russian and the Ukraine under DALASP or QofA funding was enrolled in a special topics seminar (NS 4079) at NPS and received graduate credit for their field re-

search. Each participated in multiple seminars held in these countries and contributed to the preparation of all reports issued in my name.

10. In my original DALASP application, I also indicated that I would make major revisions to my Soviet Military Strategy course outline based upon my research experience. Enclosure (7) provides the addressees with a copy of the revised course outline for NS 3450, Military Strategy in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This course was offered during the Fall Quarter, Academic Year 1992-1993. It will again be offered during the Spring of 1993. Enclosure (8) are notes used for the teaching of a lecture on General-Major Svechin's book *Strategy* in that course. These notes were developed after considerable interaction with Russian military faculty members during the DALASP-funded trip. They form the basis of a forthcoming technical report and article on the same subject.

11. The omission of the phrase Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) generally throughout this report is deliberate. During three weeks in Russia and the Ukraine, I never once heard any Russian or Ukrainian talk about the CIS.

12. If you have any questions, please let me know at (408) 646-2143 AVN 878-2143 or by FAX at (408) 646-2949 or AVN 878-2949.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "James J. Tritten", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

JAMES J. TRITTEN

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

NPS(NS/Tr)
August 6, 1992

MEMORANDUM

From: Associate Professor James Tritten (NS/Tr)
To: (1) Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs (NS)
(2) Curricular Officer, NSA/Intelligence Programs (38)

Subj: TRIP REPORT

1. This memo will report on my trip to Russia and the Ukraine taken between Thursday July 2 and Saturday July 25, 1992, under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program (DALASP), as Navy reimbursable research. This trip report also covers the activities of 4 Navy and 1 Army students also funded by DALASP and 3 Air Force students funded under the Quality of Analysis (QofA) Program. The students taking part in this trip were: LTs Mark Admiral, Dave Hanson, Jim McIlmail, and Scott Stanley, USN, CPT Jim Jaworski, USA, and CPTs Evie Conlon, Frank McGuigan, and Jay Warwick, USAF. Additional substantive reports will be prepared by all participants as required by DALASP and QofA directives and should be consulted for a full documentation and detailed report of all activities. My own research will be further documented in an NPS technical report under preparation and by revisions to my course outline for NS 3450 (Russian Military Strategy).

2. The trip involved participation in an international group tour sponsored by the Russian Military History Institute and authorized by their Chief of their General Staff. The tour was executed by a joint venture, ASK Tours, with LTC John Sloan, USA (Ret.), acting as principal agent in the U.S. Participants included academics and active and retired officers from Finland, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. According to each of the tour participants themselves, virtually all of them were currently or previously associated with various intelligence services. According to the translators provided to the tour, some of the Russian tour directors included KGB and GRU operatives and the translators themselves (provided by the Russian military) were either GRU officers or cadets enrolled in their version of DLI.

3. As you will recall, just prior to departing on our trip, Mr. Donald Atwood, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued instructions that reduced the amount of participation for DoD employees. As a result, we were only allowed to spend 21 days in country and

had to reduce our number by five. Group tour funds provided by DALASP already paid by NPS are lost due to the late cancellation and we will also be obligated to honor reimbursement for costs incurred by the non-participants to pay for their passports, visas, and books ordered prior to the trip. From my discussions with DoD employees who did go on the trip, it is my understanding that there will be additional Congressional and GAO and legal actions taken by some of the Washington non-participants. To my knowledge, although no one from NPS has or will participate in complaints to the Congress to date, it is obvious that due to Mr. Atwood's actions, less language and area studies research and training was performed at a higher per capita cost than if we had been allowed to execute our original orders.

4. The programmed portion of our trip generally involved visiting military educational and research facilities, museums, and the sites of important battles or fortifications. The site visits were generally complemented by the participation of experts on the wars or campaigns that involved the individual battles. This included an entire week and a half of involvement by the faculty of the Frunze Academy, the equivalent of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In addition to these programmed activities, both the students and myself were able to schedule additional activities with military and academic groups.

5. We arrived in Russia late on Friday July 3rd. The first 4 days were spent in St. Petersburg, with 1½ days of those being spent on trips outside of the city. The Russian military admitted our group to a number of closed areas that our embassy has been trying to see for years. Among those are the naval base at Kronstadt (soon to be the headquarters for the Baltic Fleet) and the Museum of Artillery, Engineer, and Signal Troops. One student made a presentation of the results of his research during this portion of the trip during a seminar involving presentations by both our group and Russians. In addition to these scheduled activities, I was approached by a faculty member of the Leningrad State University of Marine Technology and given a proposal for joint research that needs to be evaluated by someone with the proper credentials. I would appreciate your assistance in determining who should evaluate this proposal (attached). At a reception held in our honor on the 4th of July, I was asked to give a short speech. I talked about democracy and freedom. The speech was videotaped and apparently broadcast later on regional television to all of northwest Russia.

6. The next 2 days were spent on the road in northwest Russia and included a very brief visit to the fortress in Narva, Estonia. Since we did not realize when arranging this trip that Narva was in Estonia, we had to obtain visas at the border. Generally we found conditions in northwest Russia, including in St. Petersburg, to be quite primitive and lacking in any advanced social or hygienic standards. From the little that we saw of

Estonia, it appears that they are better off and eager to disassociate themselves from years of rule by Moscow. An overnight train trip was taken to Moscow.

7. We arrived in Moscow on the morning of Friday July 10th and spent the next 5 days there with 2 of those days spent on full day tours outside of the city. Instructors from the Frunze Academy or the Military History Institute accompanied us on all of our outings. One of those trips included the History of Aviation Museum in Monino. Seeing actual Soviet and Russian aircraft instead of recognition slides was most exciting to our group. The Moscow portion of the trip was probably the most productive and involved a series of unprogrammed presentations and seminars arranged by me. This included visits to the Institute of World Economy and International Relations - IMEMO (arranged by Dr. Aleksey G. Arbatov who visited NPS late in June), the U.S.A. and Canada Institute (where I met primarily with a researcher who visited me in Monterey last year), and at the Military History Institute. I made presentations to the Department of Military-Political Affairs (including its department head Sergey M. Rogov) at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute and at Arbatov's Disarmament Department at IMEMO. Students participated in the IMEMO seminar and two additional seminars at the Military History Institute. At the Military History Institute, we met with the commanding general (who is also the editor in chief of the General Staff journal *Voyennaya Mysl*), his deputy - another general (who is working on a project for the RAND Corporation), and I learned that my published work was already well known by the faculty.

8. Following our departure from Moscow on the morning of Wednesday, July 15th, we spent the next 7 days on tour west, northwest, north, and northeast of Moscow, staying in a series of smaller cities and towns. Perhaps the most important site that we visited was the Armor Museum in Kubinka where we saw an entire armored division's worth of tanks and other vehicles. In addition, I arranged a series of special evening seminars with the different Frunze Academy instructors who accompanied us on this portion of the trip. Generally, each instructor was with us for 1½ days. Additionally, the students and I spent numerous hours talking to these instructors during the long bus rides and while at each of the sites we visited. I made another presentation at one of these seminars. Upon completing this leg of the trip, a few of these instructors saw us off at the train station in Moscow and one invited me to return next summer.

9. After an overnight train trip to Kiev, we arrived in the Ukraine on Wednesday morning, July 22nd. This portion of the trip included a visit to the Vasilevsky Air Defense Military Academy. I again asked for a follow-on seminar with the faculty. When we reported at the Academy the next day, we were instead taken to the office of the Deputy Defense Minister for the Ukraine, where we conducted the seminar with the participation of the Deputy and I made another presentation. Due to the nature of

this unexpected meeting, I called our embassy and tried to report it but found the only military officer absent. I left a brief message and promised to write with a summary of what transpired. I also participated in a seminar with Ukrainian academics in a private think tank. In general, we found the Ukraine to be much better off than Russia and the Ukrainians almost hostile to their former masters.

10. The tour continued on to the Crimea after dinner on Thursday, July 23rd and we remained in Kiev overnight, departing on the first available plane on Friday. We were unable to make a same day connection upon our arrival in Frankfurt and continued our journey home arriving in Monterey on Saturday evening, July 25th.

11. While on the trip, I passed out copies of the *National Military Strategy of the United States* (there is no objection to this action from J-5 officers who have cognizance over this publication) and one of my recent and unclassified technical reports. Due to luggage limitations, I had sent multiple advance copies but still ran out and I will send more. The Russians and Ukrainians appeared most eager to learn about our new regional defense strategy and I learned that the military has little access to Russian civilian academic publications or researchers. They were also very interested in our views on the Persian Gulf war, SDI/GPALS, nuclear operations, the competitive strategies initiative, and war gaming. They were also most forthcoming about their new military policy, doctrine, strategy, and operational art, all of which I will use in my research efforts for the Director of Naval Intelligence.

12. In addition to meeting with the Russians and Ukrainians, I found that the interaction with specialists from the other countries was most beneficial. I found my interaction with the Swedes most interesting and it appears that it will lead to a publication and invitation to visit their defense establishment. I was also most interested in Sweden's participation in World War II and we all benefited from seminars with the former head of their Army. Having Bill and Harriet Scott, the authors of the textbook on former Soviet military strategy, on the tour was most enlightening. Post-tour interaction with Air Staff officers who made the trip has already been beneficial.

13. During the first night that we arrived in St. Petersburg, one of the students was robbed in his hotel room while he was in the room. LT Scott Stanley immediately made a formal complaint to the police. Our Air Force students felt that they were being set up for another theft while walking on the streets. Following another theft, this time in the halls outside of our rooms, the thief who robbed LT Stanley was captured by our group and some American tourists. It was obvious that there was official and Russian tour leadership inaction to these thefts. I met with our students to consider terminating the trip for the one female Air

Force officer since it was obvious that no one could guarantee our safety. Upon the advice of other individuals in our group who had been to Russia before, I went to the American consulate to discuss the lack of safety in our hotel and the city. Formal reports were filed with the consulate by the two individuals who were robbed and I recommended that the consulate place the hotel "off-limits" to visiting government personnel. The consulate regional security officer spoke to one of our Russian tour directors and we noticed that conditions improved immensely. For example, we took additional consulate-suggested precautions, including the posting of a "watch" in our train car and wiring all doors shut from the inside.

14. Prior to departing on the trip, I confirmed (in writing) with LTC Sloan that we would be able to modify our itinerary to meet our own DALASP/QofA training and research objectives. During the stays in St. Petersburg and Moscow, all of us modified the itinerary routinely and daily (see additional subsequent detailed DALASP and QofA reports). During the bus tour outside of Moscow, a number of the language students decided that they were not obtaining the necessary amount of Russian speaking opportunities. I concurred. The Air Force officers phoned NPS Assistant Professor Roman Laba, who was staying in Moscow and with whom they had met, and set up an alternative visit with a Russian family in lieu of two days of future programmed activities. Two of them then chose to leave Smolensk by train and travel to the next town, Zagorsk, via alternative and more comfortable means. They would then depart Zagorsk two days hence and go to Moscow instead of a number of smaller towns in the country. I approved these actions and notified the Russian tour directors. Upon our departure from Smolensk, the Russian tour director responsible for that portion of the tour got confused about what the students had done and were doing and objected to this change in the itinerary. I suggested that we solve the problem and we picked up the students at the train station and took them along with us.

15. The train incident upset the Russian tour director more than was warranted and I suspected that what really was happening was that the suspected KGB/GRU intelligence operatives responsible for monitoring the tour group were upset over the highly successful non-programmed activities in which we were engaged. I was told that there were elements of the Russian military that wanted the tour to fail and were manipulating the schedule to be less productive than we hoped. To complicate the matter, a Russian tour director and suspected KGB operative (according to our GRU cadet translators), in the presence of Russian Colonel Viktor Kuznetsov (advertised as a Frunze "instructor"), gave me an explicit warning that any further modifications of the itinerary would lead to an "incident" that would be photographed and reported in the press and would not be to the liking of the U.S. or Russian governments. He specifically warned me that the incident would involve our female officer. I met with our students and

told them to double all precautions and withdraw all requests for modifications of the programmed itinerary.

16. On Saturday, July 18, 1992, an incident occurred in the hotel restaurant in Zagorsk involving an active duty female U.S. Army officer (LTC Diane Smith stationed in England) and an apparent "drunk." During the incident, threats were made at our table and a knife was pulled on CPT Jim Jaworski. Our Russian tour directors and the hotel staff did virtually nothing to defuse or handle the incident. The initial response by the militia was totally ineffective and required reinforcement. I was told by a U.S. Army civilian intelligence officer that the incident was staged to reinforce the warning that had been given the day before. I was told by other individuals that the incident only involved a member of the mafia who had gotten drunk. CPT Jaworski went to the militia station but they failed to take his report and to the best of our knowledge the perpetrator was released to his waiting comrades. Due to the lawlessness of the situation and the inability of the tour to ensure our safety, I called the Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow and requested instructions. He recommended that we leave the tour and leave the country. I made such a request to the Russian tour directors and proceeded to pack for a departure. The next day, I was told by the tour company that it was impossible to leave the tour and we would have to continue. I was advised by a number of the U.S. intelligence officers accompanying the tour that they would not like it if we left. I discussed our desires with the tour director and suspected KGB operative and reached an understanding with him, the overall Russian tour director for that portion of the trip, and with LTC John Sloan, that if all incidents ended, we would withdraw our request to leave early and we would not request any further modifications to the programmed itinerary. In all my interactions with the Russians involving this incident, they all reported their actions and deferred to the directions given by the one individual that we were told was KGB. I had no reason to suspect that he was not KGB.

17. All incidents ended once that arrangement was made. When we arrived in Kiev, I responded favorably to a suggestion by the commander of the Vasilevsky Air Defense Military Academy to continue discussions in follow-on meetings. Apparently that suggestion was looked on with disfavor by the Russian tour director and suspected KGB operative and he twice actively interceded and tried to prevent the seminar. As I reported above, not only was the seminar held, but the Ukrainian military went to great lengths to get rid of the openly acknowledged GRU officer/translator who was in our company and shift the seminar to the Defense Ministry. There were no further incidents.

18. In summation, our group met the training and research objectives specified in our applications for DALASP and QofA funding. Each participant had ample opportunities to refine his/her language skills, especially those directly relating to military

issues. I was most impressed by the abilities of our students to act as translators and consider the DLI to be succeeding in meeting our educational skill objectives. Although Russian speaking skills might have been developed further with additional variations in the itinerary, the above mentioned incidents explain why they were somewhat limited. As for research, the tour offered opportunities that were beyond outstanding. Three of my thesis students and two new students who have yet to pick a thesis topic had ample opportunity to gain primary materials while conducting field research. My own efforts will result in major modifications in teaching military strategy and the publication of a major book-length technical report. All participants of the tour responded favorably to my question in Frankfurt, "would you go on the trip again knowing now what you did not know before?" I held regular sessions with the students to discuss the substance of what we were learning as well as the problems that we were encountering. I also made presentations of NPS plaques at each site that we visited. I would again go on such a trip but would insist that some military faculty member or NPS faculty member accompany any group of students so that a civilian faculty member would not be placed in the positions that were described above.

JAMES J. TRITTEN

cc: NPS Code 07
DALASP and QofA sponsors
CAPT Ed Smith, OP-922
NIS Monterey
LCDR Jeff Kuipers, USDAO Moscow

cc w/o attachment: NS/Br, NS/Mi, 381
Each student participant

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Leningrad State University of Marine Technology

Professor Nikolayev's proposals for co-operation in the field of research, industrial and educational developments.

Professor Nikolayev V.I., Doctor of Science (Technology), Ship Energetics Faculty, Department of Ship Power Plants, Systems and Equipment, Head of the Research Laboratory of Automation Design of Complex Engineering Systems.

Sphere of scientific activities:

1. Imitational models of complete life cycles of complex engineering systems (CES) for substantiation of optimal designs at early stages of designing when incomplete or incorrect information is available. Examples of created models: an imitational model of a cargo vessel to determine optimal requirements to her repairability at early stages of designing, imitational models of craft-carriers operating with different types of underwater craft, imitational modes for substantiation of optimal operational modes of CES.
2. Mathematical and computer tools for automated control of ecology at large industrial enterprises.
3. The same tools for automated control of ecology in a large city district.
4. Further developments: a) imitational models for optimal development of low-waste technologies for shipbuilding (machine-building) plants polluting the atmosphere; b) expert systems and knowledge bases in shipbuilding and ship machine-building.
5. Complex educational programmes on IBM PC for shipbuilding universities.

Forms of possible co-operation:

- joint conduction of research work (RW);

- conduction of RW, or creation of complex programmes to a foreign partner's order;
- development of complex educational programmes and mathematical models;
- exchange of information and specialists (on the basis of mutual business trips).

Short annotations of the Laboratory's major works are given in Appendix 1 and 2.

Connections:

Faculty of Ship Energetics and Automation, Leningrad State University of Marine Technology, 3 Lotsmanskaya Street, Leningrad, 190008, USSR. Telephone: 1148021

Prof. V.I.Nikolayev, Flat 29, 18/1 Gagarin Prospect, Leningrad, 196221, USSR. Telephone: 2641943.

Professor V.I.Nikolayev

APPENDIX 1

MATHEMATICAL MODELS AND CAD FOR HIGHLY EFFICIENT VESSELS AND SHIP POWER PLANTS

The Research Laboratory of Automation Design of Complex Engineering Systems (CES), headed by Professor Nikolayev VGI., specializes in creating and introducing imitational models for optimal designing of vessels and ship power plants (SPP). CAD programmes for optimal designing of ships and ship power plants are being created that are based on imitational models and supplied with a wide range of auxiliary and service programmes.

Imitational simulation nowadays is a powerful engineering mathematical tool that, in conditions when incomplete or incorrect information is available at early stages of design work, allows to correlate the vessel's efficiency (in her future operation) and characteristics of any of the ship and SPP design variants by means of machine experiments to substantiate a best variant. Unlike routine mathematical models, such a model using computer reproduces the whole real time process of the ship's operation, from her launching till the end of her service life, when the real chance process of operation is simulated to reproduce all accidental fluctuations and deviations of major operational parameters. For this, about twenty major operational parameters of the ship and SPP are statistically processed with the data from a few series of ship-prototypes and then introduced into the model in form of distribution laws. The simulation is performed not for one but dozens of the ship's service lives, so the computer simultaneously simulates the operation of dozens of the same-type ship design variants. The resulting engineering economical para-

REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

meters (which are accidental values) are processed by means of mathematical statistics. Thus the comparing of the ship and SPP design variants may be performed for twenty engineering economical characteristics. Such simulation can be used at early stages of design work to determine the ship's efficiency under any (including extreme) conditions of the future operation. At final stages of designing, the simulation models can help quantitatively substantiate optimal operation modes of the ship and SPP.

At the Laboratory the following imitational models have been created for large industrial enterprises:

- to determine optimal requirements to the repairability of cargo vessels and their main parts at early stages of design work;
- to estimate the efficiency of design variants of a craft-carrier operating with several types of underwater craft, etc.

APPENDIX 2

MATHEMATICAL TOOLS AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE FOR AUTOMATED CONTROL OF ECOLOGY AT AN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE

The automated control system is based on a complex of mathematical models for simulation of the interaction between harmful wastes polluting the atmosphere (including gaseous wastes) from hundreds of funnels and other sources at one plant and the meteorological and topographical conditions in the surrounding area. The mathematical models use standard methods of calculations and simulation current in the USSR, but they are added with subsystems - those of imitational simulation of meteorological conditions and real processes of the plant's shops and aggregates operation polluting the atmosphere. The automation system is supplied with a number of service programmes and automated database. With the help of this system all major problems of the ecology analysis (concerning the atmospheric pollution) and the production management may be solved on IBM PC.

The system is now under development on order of a large industrial enterprise.

REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

NPS(38/SMC 1669)
Sept 30, 1992

MEMORANDUM

From: DALASP Trip Participants

To: (1) Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12)
(2) U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(DAMI-PII-T)

Subj: Dalasp Trip Report

Ref: (a) DALASP applications of trip participants
(b) James Tritten's trip report dated August 6, 1992
(c) James Tritten's draft DALASP summary report dated
August 10, 1992

Encl: (1) Dalasp trip report dated 30 September 1992

1. Reference (a) requested DALASP funding for research in Russia and Ukraine during July 1992. Results of that research were reported in references (b) and (c). This report is submitted as a supplement and not as a substitute for those reports and will be included in the final version of reference (a).

cc: Dr. Robert Slater (DIA/DIC/R)
Lt Col. James D. Willis, Jr. (AF/INRF)
Navy Liaison Unit, San Francisco
Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Monterey
Capt. Ed Smith, Director, Intelligence Division (OP-922)
LT. Scott Stanley, CINCUSNAVEUR (N-2)
Special Security Officer (NPS Code 38B)
Dr. James Tritten, Associate Professor (NPS Code Ns/Tr)
Curricular Officer, National Security Affairs and Intelligence
Programs (NPS Code 38)

TRIP REPORT FOR DALASP

2 July - Five NPS student participants in a DALASP-funded trip to Russia and Ukraine departed Monterey. Participants were; LT James McIlmail, LT David Hansen, LT Mark Admiral, LT Scott Stanley all USN, and Cpt. James Jaworski USA.

3 July - Arrived in St. Petersburg at approximately 5:00 pm local time. The group proceeded through customs with no problems and was met by representatives of ASK tours. The group was then escorted to the hotel MOSCOW and met the rest of the international participants of the tour. The group went to assigned rooms, unpacked, and had dinner together in the hotel dining room. Most members retired after dinner because of the long journey. The hotel bar was heavily patronized by foreign travellers and what can only be described as the prostitution ring allowed and even encouraged to operate by the hotel security personnel. Due to this and subsequent events it seems safe to call for placing the hotel and bar off-limits to our personnel.

Detail: Upon arrival the generally poor state of repair at the airport was noticed. The customs personnel were far from alert and seemed to care little for their work. The technological backwardness of the country became immediately apparent from the really poor baggage claiming facilities were easily overwhelmed by the arrival of two planes at the same time. The outside of the terminal was crawling with persons looking to sell rubles for dollars. The airport security did not make any attempt to stop this activity.

4 July - Early on this day at the hotel MOSCOW at approximately 5:00 am a man entered room 6020 and stole approximately 540 dollars from Lt. Scott Stanley, USN. A police report was filed with the hotel representative from the ministry of internal affairs. This report did not seem to generate any increased security at the hotel. At all meals the wait staff of the hotel would attempt to sell many different types of souvenirs to the group as well as exchange money at rates that turned out to be reasonable. This was all witnessed at different times by their superiors in the hotel but in no way discouraged. The food was of average quality and only bottled water was served, no city water.

In the morning the group split up with half going to see the Peter and Paul Fortress, while the other half went to the Artillery museum. A plaque from the Naval Postgraduate School was presented to Colonel Evgeny Nikolaievich Karchagan, the head of the museum. Lunch was at the hotel. In the afternoon the group, went on a tour of the Naval museum and the battleship Aurora. The guide of the Aurora, speaking in Russian, displayed the new political correctness. According to him, the significance of the Aurora was due to it being an example of Russian ship-building technology. However, virtually all the displays were related to the role that it played in the Revolution. The displays have not kept up with

current doctrine.

5 July - After breakfast in the hotel the whole group went on a tour of the Hermitage museum. Security at the museum was very poor with the exhibits in many case open to the touch of any patron. The parade ground outside of the Hermitage and the Ministry of Defense was populated by beggars in ragged clothes who appeared to be Central Asian origin. The beggars included handicapped persons as well as children. It was noted that no facilities were in evidence at any time for the handicapped. No security personnel were in evidence either. Lunch was at the hotel, and afterward there was a tour of the Fortress Kronstadt with dinner there sponsored by the Russian Naval Officers Mess. A presentation was made to the Russian civilian and military hosts by Prof. James Tritten on behalf of the Naval Postgraduate School.

DETAIL: Enroute to Kronstadt, observed the heart of St. Petersburg military-industrial establishment. Buildings were observed to be in a state of deterioration comparable to the industrial revolution in the United States. The quality of construction was observed to be markedly below western standards for all buildings (commercial and private property). The skyline of St. Petersburg was peppered with smokestacks of various factories. No emissions were observed from any stacks and all factories that were passed by appeared closed and non-functioning. It is unknown if this situation is temporary or permanent.

Access to Kronstadt military facility was controlled. A security post was operational at entrance to the island, manned by three to five uniformed personnel. Base buildings and grounds were observed to be in a state of low maintenance. Restricted areas were marked by sentries and posted signs. Significant ships observed in port included an ice-breaker with civilian paint and markings and the SMOLNY class training vessel PEREKOP. Both ships appeared in a low state of maintenance (significant rust on hulls and superstructure), with little activity observed on deck. The ships were probably utilizing shore-power as no indication of boiler smoke was evident. No indications of preparations to get underway were evident. Operational status of weapons systems is unknown.

06 July - Departure to Vyborg. Trip duration was approximately 4 hours. Discussion of Russo-Finnish War used as background for follow-on observations of the remnants of the Mannerheim Line and ancient fortifications.

DETAIL: The trip from St. Petersburg to Vyborg utilized route consisting of single two-lane road. Road was partially newly-paved (paving crew observed working on road), but mostly older pavement in fair-good condition. One section of approximately 5 miles was unpaved (hardened dirt surface). Youth camps were observed in high state of activity (possibly Young Pioneers and other defunct Communist Party-run establishments). As yet, little opportunity has been available to speak with civilian representatives of population.

07 July - Last evening another incident involving crime in our hotel as an elderly American gentleman was approached and assaulted in the hallway by a criminal who attempted to rob him. The criminal ran away but was captured by another American tourist. LT Stanley sat in on the presentation of statements by the Americans involved and had the opportunity to identify the criminal as probably the same man who had stolen LT Stanley's money from his room two days prior. Prof. Tritten decided that he should go to the American consulate to report the increasing crime problem. Prof. Tritten also talked with the female USAF representative in our group to offer her the opportunity to forego the remainder of the trip and return to the United States early due to the crime problem. She declined the offer.

Today CPT Jaworski and LT McIlmail presented the main points of their thesis which addresses the future of the Russian military. The seminar was held at the Artillery Museum. In attendance were most members of the American group and representatives of the Russian military-civilian establishment.

The program began with a forty minute exchange of ideas (general), followed by a break-up into small seminar type groups. Navy, Artillery warfare and fortification warfare and general military discussion were the three main topics.

LT McIlmail addressed the group for 5-10 minutes on the future of the Russian Navy and his presentation provoked one question from a Taiwanese representative of our group. He was interested in knowing LT McIlmail's source for a report that Russia was selling arms to the PRC (SU-27's). LT McIlmail stated that the sale had been reported in the open Russian press.

A reception followed the end of the afternoon session. It was noted at the party that the deputy director of the Artillery museum (Colonel) and another colonel were openly critical of both Yeltsin and Kravchuk. This was surprising in that one of them was Ukrainian, the other one Russian, and their immediate superior is Russian.

Cpt. Jaworski received a tour of the museum that included a tremendously large collection of armament consisting of historical as well as contemporary weapons. Access to the Museum archives was allowed. This is usually never allowed, and only a handful of Westerners have ever been granted access to it. The collection of weapons occupies the complete top floor of the museum and contains virtually every firearm and weapon that was ever known to man. The collection includes most of the original prototypes of all types of weapons, such as the AK-47. The collections of weapons are stored in large metal cabinets that are locked and sealed with wax. In the opinion of Cpt. Jaworski, this was the single best collection of weapons in the world. Additionally, there are weapons from the royal family and other priceless artifacts, such as Catherine the Great's personal book of castle fortifications (including detailed diagrams).

08 July - Departed St. Petersburg for Pskov by bus. Observed the seriously poor condition of the road we used. The surface, while

nearly inadequate for civilian vehicles, would perfectly suit tracked/half-tracked vehicles or any heavy military wheeled transportation vehicles.

Very rural landscape with little industrial build-up. Farmland was extensive but no notable modern farming equipment observed. It seemed probable that horse-pulled plows and no irrigation equipment accounted for sparsely grown crops (not identifiable). Basically, the whole day was spent on the bus. Two stops were made enroute to Pskov at ancient ruins, but nothing notable to report from these.

09 July - Previous night spent in Pskov at a less than adequate hotel. American tourists from several high schools were also at the same hotel and the girls complained of harassment by local males. In the morning one group departed by bus for the Pskov Pecherisky Monastery while the second group remained in Pskov and toured the fortifications and churches of the city. Both groups were happy with the tours. The portion of the group that stayed in Pskov encountered a group of people actually working at doing something constructive and not just involved in selling goods as in a pure service industry or black market. The group consisted of about 25 college students who were performing archeological digs at the city fortress. This was the first active restorations that have been seen, many of the earlier fortresses had scaffolding up but no work was in progress. The students were all very enthusiastic and interested in their American visitors.

This same portion of the group also had the opportunity to talk to three soldiers who were assigned to the airborne division located in Pskov. They were quite surprised when the large group of Americans approached them and gave them cigarettes and other various gifts. The interesting note here is that one of the group was clearly from one of the southern Republics, yet seemed to be good friends with the other two. The senior soldier told Capt. Jaworski that he used to be a sergeant, but was absent without permission chasing girls and lost his rank.

Departed Pskov for Novgorod in the afternoon. Upon arrival toured the city fortifications and churches. Interesting side-note is that there are many youngsters selling souvenirs out of bags they carry, but the police actively patrol the tourist areas in this city and chase the youngsters away. The youngsters ran as soon as the police showed up - this city still doesn't tolerate aggressive selling in some areas.

After dinner departed for Moscow by train. Per U.S. Consulate in St. Petersburg briefings and advice of three tour guides all group members locked themselves into their rooms with wire and a watch was posted in the passageway, with Mace, for possible gang threat - no problems materialized. Condition of the train was surprisingly good as was the track. The other trains noted in Moscow were of lower quality.

10 July - Arrival in Moscow. Train station was very busy. Baggage was transported by ALKOR CONSULTING in an army vehicle

supposedly purchased or rented by ALKOR. (ALKOR CONSULTING was somehow associated with the organizers of the tour and assisted in contacts with the military and other arrangements.) The hotel was the Academy of Sciences Hotel - the rooms were fairly large, but were infested with a large number of cockroaches. Some rooms had working refrigerators, non - working TV's. All had no hot water! Explanation was that the summer is the only season in which the pipes in Moscow can have maintenance performed on them and they shut off the hot water by months in different districts. Hot water had been shut off in our district for the whole month and was not available for the entire stay. The hotel had its own security personnel who were of a very dubious quality indeed. Also on each floor there was one locked heavy steel doored room from which these security personnel were observed entering and exiting, could not determine the use of the room. It is possible that some illegal activity was run from this room as the security personnel were trying to sell goods and exchange money on many occasions.

Escorted by officers/representatives of the IMH (Institute of Military History) to Monino Aviation museum. Interesting tour with the highlight being the actual planes of all types on open-air display. The exhibit included many helicopters, jets, fixed wing aircraft and various experimental models. After the museum and dinner the group split with some attending the circus, and LT Hansen attending a local Russian language theater performance, and the rest remaining at the hotel.

11 July - Several different groups went in different directions. LT. McIlmail, LT. Stanley and Cpt. Jaworski went to the US embassy for consultations with the Asst Naval Attache LT Jeff Kuipers, who proved to be especially helpful for the entire period of the stay in Moscow.

The other group toured the Kremlin, Red Square, and Lenin's tomb. Reverence is still held for Lenin, but the line to get into the mausoleum was only about 20 minutes long, on a warm summer day. Also, the only leader with more than the requisite one set of flowers upon his grave was Stalin - he obviously has a big fan club still!

The city offers a wonderful mass transportation system with buses, trollies and a very good subway. Travel about town is simple and speedy with even the taxis being cheap and available.

A Communist rally near Red Square was witnessed by LT McIlmail, LT Stanley and several other members of the group, all stayed well clear of the activity. The word AMERICANSKI was much bandied about but the substance of the speeches was not intelligible and the distance deemed safe.

12 July - The main body of the group headed for Tula and the Weaponry museum there. This trip included the extensive conversations that DR. Tritten and Cpt. Jaworski held with several officers of the Frunze Academy who were escorts for the trip. Good discussions were held with DR. Tritten in which some useful information was obtained.

Several other members of the group spent the day sightseeing in Moscow led by Russian-speaking guides, with the Armory being the highlight of the day. The displays of jewels, dress, Faberge eggs, and carriages was very impressive.

DETAIL: There is a very great discrepancy between the official prices for goods, and what can be obtained by talking to the cashier, especially if the request comes from a native Russian. One example came with an tour of the Kremlin Armory that was led by a Russian who befriended the group. She went off to buy tickets for the group which amounted to a few rubles (cents) per person. Our official guide notified us later that the official price of admission was \$22.00 each. This same Russian native got Americans into other museums and sights without paying anything at all. Another dual standard is also obvious in those Russians who have access to dollars, and those who do not. A new monetary reform was instituted 1 July, which allowed Russian citizens to legally hold "valuta", or hard currency, without explaining its source, but the dual standard remains .

13 July -Several members of the group continued touring Moscow sights with unofficial Russian-speaking guides. Once again, a small Communist demonstration was noted outside the Lenin museum. The gist of the demonstration was how brilliant Lenin was, how many languages he could speak, how well he had done in school, etc. The implication was that his teachings should be followed because he was so much smarter than a normal human being. The majority of the DALASP-sponsored officers became confident at striking out into the city in small groups, away from the conducted tour. This has yielded much greater benefits to those individuals, in terms of increasing confidence in everyday situations. The afternoon was spent at the Institute of Military History. After a general session in which Dr. Tritten presented a plaque to the Institute, on behalf of the Naval Postgraduate School, the scholars broke into three working groups: The first was Medieval Military History of Russia and the U.S.! Discussions presumably centered on the activities of the former rather than the latter. The second was Military History of the Great Patriotic War. Most students attended the third session which was on the post-war period. The Russians had not wanted to conduct this session at all, and only grudgingly participated. Dr. Tritten presented his research on the new national security strategy of the U.S. All the remaining time was exhausted by other U.S. scholars, leaving no time to ask the Russian participants any questions. This was apparently by design of the Russian officers.

A Captain from the Military History Institute, who is the chief historian on Stalin's family, was interested in talking to Cpt. Jaworski. This was due to the fact that through an article that was published in the English language journal The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, this officer found out that Cpt. Jaworski's father had spent time in the same POW camp as Stalin's son, and knew him fairly well. A copy of this article was given by

Cpt. Jaworski, to another member of the IMH.

ALKOR representative Vladimir Snitkovsky approached LT Admiral during the seminar and said that he was interested in "mathematical models to determine sufficient force levels." LT Admiral responded that he was not knowledgeable in operations research. Snitkovsky also stated that he had been to both Monterey, CA and the Pentagon in the past and he would soon be visiting Washington again. LT Admiral felt that Snitkovsky's behavior was suspicious.

Several students spent the evening in a joint-venture restaurant. The food and especially the service were a quantum leap above standard Russian fare, proving that change to a service-oriented economy is possible. LT Kuipers of the embassy offered the most insightful observation of the evening. When it was noted that left-hand turns are illegal in most places in Moscow, requiring drivers to drive down the road until they can find a place to commit a series of right-hand turns, and how inefficient this was, he noted that full employment of the population was a higher priority than efficiency under the old Soviet system. Another new custom in Moscow was noted: the necessity of paying protection money to street thugs in order to park the embassy vehicle.

14 July - The scheduled tour visited the Borodino battlefield, and received some excellent instruction on the tactical and strategic considerations and consequences of the battle. Dr. Tritten, accompanied by LT Hansen, Cpt Jaworski, LT McIlmail and other students visited the Institute of Military History again. This second meeting was arranged because the Russian participants had not been forthcoming the day before. A quid pro quo had been agreed to in which Dr. Tritten provided his unclassified paper on the new U.S. strategy, with the understanding that his students would have access to Russian thought. The meeting was with Gen. Major Har'kov. He confirmed that Russia is using the military reform of 1924-5 as an historical surrogate to discuss the current reforms in the Russian military. The afternoon session for these students was at the Institute for International Relations and Economics (IMEMO). The meeting there was with Vice-Admiral (ret) Markov, and several other members of the Department of Disarmament. Participants on the American side were Dr. Tritten, LT Hansen, LT McIlmail and LT Stanley. Topics discussed included the national security strategies of Russia and the United States, and the future force structure and mission of the armed forces.

LT Admiral visited the Borodino battlefield and museum. The museum was impressive and included uniforms and armaments of the Napoleonic period. The battlefield tour was highlighted by a visit to the location of Napoleon's command post and the Raevsky battery, which was the center of Russian resistance and a the pivotal position of the battle. At the battery, the earthen berm which was hurriedly constructed three days before the battle remains to this day. It was also interesting to note the large amount of pillboxes and other defenses which dot the landscape, having been left from the battle of Borodino in 1941.

15 July- Left Moscow for Smolensk, travelling by bus. On the way, stopped at the Armor Museum at Kubinka. The group spent two hours touring this very impressive museum, which includes more than 380 examples of both Soviet and foreign armor. The exhibit of foreign armor was very comprehensive and includes such modern types as M-60 and Chieftain as well as most significant armor from the Second World War, including the only existing example of the German super-heavy Maus tank. The display of Soviet postwar armor was also very complete and included many prototypes and test vehicles. They had examples of the most modern equipment, including a T-80 MBT (labeled as an experimental T-72) and BMP-3 AIFV, which the tour director indicated could be armed with a 100 mm cannon in place of the usual auto-cannon. Capt Jaworski believed that the experimental T-72 was a T-80 tank because of the recognition factor of the distinct gaps between the second and third, fourth and fifth, and fifth and sixth roadwheel. At the time Capt Jaworski did not notice whether the tank on display had a distinct oblong exhaust outlet in the hull rear which distinguishes the T-80 from the T-64 and other modified T-72 models. Other distinguishing characteristics were not noted, although it could be argued by armor experts that this vehicle could be described as an experimental T-72 that eventually led to the development of the T-80. Several other rare vehicles were on display including the Draken ATGM vehicle, SU-130 tank destroyer and a small turreted tank which fires ATGMs' through the barrel. While the museum had a tremendous amount of exhibits, they are somewhat crudely displayed, being placed in a row with a small plaque in front of each display. In all, this is probably the most complete armor collection in the world.

Lunch was at Mozhaisk and the rest of the day was spent on the bus. Arrived in Smolensk at about 2030 and all retired after a late dinner.

16 July- In the morning, the tour visited the Assumption Cathedral and the Military Museum in Smolensk. A city tour of Smolensk revealed the center of town is in better material condition than many cities we have seen. However, walking away from the tour group revealed that many of the streets in the residential areas are not paved. The housing there is also quite poor, reminiscent of rural areas. The military museum was devoted mainly to the Great Patriotic War but also had some modern military hardware, including a MiG-23 on static display. After lunch at the hotel, the group proceeded to the Smolensk fortress, where two instructors from the Frunze Academy gave a brief on the Polish siege of the city in 1609-1611. The group conducted a walk around the bastions and ramparts of the fortress, while the Frunze officers discussed the design of the fortress and how it reflected the technology of the period. They followed this with a general overview of the Polish/Lithuanian Invasion and a description of the siege of Smolensk.

In the afternoon, the officers conducted a chart briefing of the Napoleonic battle at the exact location where Marshal Ney's

forces conducted their attack on the forces. The Frunze officers very effectively combined chart briefings with a terrain walk to make the battle easily understandable. After dinner at the hotel, the group drove outside the city to see the route of advance of the German panzer forces into the city on 16 July 1941, exactly 51 years before. The Frunze officers, again with the use of charts, showed in great detail how the Russians conducted the city proper from the German 29th Panzer Division. After the bus tour, Professor Tritten agreed to talk to a LTC from the Frunze Academy on future U.S. defense policy. The LTC kept interrupting the Professor's prepared brief with questions and he could not finish his prepared presentation. The LTC repeatedly expressed his fear that GPALS could be converted into an offensive weapon system. Dmitri, our interpreter, joined the argument by pointing out that verification of weapon systems capabilities is difficult, citing how the Backfire bomber's in-flight refuelling capability can be rapidly changed as an example. Despite the officer's contrary point of view, the discussion remained friendly and cordial at all times.

17 July- After breakfast, departed for Zagorsk. Lunch again at Mohzaisk, and a visit to the Savinno- Storozhevsky monastery broke up the day. Arrived in Zagorsk late in the evening. It was especially noted that the road to Zagorsk from Moscow was the best in the whole area, as it turns out this is because the Orthodox church had a direct hand in its construction. The city itself is small but fairly clean.

Detail: A note on Mohzaisk: This afforded a good opportunity to observe life in a small town. The group ate lunch at the same restaurant each way, and while the food was good by Russian standards, the facilities were not. The restaurant has a plaza out front with a fountain and pool. No water was in the pool, and the plaza was overgrown with grass. No locals were observed eating in the restaurant on either occasion. The condition of the town was very poor with the only department store in town offering few goods and even those were at high prices for the locals.

18 July- During the morning, the group visited the churches of Zagorsk and the Vestry museum. The group was very fortunate to witness the Festival of St Sergius, the second largest religious festival at the monastery. The service was held out in the central plaza of the monastery, and led by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox church. There was a very large crowd, and after the service the Patriarch addressed and blessed the crowd from the balcony of his residence. It was especially interesting to note the large number of young monks on the grounds. We were informed that there are currently a thousand monks enrolled in the seminary, which did not even exist three years ago. Some members of the group toured a local flea-market where almost anything imaginable was for sale, from vacuum tubes for televisions to a plethora of pets and farm animals and food. The prices were high for the locals but there was no lack of business.

After lunch, the majority of the group went to Radonezh to

examine fortifications. Colonel Pyotr Fyodorovich Vashenka, chairman of the History of Military Art Department, agreed to answer our questions relating to military history. The discussion lasted several hours and was very fruitful. The Colonel answered questions about the military reforms of the 1920's and the false lessons of the Spanish civil war.

This evening an incident occurred in the dining room of the Hotel. A drunk local attempted to dance with female members of the tour group. Cpt. Jaworski interjected and told the local politely in Russian that the women were eating their dinners and did not want to be disturbed. Two of his friends retrieved him and while this was going on a member of the group attempted to get the police, but the hotel, for some reason, would not call the police, and therefore they had to be flagged down on the street. When the two militia members came in they met the two friends of the drunk and the whole group left. Less than five minutes later, the drunk appeared again and approached Cpt. Jaworski and told him he wanted to go outside and fight. Cpt. Jaworski replied that he was just a tourist eating dinner and did not want to fight anyone. The drunk then pushed Cpt. Jaworski in his chair, and when Cpt. Jaworski got up to move his chair back to the table the drunk pushed him again and then pulled a lock-blade knife out of his pocket. By this time the rest of the group stood up and grabbed the drunk and seven policeman arrived in the dining room (including the two from before). The drunk was apprehended and Cpt. Jaworski was asked to fill out a statement outside. While outside, in front of the hotel, the drunk's two friends, threatened Cpt. Jaworski by saying that they were members of the Mafia, and that no statement/charges should be made against their drunk friend. This was done in the presence of the others from the tour and the militia, with no reaction from the militia noted. Cpt. Jaworski was then walked down to the militia station because they said they didn't have the proper forms with them. At the militia station, Cpt. Jaworski waited two hours, with no statement being taken, and finally requested to be brought back to the hotel when he overheard in Russian that the drunk was an "old-time friend" of the assistant police chief. No report was ever taken from Cpt. Jaworski.

19 July- Departed for Pereslavl. Toured the city, the bank of the Plescheyevo lake, the museum of the Russian Fleet, the Pereslavl ramparts, Red Vechevaya Square, and a tour of the museum at Goritsky convent. Departed for Vladimir with accommodations and dinner there.

20 July - After breakfast toured the Assumption Cathedral, the Golden Gates, with a discussion of the Mongol Tartar invasion followed by departure for Suzdal. In Suzdal toured the monasteries and convents, and the Museum of Wooden Architecture. The latter contains a number of exhibits which show how the average Russian peasant lived into this century. After lunch departed for Rostov Veliki and had accommodations and dinner there. This was without a doubt the worst hotel many of the members have ever stayed in.

The town of Rostov was built on a swamp with a small lake located in the center of the town. The locals said the lake is so polluted that it won't freeze in the winter, and that after clothes are washed in it they quickly deteriorate. Also Cpt. Jaworski saw marks on the front steel doors of the hotel which looked like they were welded shut recently. When a hotel employee was asked about this she replied the hotel had indeed been closed for several years and was just recently reopened. The group could not be sure if the hotel was opened for the tour but this could definitely be a part of the decision since it would mean a large amount of hard currency. Even though the hotel was built less than 12 years ago it is already falling apart and seems un-repairable and will probably need to be torn down in the near future. In the past, this had been a tourist area with people being attracted by the lake, but due to the pollution, the tourist industry has collapsed. The insect problem was awful as was the food, the rooms, and everything associated with the Hotel Rostov.

21 July - After breakfast toured the monasteries on the shore of the Nero lake. Also toured the Arts Museums that featured a collection of Rostov enamels. After lunch departed for Zagorsk, where the group had dinner. After dinner departed for the Moscow train station to board the train to Kiev.

At the train station in Moscow, shortly before departure for Kiev, two Colonels from the Frunze academy and their wives, appeared to give us gifts and bid us farewell. One of them (the shorter of the two with black hair) invited Prof. Tritten and Cpt. Jaworski to visit Moscow next summer with their families for an "un-official, non-working vacation." He mentioned something about both of them being guests in the official government "dachas." We assume these are quarters reserved for the faculty and guests of the Frunze academy. Dr. Tritten replied that he already had a tentative offer from IMEMO to work in Moscow next year and was considering it. Then the Col. stated that he and Trofimenko were working on the different theories of developing the new military strategy and doctrine and would introduce Dr. Tritten to him on his next visit. Dr. Tritten responded that he already was acquainted with Trofimenko and corresponded regularly with him. Then almost as a change of thought, because time was short before our train departed, the Col said the biggest problem of the reform process currently is that the military wants it to proceed, but at a much slower and careful/cautious pace, while the civilian leaders want to move ahead too quickly and this can be very dangerous. We then shook hands and departed by train to Kiev.

This Colonel was one of the several officers we met that said there are many parallels between the 1924-25 reform and the reform process that is currently ongoing. He also explained the key difference between military reform and military reorganization. These ideas were almost the same as those expressed by the deputy director of the IMH General Har'kov.

The train ride to Kiev was uneventful and we all felt safe as there were much better locks on the doors to the rooms, and decided

not to post a watch outside the cabins.

22 July - Arrived in Kiev and were met at the train station by the local tour guides, who immediately impressed us with their efficiency. The group now had an air-conditioned bus and on the way to the hotel the tour guides told us a little about the city and passed out tourist maps of the city. We were all very impressed with the appearance of Kiev and the attitude of the population. Ukraine looked much better than Russia and the appearance/cleanliness of the country combined with the attitude of the people made it an enjoyable stay. Here LT Stanley, LT McIlmail and Cpt Jaworski met several businessmen from Europe and America, and they all said that joint-ventures in Ukraine are very profitable, but that wasn't the case in Russia. In sum, Ukraine appeared to be hard at work to integrate itself into the European community.

After a late breakfast there was a tour of the city followed by a visit to the Museum Kosoi Kaponir, Kiev-Pechersky Fortress, and the Museum of World War II. After lunch, there was a meeting with the staffs and cadets of the Vasilevsky Air Defense Military Academy of the Ground Forces, with a tour of the Academy's museum. At night a joint banquet was held at the hotel with the officers of the Academy.

23 July - After breakfast departed for the Lutezhsky springboard for attack to force a crossing over Dnieper river and a tour of the museum. The museum at Lutezhsky was interesting and the museum guide gave a very interesting and detailed account of the battle to liberate Kiev in November 1943. The guide stressed the use of maskirovka; a whole Russian tank army moved from the Bukhrin bridgehead to the Lutezhsky bridgehead at night without the use of headlights. Decoy groups were used extensively to mask this movement. The guide also pointed out the capture of Kiev was driven primarily by political not military concerns. Stalin wanted Kiev in Russian hands by the anniversary of the revolution and this led to a large loss of life in a hasty attack.

After lunch there was a tour of the city with a visit to the State History of the Ukraine Museum, the fortification structure "The Golden Gates" (XIth century), St. Sofia Cathedral, St. Andrew's church and St. Andrew's slope. Some members of the group toured the city with an emphasis on the social aspects of day to day life in Kiev. The local stores appear to have plenty of goods and food did not appear to be a problem either. After dinner at the hotel our group bid farewell to the remaining members of the tour who were continuing south by train to Dnepropetrovsk. We stayed in the hotel for the night.

24 July - After breakfast our group packed our luggage for the trip back and did some last minute shopping. We were taken to the airport by the tour company for the fee of \$20.00 per person. At the airport everything went smoothly except that Cpt. Jaworski had two Soviet medals confiscated by Customs. Both medals were found

during the X-raying of his luggage, and he was given a receipt for them which entitled him to claim them within three years and give them to someone in Ukraine. The customs officials were much more alert and attentive than the ones in St. Petersburg, one more small sign of the improvements in Ukraine vice Russia. Also none of us had purchased a Ukrainian visa and we thought this might cause some problems for our departure. Dr. Tritten explained to the authorities, at one of the many checkpoints in the airport, that we had only been in the country for two days. The authorities had no steadfast rule about visas and said that since it was such a short time we didn't need visas. This appeared to us that the laws concerning visas is not really worked out yet in Ukraine. We departed Kiev on Lufthansa and landed in Frankfurt where we spent the night at the Ramada Inn. We were all very grateful to be back in the West with all the conveniences we were accustomed to.

25 July - We departed on Delta non-stop from Frankfurt to Los Angeles, where we transferred to a small plane for the connection to our destination at Monterey. We were once again happy to be back home.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

4613TH ADVERSARY THREAT TRAINING GROUP (TAC)

NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE NV 89181-5000

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: THOA

SUBJECT: Trip Report - Quality of Analysis (Q of A)-funded Trip to Russia and Ukraine

TO: HQ ACC/TN/INX

7 Sep 92

1. Purpose. This trip report is in response to a Q of A-funded trip to Russia and Ukraine, covering the dates of 2 Jul 92 - 25 Jul 92. My participation on the trip was as a student of Russian studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Additionally, I had just completed the Russian Basic Language Course at the Defense Language Institute. The purpose of my trip was to experience, first hand, the evolving social, political, economic, and military changes taking place in the former Soviet Union, as well as to exercise my language skills. I feel that I succeeded in achieving my stated purpose.

2. Itinerary. See attachment.

3. Discussion. The trip was organized by John Sloan Enterprises in coordination with the Russian Military History Institute. The tour group consisted primarily of Americans and a smaller contingent of foreigners from Great Britain, Sweden, and two individuals from Taiwan. The primary reason for the tour was military historical research; consequently, the itinerary was heavily slanted towards military historical sites, fortresses, ramparts, battlefields, and military museums of Soviet and Russian Empire eras.

As readily apparent after a quick examination of the itinerary, the tour was conducted at a very fast pace. We visited numerous cities, and, to say the least, covered a great distance. We traveled primarily by bus, but had two overnight train rides. I feel that the bus travel was beneficial in that it enabled us to see, up-close, the Russian countryside and rural areas. This gave us a better appreciation for the country and a sense for how most Russians really live. My personal objectives were to see as much Russian history and culture as possible, but also witness the rapid social changes taking place in the countries. Additionally, a primary objective of mine was to exercise my language skills by conversing, in Russian, as much as possible. In short, I wanted to absorb as much as I possibly could about the country which I had studied for the past two years. My plan of attack for achieving my objectives was to carefully chose those scheduled tour activities in which I wanted to participate as well as develop my own sightseeing itinerary along with two other "area specialist" Air Force officers.

Our arrival point was St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad). Because it was my first time in Russia, I was not sure what to expect; however, I was shocked by the level of backwardness. St. Petersburg Airport, one of the major entry points especially for Western foreigners, resembled a rural, run-down and outdated airport. As an aside, the baggage claim area was rather humorous. There was no mechanized system of luggage handling. The system consisted of a small hole in the wall of the terminal through which two workers passed luggage and placed it onto a small shelf. At that point, travelers had to fight through crowds of other travelers to search for their pieces of luggage. From that point, travelers attempted to proceed through customs. We finally made it to our hotel after approximately 25 hours of traveling.

We spent four days in St. Petersburg. It is truly a beautiful city with many spectacular historical sights. I did my best to see all of them; in particular, the Hermitage (i.e. the Winter Palace), Peter's Summer Palace, Saint Isaac's Cathedral, the Peter and Paul Fortress, the Admiralty, and numerous military collections in various museums. Of note, we toured Khronstadt Fortress which was formerly prohibited to

Americans. Additionally, one of the highlights for me was an evening which we spent at the Kirov Theater watching a ballet. We also went to a symphony another evening.

As most foreigners note, the subway system is extremely impressive. The subways are truly museums in and of themselves. They had spectacular chandeliers and murals on arched ceilings and, surprisingly, no graffiti. Given the desperate state of the country, I expected to see dirty subways and a general lack of order but was surprised at least when it came to the subways. There was, however, a general lack of order in the city. The buildings had a drab look about them—a general state of decay from no maintenance. Russians noted to me in conversation that although the buildings were beautiful, they looked "tired", and that "ten years ago they looked so much better." It occurred to me that the older generation longed for a return to communism because there was "order" in those days.

We had the unfortunate circumstance of being victims of crime our first night in St. Petersburg. One of the individuals on our trip was robbed in his hotel room while he was sleeping. As a result, we learned an early lesson about the extremely high level of crime especially directed against foreigners. There was and is a large and growing Mafia in St. Petersburg. Not surprisingly, the high level of crime corresponded with the general lack of order in addition to the desperate living conditions.

All in all, St. Petersburg was and is a wonderful city filled with history and culture and, as such, requires more than four days to experience; in fact, the Hermitage itself takes more than four days. Our stay in St. Petersburg, however, provided me with the basic knowledge about the city and I know that I will return one day.

From St. Petersburg, we drove to the medieval city of Pskov. In place of touring the ramparts and fortress at Pskov, I opted to tour the breathtaking monastery in Pechera which recently became operational for religious services. I had the opportunity to experience a Russian Orthodox mass. We only spent one day in Pskov and moved on to Narva which is actually in Estonia.

On the way to Narva, we visited the Novgorodian fortress at Kipor'ye (12th century), and then continued on to the rival fortresses of Ivangorod and Novgorod. The Novgorod fortress located in Narva, Estonia, had been recently renovated which presented an embarrassing contrast to the neighboring fortress in Russia. Furthermore, the lunch we ate in Estonia that afternoon was the best we had on the entire trip. Also of note, we had to purchase visas to enter Estonia which solidified their stand on being an independent nation.

From Narva, we took the overnight train to Moscow. My first impression of Moscow was not positive. I immediately felt the effects of widespread pollution. The air was filthy and actually hurt my lungs to breathe. At first glance, there was no charm to Moscow as there had been in St. Petersburg, however, Red Square and the Kremlin certainly held a captivating appeal. We spent a total of five days in Moscow which were filled from morning to night. I spent my days in Moscow touring the Kremlin and Red Square and its many cathedrals and museums. Additionally, I spent a lot of time touring art galleries. The most impressive event for me was the tour of the Armory in Red Square which holds an enormous collection of crown jewels, carriages, coronation wardrobes of Russian tsars and tsarinas, silverware, china, and a beautiful collection of Faberge eggs—certainly too much to absorb in one visit. We took a day trip to the Aviation museum outside of Moscow and saw a rather comprehensive collection of Soviet aircraft from the inception of aviation history in Russia. Of note, we saw a piece of Gary Powers U-2.

In Moscow, I had the opportunity to have dinner with a Russian family. A professor of mine from the Naval Postgraduate School was researching in Moscow, and invited me to have dinner with his Russian landlords. This was a very valuable experience because they spoke no English which "forced" me to fully exercise my language abilities. I found that I could communicate very well and comprehend fairly deep subjects in Russian. I feel that this experience gave me a better understanding of the Russians. The wife communicated to me that Russians are the way they are, that is, "passive", because they learned to be under communism. Their feeling is that if something isn't right, settle for something else, versus

resolving the problem. She said that this extends to every level of society and is deeply ingrained in their minds. It was a very powerful and sad commentary on the state of affairs in the country.

From Moscow, we drove to Smolensk (a lengthy drive of eight hours) and viewed wonderful scenes of the Russian countryside. It is commonly known that the Russian transportation infrastructure, in particular, the roads, are substandard—our experience only reinforced that. Smolensk was also a very dirty city and much poorer than Moscow. It had fewer goods available and the people were more disheveled and desperate. Smolensk had a very dreary aura about it. We toured Smolensk for a day and then traveled back to the Moscow area the next day.


For the next five days we traveled around the Moscow area visiting numerous cities of the Golden Ring. More specifically, we visited Zagorsk, Rostov, Vladimir, and Suzdal. These are very old, beautiful, and picturesque cities which comprise a major tourist route. I saw more breathtaking monasteries than I ever believed could exist. We received guided tours of these cities, lectures regarding their involvement in the Mongol campaigns, and toured numerous fortifications and cathedrals. Our tour during these days was very exhausting as we were spending only one night at each of the cities and moving on early the next day.

Finally, we entered the last leg of our tour as we departed to Kiev on the overnight train from Moscow. We spent two days in Kiev and from first sight, our impression was very positive. Kiev had a more uplifting aura about it in comparison to Russia. There was a noticeably more Western orientation to it; there were signs and advertisements in Ukrainian/English and Ukrainian/German showing the presence of joint ventures. Goods appeared more readily available, and the food was considerably better. People smiled more and seemed more proud of their country. People were also more politicized. One night a group of us went across the street from our hotel and listened to a large gathering of men who were openly discussing the current political environment in Ukraine. I felt that this was a positive sign on the road to free speech and democracy.

Kiev was an absolutely beautiful city which we toured diligently and with pleasure. We toured the Ukrainian State History Museum and our guide was a Ukrainian retired General. We also toured the Percheski fortress. The second day, we received a guided tour of the city and its many cathedrals and monasteries. In the afternoon, a small group of us, led by our professor from the Naval Postgraduate School, met with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense for Training. He was very interested in officer professional development and how our officers receive follow-on education.

4. Suggestions. I have one suggestion for future area specialist travelers; namely, I suggest that individuals do not travel in large tour groups. The problem is that there are too many people with too many different agendas. Additionally, traveling with a large group of Americans highlights the group as Americans. This serves to either intimidate people or highlight the group as a target for crime. It also limits the amount of language practice.

5. Conclusion. This trip was, without question, a wonderful, valuable, unforgettable, and irreplaceable experience. I believe that touring the country is the only way to acquire a true flavor and understanding of the country and people which an analyst studies, and is the perfect end to two years of intensive study. I feel that I have a more complete understanding of the history and culture of Russia, as well as the current political mood. This trip has enabled me to more accurately and confidently do my job as a "Former Soviet Union" analyst. In these times of budget cuts, I believe that this program should not be eliminated; it simply provides too many returns for the amount of money it costs. There is no replacement for this in-country experience!



EVELYNE M. CONLON, Capt, USAF
Analyst, Former Soviet Union

cc: HQ USAF/TNRF

ITINERARY: TRIP TO RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, 2 - 25 JUL 92

2 Jul 92: Depart Monterey, CA for St. Petersburg

3 Jul 92: Arrive St. Petersburg

3 - 7 Jul 92: Tour St. Petersburg and Khronstadt

8 - 9 Jul 92: Tour Pskov and Narva

10 - 14 Jul 92: Tour Moscow and area

15 - 16 Jul 92: Tour Smolensk

17 - 18 Jul 92: Tour Zagorsk

19 Jul 92: Tour Vladimir

20 Jul 92: Tour Rostov

21 Jul 92: Tour Suzdal

22 - 24 Jul 92: Tour Kiev, Ukraine


FROM: Capt Warwick [comm (301) 688-8768]
NSA/H228 Fort Meade, Md 20755
SUBJ: Quality of Analysis Trip Report
To Russia and Ukraine, 2 Jul - 25 Jul 92
TO: HQ USAF/INRF

20 Aug 92

1. The intent of this report is to provide your office with details of the Quality of Analysis funded trip to Russia and Ukraine by Captain Jay J. Warwick, 261-13-8936. Attached you will find a summary of the excursion, complete with all recommendations and lessons learned.

2. At the onset of this trip, I had set two professional goals. The first was to learn as much as possible, by first-hand experience, about the present condition of Russian society. This was especially important given the extra-ordinary events occurring in the country during the past two years and my concurrent, in-depth study of those events, as a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. The second was to use and refine my newly-acquired language skills in "every day" situations such as ordering a meal, taking a taxi, asking directions, or making a telephone call. These goals were of primary importance and concurrent with the historical research nature of the trip as designed by the trip organizer, LTC John Sloan, U.S. Army (Retired), and concurrent with the discussion of more purely military matters, with our hosts, the Russian Military History Institute and the Ukrainian Air Defense Academy, which were presented to your office in my 3 Apr 92 application. Despite some small problems due to the current deterioration of economic conditions in Russia and the large size and related conflicting research goals of tour members, all of my personal and professional research goals were fully met. More precisely, this trip made it possible for me to personally appreciate a portion of Russian life, about which I could previously only vaguely comprehend. As such, it was an invaluable experience which could not have been obtained from a textbook. With some minor precautions, I believe future participants will enjoy a similar experience. I highly recommend this program for all qualified applicants.

3. I again thank your office for making this trip possible.


JAY J. WARWICK
Captain, USAF

- 3 Atch's
1. Itinerary
2. Synopsis & summary
Tab 1 Prof. Tritten's
notes, 23 Jul mtg.
3. Observations and
lessons learned

DETAILED ITINERARY

2 Jul	0800	Departure from Monterey, Ca
3 Jul	1830	Arrival in St. Petersburg, check in and dinner at Hotel Moscow
4 Jul	1000	Bus tour of city; tour of the Peter and Paul Fortress with group
	1330	Lunch at hotel with group
	1430	Self tour of the city; walk along Nevsky Prospekt with 3 group members
	1900	Dinner at hotel with group
5 Jul	0930	Breakfast at hotel with group
	1030	Tour of the Hermitage with group
	1300	Lunch with group
	1400	Bus trip to Kronstadt Naval Facility with group; bus tour of Kronstadt; dinner at Kronstadt hosted by deputy mayor of city
6 Jul	0800	Breakfast at hotel with group
	0900	Departure for waterfront; boat to Czar's Summer Palace with 3 group members
	1500	Return to hotel
	2000	Attended symphony orchestra in Petersburg
7 Jul	0900	Breakfast at hotel with group
	1000	Return to Nevsky Prospekt to continue walking tour with 2 group members
	1400	Return to Hermitage; continue tour
	1900	Attended the Kirov Ballet
8 Jul	0700	Early breakfast with group
	0800	Group departed St. Petersburg for Pskov
	1015	Arrival at the Fortresses of Ivangorod/Narva; tour of the fortresses
	1430	Lunch in Narva
	1600	Departure for Pskov by bus
	1900	Arrival in Pskov
	1930	Dinner at Hotel Pskov
9 Jul	0730	Breakfast at Hotel Pskov
	0830	Tour of monastery 50 KM from Pskov with group
	1130	Arrival back at Pskov; tour of Pskov Fortress
	1230	Departure for Novgorod by bus
	1545	Arrival in Novgorod by bus
	1600	Tour of the city and Fortress of Novgorod by bus with group
	1900	Dinner at Intourist Hotel in Novgorod
	2000	Departure for Novgorod train station
	2045	Train departed from Novgorod for Moscow

10 Jul 0730 Arrival in Moscow by train
0830 Check-in at the Academy of Sciences Hotel and breakfast
1000 Departed with group for the Aviation Museum in Monino
1040 Arrived in Monino and toured museum
1345 Departed Monino with group for hotel
1430 Lunch; rested at hotel
1800 Dinner at hotel
1900 Attended the Moscow Circus with group

11 Jul 0930 Toured the Kremlin; Lenin's tomb, the Kremlin wall, G.U.M.'s with 2 members of group
1500 Lunch at Pizza Hut
1600 Tour of the Arbat Market with 2 members of group
2000 Dinner at hotel with group

12 Jul 0800 Rest at hotel until noon
1200 Walking tour of city near Lenin Stadium with 1 member of group
1400 Return to Red Square and toured St. Basil's Cathedral
1800 Dinner at McDonald's with 5 members of group

13 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel
1000 Tour and walk through Children's World
1200 Lunch near Red Square with 1 member of group
1300 Return to G.U.M.'s
1915 Banquet at the Russian Military History Institute

14 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel
0900 Walk through Gorky Park with 2 members of group
1100 Tour of Modern Art Gallery across from Gorky Park with 2 members of group
1300 Return to Arbat Market with 2 members of group
1500 Met with Naval Postgraduate School Professor Roman Laba at hotel
1900 Attended theatre in downtown Moscow
2100 Dinner at McDonald's

15 Jul 0800 Breakfast with group
0900 Departed Moscow for Smolensk with group by bus
1100 Toured Armour Museum in Kubinka with group while enroute to Smolensk
1400 Lunch with group
1900 Arrival to hotel in Smolensk and dinner

16 Jul	0800	Breakfast at hotel with group
	0900	Bus tour of city with a visit to the Assumption Cathedral and the museum of World War II with group
	1300	Lunch at hotel with group
	1400	Rest at hotel
	1800	Walking tour of Smolensk; visited market square, took bus to edge of town with 1 member of group
17 Jul	0800	Breakfast with group
	0900	Departure from Smolensk with group by bus to Zagorsk
	1300	Lunch in Mozhaisk with group
	1600	A tour of Zvenigorod with a visit to the Savino-Storozhevsky Monastery
	1900	Accommodations and dinner in Zagorsk
18 Jul	0830	Breakfast at hotel with group
	1000	A tour of the Vestry Museum with group
	1100	Attendance of Russian Orthodox Service with group
	1220	A tour of the Architecture of Trinity Sergius Monastery with group
	1400	Lunch
	1500	Rest at hotel
	1830	Dinner at hotel with group
	1900	Walking tour of city with 1 member of group
19 Jul	0800	Breakfast at hotel with group
	0900	Departure for Pereslavl by bus with group
	1030	Toured the City of Pereslavl, the bank of the Plescheyevo Lake, the Museum of Russian Fleet, the Pereslavl Ramparts, Red Vechevaya Square and a tour of the Museum at the Goritsky Convent with group
	1430	Lunch with group
	1530	Departure for Vladimir by bus with group
	1900	Arrival, accommodations and dinner Vladimir
20 Jul	0800	Breakfast at hotel with group in Vladimir
	0900	A tour of the Assumption Cathedral, The Golden Gates, and discussion of the Mongol Tartar Invasion
	1000	Departure for Suzdal by bus with group
	1030	Arrival in Suzdal with group, tour monasteries and convents, The Museum of Wooden Architecture
	1530	Lunch in Suzdal with group
	1630	Departure for Rostov
	1930	Arrived at Rostov

21 Jul 0800 Breakfast at Hotel with group
0900 Tour of the monasteries on the shore of Nero Lake with group
1000 Tour of the art museums featuring the Collection of Rostov Enamels with group
1300 Lunch with group
1400 Departure for Zagorsk by bus with group
1700 Arrival and dinner in Zagorsk
1800 Departed Zagorsk for Moscow
2000 Arrival in Moscow to board night train for Kiev
2100 Train departed for Kiev

22 Jul 0910 Arrived in Kiev
1100 Breakfast, followed by a tour of the city with a visit to the Museum "Kosoi Kaponir", "Kiev-Pechersky Fortress" and the Museum of World War II
1600 Lunch with group
1730 Met with staff of Valilevsky Air Defense Military Academy, a tour of the Academy's museum
2030 Joint banquet with the staff of the Academy with group

23 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel with group
1000 Observed meeting between Professor James Tritten and the Director for Military Training and Education, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
1400 Lunch with group
1500 A tour of the city by bus with group
1900 Dinner at hotel with group

24 Jul 1100 Departed Kiev for Frankfurt, Ger.

25 Jul 1130 Departed Frankfurt, Ger. for Monterey, Ca.

SYNOPSIS AND SUMMARY

The trip involved participation in an international group tour sponsored by the Russian Military History Institute, authorized by their Chief of the General Staff. The tour was executed by the joint venture, ASK Tours, with LTC John Sloan, USA (Ret) acting as principal agent in the U.S. Participants included academics and active and retired officers from Finland, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. According to each of the tour participants themselves, virtually all of them were currently or previously associated with various intelligence services.

2-3 July (Thursday-Friday): FLIGHT TO ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA.

The flight into Russia was very uneventful, except for a slight delay on the ground in Frankfurt, Germany. Upon arrival in St. Petersburg, we immediately noticed the inefficiency characteristic of many operations in Russia. In particular, receiving operations for ourselves and our luggage were very confusing. St. Petersburg, a city of 5 million inhabitants, has an airport comparable to a U.S. city of 50,000. There was only 1 baggage claim belt in the entire airport and passengers from several flights (a few hundred people) all converged on it at once when our group needed to pick up our luggage. Passing through customs was surprisingly simple and we were met by LTC John Sloan, USA (Ret.) organizer of the participants of the tour. Met also by Valentine Navara, co-leader of the St. Petersburg portion of the tour.

Our first dinner included the Commanding Officer of the Artillery, Engineering, and Signal Troops Museum and the Naval Museum. The Artillery Museum Commander, Yevgeny Nikolaievich Karchagan gave a short welcoming speech and the Commander of the Naval Museum, a Captain 1st Rank, said nothing. I had no personal contact with either of them. During this time, two members of the ASK Tours Staff, Maxim and Dmitriy Alekseyevich Ivanov, were introduced. These two were to remain with us for the remainder of the tour. That evening, LT Scott Stanley, USN, one of our tour participants, was robbed in his room while he and his roommate were sleeping. A police report was filed the next day in the hotel and at a police substation near the hotel.

4 July (Saturday): ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA

Tour group visited the Artillery Engineering and Troops Museum. After a small introduction of the staff in the Museum's courtyard, approximately 10 members of the group were given the opportunity to tour the Peter and Paul Fortress, which was just across the street. This tour was conducted by Valentine Navara. The Fortress contains the graves of the majority of the Czars, including Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. The Fortress, for the most part, was in pristine condition, and is considered one of the most important landmarks in St. Petersburg, although a small portion of the interior was under repairs and some scaffolding had been erected. Scaffolding was quite a common sight in every city we visited. In the afternoon, I took a

walking tour of Nevsky Prospekt with 3 other members of the group. St. Petersburg is a city of striking contrasts. The architecture along the main avenue of St. Petersburg is the most stunning I have experienced: majestic cathedrals and domed churches, beautiful, ornately decorated exteriors on almost all buildings. I am sure at one time this city could proudly claim to be a showcase of Europe. Currently, however, the entire city is in shambles. Motionless construction cranes dot the skyline. The effects of dirt and pollution are everywhere: on the streets, on the sides of the buildings, and on the cars and busses. Much of the city is in disrepair: many, many windows of the buildings along the streets were broken out, there was uncollected trash along the streets, which were full of pot holes. Everywhere people asked for our business: to change money, to buy a Soviet military uniform hat, a book, or a painting. Everyone is desperate for hard currency in a way that reminded me very much of the Phillipines or Korea.

5 July (Sunday): ST. PETERSBURG WITH DAY TOUR TO KHONSTADT NAVAL BASE

Toured Hermitage in the morning. It was unbelievably beautiful. There was art from every well-known artist in the world. What was extra ordinary to me was the remarkable condition of each painting or sculpture despite no protection from the public, and despite survival of the 1917 revolution and siege by the Germans during World War II. In the afternoon, I accompanied the tour group to Khronstadt Naval Base. Enroute, we went through the industrial center of St. Petersburg. It does not appear to be in good shape. We noted on this leg and subsequently that none of the smokestacks in the city (or elsewhere in Russia) are "smoking". We also went over a major water project between Khronstadt and the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland. We learned that it had been delayed due to cost overruns. Khronstadt has been a closed city and was specially opened up for our tour. Special permission was needed and had been obtained. Like most areas in Russia, the entire base was in extremely poor disrepair and it appeared that routine maintenance had not been accomplished in quite a long period of time. At a reception in the Officers Club, the City's Deputy Mayor introduced himself to us. I had no personal contact with him. In port, I noticed several surface ships, the only one of which I could recognize was an ice-breaker.

6 July (Monday) ST. PETERSBURG

With three other members of the tour group, decided to tour the Czar's Summer Palace, which was a 20-minute hydrofoil ride across the bay. At the dock, we met a 19-year old woman named Mariana, who offered to be our tour guide. The grounds surrounding the palace were beautiful, decorated with many fountains. We were not able to go inside the Palace due to repairs. Mariana was an excellent guide. We talked mainly of her life in Petersburg and the bad economic conditions under which the city is suffering. That evening, we decided to attend the symphony orchestra near the Hotel Europe. After our return, we were informed that there had been another theft incident, this time involving John Sloan,

and that Professor James Tritten, leader of our contingency from Monterey, would go to the American consulate the next day to file a report. He gave us the option of leaving, but we wanted to continue the tour, and redoubled our efforts to avoid becoming the objects of robbery.

7 July (Tuesday) ST. PETERSBURG

I and 3 other members of the group continued our walking tour of Nevsky Prospekt and in the afternoon went back to the Hermitage. After dinner, we attended the Kirov Ballet. It was most extraordinary and very well done. The hall was inlaid with gold and was a stark contrast to the poor conditions on the street.

8 July (Wednesday) DAY TRIP TO NARVA, ESTONIA AND OVERNIGHT IN PSKOV, RUSSIA.

We visited two ancient fortresses right across the river from each other at Ivangorod, Russia and Narva, Estonia. I got the general impression that the people in Estonia are generally better off than in Russia and wished to keep it that way. The food was better, the condition of the museum was better than across the river, and the town was cleaner. We then drove over some extremely bad roads to Pskov. Upon entering the city, many, many churches were apparent. The central Kremlin Fortress was especially magnificent. The accommodations, however, in the Hotel Pskov were deplorable.

9 July (Thursday) DAY TRIP OUTSIDE PSKOV TO PRESKERISKY MONASTERY, RUSSIA; DRIVE TO NOVGOROD, RUSSIA AND TRAIN TO MOSCOW.

We drove to Novgorod on bad roads. Learned that the city was virtually wiped from the face of the map by the Germans during the Great Patriotic War, and was totally resettled after the war. We took the night train to Moscow and posted guards during the night and wired the doors of our compartments shut.

10 July (Friday) MOSCOW AND DAY TRIP TO MONINO

Arrived and met by Military Historical Institute staff Colonels Vitaliy Bogdanov and Slava Terekhov and Senior Lieutenant or Captain Aleksandr Fedoseyev. Also, two young translators were introduced, Anatoliy Kamyshnikov and Nikolay Zubchok and was told they were cadets in what was parallel to our Defense Language Institute.

Taken to the Air Force Museum at Monino. This was very exciting to me because every conceivable Soviet fighter jet was on display from the Mig-15 to the SU-27. During the tour, Captain Evie Conlon and I were approached by two gentlemen who said that they were from "Soviet Soldier" magazine and asked if we would mind if they asked us a few questions for an article in the magazine. One of the gentlemen had a small tape recorder with him and recorded our conversation. He asked us where we had been, and what we had seen and our overall impression of Russia. He then asked us our professions in the military, to which we responded that we were students. These two gentlemen departed and asked a few questions of some of the other tour members. I noted

that these same two gentlemen were present at a banquet held by the Military History Institute for us a few days later and assumed that they were part of their staff. They were in civilian clothes the entire time I saw them. That evening, I attended the Moscow Circus with the tour. It was apparent to me that a lot of the performance was geared toward a western audience, because a lot of the background music was recognizably American.

11 July (Saturday) MOSCOW

I and two other members of the group toured Moscow by foot to include the Kremlin, Red Square, Lenin's Tomb, The Kremlin Wall, The State Department Store, and the Arbat District. Moscow itself seems to be in the same state of disrepair as St. Petersburg, without the beautiful architecture. The greatest shock to me was the open display of pornography in the subways, and at the bookstands. It appears to me that Moscow society (and perhaps most of the larger cities in Russia) are in the midst of a sexual revolution much the same as the United States was in the 1960's. This was reinforced in my mind by the revealing dress of the younger women we encountered on the street. This, in addition to the crime we had already seen, makes me believe that many of the negative features of western culture is being introduced along with the good ones, and in some circumstances, is taking precedence.

There appeared to be many, many Americans at the Kremlin, and Russians seemed to be accommodating that reality. Several young boys came up to us to ask us if we wanted to buy books of the Kremlin and Moscow, and several young women asked us if we wanted to pay for a guided tour of the Kremlin. We declined. Lenin's Tomb was still open to the public and we stood in a surprisingly short 20-minute line to see his body. Once we entered, the posted guards kept whispering to all the people in line to be quiet, underscoring the fact that this was still a place of reverence, despite all that has happened. This was very surprising to all of us. However, the real activity was at the Arbat, a 2-mile stretch of open market place. Anything and everything was for sale, watches, Soviet uniforms, art and communist memorabilia. It was very apparent that this place was for westerners, with Russians selling their goods for hard currency.

12 July (Sunday) MOSCOW

I and one other member of the group toured an open-air market, stretching around Lenin Stadium. This was clearly a market for Russians, not westerners. A line of people selling their goods stretched toward and around the stadium as far as the eye could see. Such common sights were: an old woman selling a single tube of lipstick or a single pair of shoes; a man selling motor oil, bathroom fixtures, or a starter from a car; or a couple selling western-style clothes. The crowd was massive and we saw some uniformed police patrolling the area, apparently to keep order.

In the afternoon, we returned to Red Square, and took a self tour of St. Basil's Cathedral.

13 July (Monday) MOSCOW

I and one other member of the group toured Children's World, a well-known department store for children. It seemed typical for most of the established stores we encountered: a combination of disorganization and mismanagement. In order to make a purchase, one first had to calculate how much you needed to spend, then get in a line to pay the cashier. It was necessary to go to certain cashiers for certain sections of the store. Then, it was necessary to get in another line and present your receipt for your purchase. This took an extraordinary amount of time if there was a long line. Another striking feature of this store was its enormity (4 floors) and the duplication of effort on each of the floors and between floors. For example, one could find the same item on opposing counters only 20 feet across from each other and on differing floors, with no apparent ordering to help in finding the item. We had lunch at a restaurant not far from Red Square, with a Russian woman who spoke no English and was the chief of a pharmacy. She was accompanying a German man who was an oil excavator and was working in the Urals. He appeared to be wealthy and had hired the woman to be his interpreter (she spoke German). She told us how bad conditions were in her hometown in the Urals, and how the Mafia had completely taken control of her city. She said she could never get a sufficient supply of drugs and that it was necessary to pay off the Mafia each month in order to prevent the burning down of her pharmacy. She also mentioned the fact that Moscow was full of businessmen from the west and how it was almost impossible for her, as a Russian citizen, to get a hotel room in the city without being in the company of a westerner who could pay hard currency. After lunch, we briefly returned to the State Department Store, and then attended a banquet at the Russian Military History Institute. The dinner was pleasant, with the best food we had yet received in Moscow. Dinner was interrupted several times with toasts, many, many of which by the Russians were centered around the Great Patriotic War. This speaks to the very very great emotional tie they still feel toward this era. Almost no mention was made of the present time, or the activities which had occurred in the past 2 years.

14 July (Tuesday) MOSCOW

I and two other members of the group took a walking tour through Gorky Park and an adjacent art gallery. We returned briefly to the Arbat District in the early afternoon. In late afternoon, we met with Professor Roman Laba, a former professor of ours at the Naval Postgraduate School, who is currently doing research in Moscow. One of the most interesting outcomes of this meeting was that we talked about the reason why there appeared to be very few homeless people in the streets, and why lines in the food stores were non existent, a fact which many of us noticed. Professor Laba indicated that conditions are currently so bad, that no one has money to pay the recently elevated prices for food, and that there is very little homelessness in Moscow, but still the practice of two or three or more families living in a single apartment. Therefore, the majority of the down and out spend practically 100% of their incomes for food and stay indoors, because they do not have anything left to spend on venturing out,

and are out of the public eye. I and one other member from the tour attended a local theatre performance in the evening, near the center of the city.

15 July (Wednesday) BUS RIDE TO SMOLENSK.

Bus ride to Smolensk was uneventful. Enroute, we went to the Armor Museum in Kubinka which is not open to Russian citizens. There was almost a full division worth of foreign and domestic armor --380 vehicles. We arrived in Smolensk by early evening.

16 July (Thursday) SMOLENSK

We toured the museum of the Armed Forces and the Great Patriotic War, the Cathedral of the Ascension, and the city walls. During the late afternoon, I and one other member of the group took a walking tour of the city and a bus ride to the edge of town and back. We walked around the local farmer's market near the center of the city. The quality of the fruits and vegetables was very, very poor and the stench of rotten food was quite overwhelming. A woman, from whom we had asked directions on the street, told us that the quality of food in Smolensk was once one of the finest in Russia, because the city was in a direct line between the Baltic ports and Georgia and as such, enjoyed being on a major trade route between the two areas. Since the dissolution of the union, however they haven't seen the good quality anymore.

17 July (Friday) BUS RIDE TO ZAGORSK

Two of my colleagues from the postgraduate school decided they wanted to take the train to Zagorsk, instead of our chartered bus. The Russian tour guides got very upset at this, saying that they were responsible for us. The leader of the postgraduate school contingent, Professor James Tritten, suggested the problem could be solved by picking them up at the train station, as they had not left yet. This was accomplished, but the entire bus ride to Zagorsk was tense over this event. Apparently, one of the Russian tour guides later approached Professor Tritten and said that another deviation from the program schedule would result in another incident that would be unfavorable to both the U.S. and Russian Governments. Professor Tritten later briefed all of us not to make anymore deviations from the tour, despite a clear understanding from the organizers of the tour by all from the Monterey contingent that such deviations were acceptable. Upon our arrival in Zagorsk, we were met by Colonels Bogdanov and Tereditov and Captain Vartanov, who provided some of the tour group with copies of papers and books that they had requested.

18 July (Saturday) ZAGORSK

Day tour of local fortifications and working monastery in Zagorsk. The tour attended an outdoor church ceremony conducted by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. A few thousand Russian and Ukrainian pilgrims had sojourned to Zagorsk to be there on this day. The ceremony was quite spectacular. After lunch and some rest, I and another member of the group took a short walking tour about the city. While I and my colleague were taking this walk, an incident occurred in the hotel restaurant

involving an active duty female U.S. Army Officer from our group (LTC Diane Smith, stationed in England) an apparent drunk local from the city, and another member from our group, CPT Jim Jaworski, USA. Because of this incident, Professor Jim Tritten made a decision, after talking with our embassy in Moscow, for the Monterey contingent to come home early. The next day, he was apparently told by the tour directors that such a change in our flying schedule could not be made on such a short term notice, and that we would need to continue with the group until our scheduled departure in Kiev. This is what we did.

19 July (Sunday) VLADIMIR

The tour spent most of the day on the bus, stopping for visits in Pereslavl, the bank of the Plescheyevo Lake, the Museum of the Russian Fleet, the Pereslavl Ramparts, Red Garitsky convent. The group arrived in Vladimir by evening.

20 July (Monday) BUS RIDE TO ROSTOV

Bus tour of the countryside north and northeast of Moscow with two new Frunze instructors. These were later most likely identified as LTC's Yurly Gordyeiv and Anatoliy Myzdrikov. I had no contact with either of them. We toured the city of Vladimir by bus and then departed for Suzdal. The bus ride was approximately 40 minutes. Suzdal is a small town of approximately 12,000 that is known for its museum of wooden architecture. It took approximately 2 hours to see the town. We reboarded the bus and drove to Rostov. The accommodations at Rostov were absolutely deplorable. Roaches and mosquitoes were everywhere. Several rooms had no electricity, and all had no hot water and were missing light bulbs. The hotel looked as if it had been deserted for several decades and I was absolutely shocked to hear that it had been built in 1980. I also heard that the lake near the city was so polluted that it turned people's skin black when they tried to bathe or swim in it and that it would not freeze in winter. The city itself looked like what I imagine Post-World-War-II Berlin did just after the war. It was very depressing.

21 July (Tuesday) BUS RIDE TO MOSCOW AND TRAIN TO KIEV.

Uneventful passage to Kiev. We did not post guards this time since it seemed that the locks on the compartment doors were safe.

22 July (Wednesday) KIEV, UKRAINE

Met at train station by Vera Novoselova from Incomart, the tour agency responsible for this portion of the trip. Also met by two new translators in civilian clothes.

Initial tour of the city and selected fortifications. Tour of the Museum of the Great Patriotic War and visit to exhibits on public display. Display included SS-5 missile, aircraft, armored vehicles and boats, and some naval ordinance. Tour was met by Retired General-Major Gavrish.

My initial impression of Kiev was that it was very different. The streets were clean, the grass cut and flowers were being tended. The people seemed happier.

Meeting at the Ukrainian Military Air Defense Academy of the

Army named after Marshal of the Soviet Union, A.M. Vasilevsky. This is not the same as the national air defense troops (Voyska Protivovozdushnoy Oborony V-PVO) but rather ground forces dedicated to air defense (Voyska Voyskovoy Protovovozdushnow Oborony). Formal welcome by three general officers (waiting outside for us). Commander of the academy is a General-Major Ivanich (with 40 years of service). His deputy is a Colonel Somel. Also present is a general-lieutenant (probably retired) who has been at the academy for 30 years. He is the senior instructor and a doctor/professor whose specialty is short and medium range ballistic missile defense. Retired General-Major Gavrish was also present.

We were given a handout about the academy and then told about it. Point was made that it is part of the Ukrainian Republic and not a CIS establishment. Students attend the academy after serving with field forces for 5 years. The program lasts 3 years and is limited to operational art. The current, and probably future program, is to train officers for all countries in the CIS and then return them to their native land for payback service. Admitted that the future is not very certain. Students are Captains or Majors that are promoted to Lieutenant Colonel upon graduation.

When responding to questions, commander did not want to get into the relationship of his troops to the V-PVO. Translator botched question about relationship to naval infantry and coastal defense forces but implied that there is no relationship yet. Dodged questions about how curriculum had changed due to new defensive doctrine (said they are only a defensive force). Question from U.S. Army Major Kristi Crosby (self identified as working for military intelligence) about whether they taught in Ukrainian. The general said that they were not yet teaching in Ukrainian but this may come later. In response to another question, he said that he was not willing to discuss lessons or Persian Gulf war in this audience.

We then had a tour of the Academy. We were taken into an auditorium and shown a movie about the Great Patriotic War with emphasis on the Kiev area.

That night we had a banquet with the general officers (one more two-star was added) from the academy. Professor Tritten asked all of the NPS students if one or two wanted to go to a supplemental meeting to be held at the Academy the next day. He stated that he needed at least one Russian-speaking student to accompany him (since he speaks no Russian). As it turned out, I, Capt. Frank McGuigan, Capt. Evie Conlon, and Capt. Eric Edgar, all U.S.A.F, accompanied Professor Tritten, after receiving permission from the senior air force official on trip, USAFR Lt Col Mark Monahan

23 July (Thursday) KIEV

Attended supplemental meeting as described on the previous day. The substance of the meeting is described in detail in Tab 1, which are Professor Tritten's personal notes of the meeting. All Air Force participants present acted as observers and fielded a few questions concerning the Naval Postgraduate School. I will only add that the Ukrainian officials with which we met did not

seem interested in Professor Tritten's presentation, but were interested in the workings of the Naval Postgraduate School, the requirements to enter the school, and the benefits to the graduates of the school. They explained they were in the process of re-building their military academy structure, and they were curious as to how the United States operated their service schools, and mid-career education. In the afternoon, I rejoined the main tour group, who was continuing a bus tour of the city.

24 July (Friday) KIEV, UKRAINE AND FLIGHT TO FRANKFURT, GER.
Uneventful Flight to Germany

25 July (Saturday) FLIGHT TO MONTEREY
Uneventful Flight Home

TITLE: PROFESSOR TRITTEN'S NOTES, 23 July

23 July (Thursday): MEETING WITH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER, KIEV, UKRAINE.

Report of meeting with Deputy Minister of Defense for the Ukraine, held in his office, supplementary to lead-in provided in Enclosure (2).

We arrived at an office of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and were ushered into the office of General-Major Yuriy Mikhailovich Prokafiev, Deputy Minister of Defense and Head of Military Education and Training. A colonel from his outer office also stayed in the room and took notes. Both the minister and retired General-Lieutenant took notes as well. I gave a one hour presentation on our new regional defense strategy, asking along the way if they knew about this or that subject, trying to tailor it to what they did not know. They did not want to talk about scenarios, saying that they already had studied those. Implication again, once something has been studied, it does not again need to be reviewed since the answer has already been obtained.

Their questions included: numbers of troops and divisions to be left in Europe under the current plan and my best guess for the post-election period; what were America's capabilities to wage a strategic-level war and operational-level campaign; lessons of the Persian Gulf War; why were we upgrading the Pershing missiles; and how would we implement our new doctrine and strategy; how could the new doctrine be developed in a top-down manner. The generals revealed their own bias that strategic-level war could be won by air forces in the future. They also stated twice that their emerging doctrine and strategy will be internal only.

We then shifted to a brief discussion on what type of degrees were offered by the various U.S. military training and education institutions. I explained the general processes as well. The minister was interrupted by a telephone call from the Air Force commander-in-chief. The translator suggested that we continue with the general (who was expressing some concern to the translator about the time that we were taking) and I asked the general if we should not wait until the minister returned. He shrugged his shoulders and said yes. I replied that this is what we would do in our country as well. The minister then asked a perfunctory question about Sweden. General Prokofiev then said that he assumed we would like to know about his own country. We said that we would.

The minister then talked for about one hour on the plans for the Ukrainian armed forces. He did not pause for questions, nor did we interrupt except for translation clarifications. I took notes. He started with a long passage about Ukrainian history and took great pains to stress the differences with Russia. He also corrected history by stating that there never had been a treaty with Russia at the time of Peter I and that the Ukraine had been enslaved and not joined Russia of its own volition.

The minister continued with his own version of the events of 1917-1920. He ensured that we knew that the Ukraine had been deceived by Russia in joining the USSR and that they were

essentially forced to join. He then spoke of the time that citizens were shot on the streets for speaking Ukrainian and that the world should know about the truth of this era and not the propaganda from Moscow.

Skipping the Great Patriotic War, the minister stressed that the Ukraine had provided 95% of its output for the center in the old Union. He also said that the old Union had devoted 37% of its effort for defense. He specifically criticized the building of large tank formations. According to the minister, the Ukraine had only been allowed to keep 5% of its output for internal use and of this, 20% was taxed. Those who knew the truth, in the past, either left for the U.S. or went to prison.

The minister then discussed the problems facing the Ukraine with large numbers of demobilized troops. He likened the situation to that in Yugoslavia. He stressed that their military doctrine would be an anti-bloc doctrine but that they would have some sort of defensive arrangement with neighbors. The Ukraine did not seek parity with their neighbors. Cooperation with other nations would be sought; specific examples included cooperation with the U.S. or Sweden in the field of terrorism, collective research, and intelligence.

The minister talked about how difficult it was to get "arms" out of the heads of officers who had been educated under the old system. He talked in terms of the need for mental rather than physical resources. He again complained about how much the Ukraine has suffered at the hands of the USSR. His goal was to create a military training and education system second to none in the world. It would be better than that in the U.S. He discussed the need to keep men in uniform as a temporary social welfare program.

He then shifted to the subject of the Black Sea Fleet and stated that it was not a strategic asset. His proof was that it cost much less than some other fleet, lost in the translation. It might have been the Northern Fleet since the word "Kola" came out in the translation. The minister stated that Ukraine was not interested in the Mediterranean. He said that their investment in the fleet was 17% plus the value of the shipyards and that Russia was only offering 10-15%.

The minister said that it was not necessary for Russia to keep bases on Ukrainian territory for the long term, specifically Sevastopol. He then said that Russia would be offered a small portion of bases that were Ukrainian to serve their temporary needs. He then brought up the destroyer that had sortied from Sevastopol a few days earlier and had sailed under a Ukrainian flag for Odessa. He said that following this incident, the issue of the bases had been settled with Russia and therefore, there would be no further incidents of this type. The clear implication was that the incident had been staged to obtain the concessions that he announced. The minister then closed by saying that there were other naval units still being considered, those not an actual part of the fleet and neither a part of the base structure. Those units would need to be settled in the future.

I closed the meeting by thanking the minister and telling him how impressed we were with his country and what we had learned

while visiting. I assured him that everything that we had seen or been told would be passed on to others in the U.S. and Sweden. I then offered to perform joint academic work with any of his people on emerging U.S. defense doctrine and strategy and I left him my card.

OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Given the degenerating economic and political situation currently taking place in the Commonwealth of Independent States, it is no wonder that foreigners in general, and Americans in particular will be prime targets for theft. We all were specifically warned about this. One item that was relayed to a portion of our tour group was that we never should give out our room number to our hotel under any circumstances to someone we didn't know or trust. Unfortunately this happened. The roommate of the person who was robbed during our first night in St. Petersburg had collected some money from tour members to be exchanged into rubles. This roommate had made a deal with someone he did not know in the lobby and gave out his room number to make the exchange at a later time. The "exchanger" never showed up and later that night, the room was robbed. The lesson to be learned is that the whole incident was avoidable, with just a little bit of "street smartness". Frankly, I hold the leaders of the tour group partly to blame for placing us in a cheaper hotel that had inadequate security. There were much better hotels in town which could have been used, specifically the Hotel Europe or the Astoria with visible, real security. For the amount that was paid to the tour company for accommodations, much better arrangements could have been made.

On this same subject, one suggestion that seemed to work very well was the placement of money in concealed places in different areas of my body. The idea here is that if you are robbed, the thief will not take all of your money, just what is obvious. Besides a regular wallet, I carried a money belt, and three velcro wallets; one around each of my ankles secured by velcro straps, and one in which I carried my passport and visa, which hung around my neck, underneath my shirt. I was never robbed and I felt very secure.

It is very true that the Mafia is active and the police are very ineffective in their job of keeping total order. In my opinion, the key to dealing with this problem is to maintain a low profile. One should do nothing to highlight oneself as an American or contribute in any way to the inflammation of a small incident. Loud or boisterous talking (especially in English) and alcohol in any form can only make a situation worse. Although I was not present during the altercation on 18 July at the hotel in Zagorsk, I feel that cooler heads and quieter language by the Americans present would have turned it into a non-event, with no need to call the embassy.

I feel the largeness of the tour group also contributed to this problem. Not enough of the group could speak Russian. I suggest that future groups should be held down to between 4 or 5 at a maximum and 2 as a minimum. This number seemed to provide maximum security without calling undue attention to the group. 53 is an unmanageable number and this probably contributed to the Russian tour guides' over reaction when 2 from our group tried to take an

alternate means of transportation to our destination on 17 July.
(Smolensk to Zagorsk)

Concerning degrees of freedom for traveling in Russia, it would be extremely helpful if some specific rules are made available for future participants. For example, is it necessary to have prior approval for a last minute change in one's travel itinerary? Who issues this approval? What are the Russian Government's restrictions for travel within their country by U.S. military officers? Apparently none of these questions were adequately answered before the trip started.

Some minor points. The food was generally bad and the water was worse. Western bottled water was generally available in the larger cities: Kiev, Moscow and St. Petersburg; but it took us a few days to find a source each time we made a move between cities. One of the smartest things we did was to bring enough water with us (about a 2-day supply) until we could get our bearings. A jar of peanut butter and some crackers is also a smart idea.

Above all, it was critically beneficial to have had the ability to converse in the native language; from reading subway directions, to asking directions and making phone calls for people. It enabled those of us who spoke Russian to operate within the culture freely and those who didn't depended upon those who did. Minimum DLPT scores should be a mandatory requirement for acceptance in the program.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Observations on a Recent Trip to the Former Soviet Union

by
James John Tritten¹

Introduction

When the Bush administration formulated its new national security strategy in mid-1990, it made certain assumptions about the security and military threat posed by the then-Soviet Union. Generally that threat was described as having receded to a level where the U.S. would have up to two-years of warning prior to a major European-centered global war.¹ With the demise of the former "evil empire," the Bush administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-evaluated the threat from the defunct USSR and made new assumptions about the security and military threat posed by the Russian and other former Soviet republics. In May 1992, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote that the U.S. could now count on eight to ten-years strategic warning before a resurgent/emergent global threat arose.²

Students and faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) recently returned from a twenty-one day educational exchange visit to Russia and the Ukraine. The group, led by the author, from the School's Department of National Security Affairs, included four Navy, three Air Force, and one Army officer students who are specializing in Russian area studies. Funding was provided by the individual services under the Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies (DALASP) and the Quality of Analysis (QofA) Programs.

The July 1992 trip to Russia and the Ukraine was made to help the researchers determine what is the current state of the former Soviet Union and specifically the state of the various republic military forces? What the researchers hoped to determine is if the Bush administration's planning assumptions are still valid? The answer to that question is the subject for subsequent additional research and analysis, the full results of which will not be available until 1993.

The researchers will either conclude that America's assumptions about the former Soviet Union are no longer valid and the U.S. and NATO need to modify defense programs, or, that the planned demobilization of the West's armed forces that were once poised against the USSR can, and should, take place. Such analy-

1. The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.

sis obviously addresses the sources of future international stability and instability and the prospective U.S. foreign policy and defense role - both subjects for active consideration by many of us.

The trip offered a unique opportunity to study the evolving former Soviet republics' military doctrines and military strategies and the roles and missions that will be assigned to their armed forces. The student and faculty researchers placed major emphasis on observing the results of the changes in the military caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of independent republics. While in Russia and the Ukraine, the group had the opportunity to interact with faculty members, researchers, and military officers at the Military History Institute, the Frunze Academy, the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada Studies, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Vasilevsky Air Defense Academy, and other military-academic institutions.

The Russian military opened up certain geographic and functional areas to the NPS students and faculty that heretofore had been closed to Western visitors. Among the highlights were a visit to the Kronshtadt naval base (soon to become the headquarters and location for the bulk of the Russian Baltic Fleet) the armor museum at Kubinka, the aviation museum at Monino, and the museum for artillery, engineering, and communications troops in St. Petersburg. The NPS students and faculty attended special seminars at these sites and had an audience with a Deputy Defense Minister for the new republic of the Ukraine.

The comments below represent the raw results of some of the research conducted on the trip. Documentation is not included since no rules were established for attribution, or not, by each individual interviewed. This will be clarified in writing before any statements are directly attributed in public documents to Russian or Ukrainian sources. The sources of the information below range from a deputy minister of defense to serving general officers to senior civilian academic researchers to civilian and military instructors and professors. The sources worked at various ministries, military academies, and institutes well known to us in the West. Additional and detailed research results will be published by NPS and should be available in early 1993.

Personalities and Current Political Issues

One of more intriguing questions that we had concerned a series of Spring 1992 pro-Navy interviews with Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, now Deputy Defense Minister for Russia, when he was serving as the Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute.³ The character of these articles was inconsistent with the earlier positions taken on defense by Kokoshin. We were told that these articles were an attempt to buy favor from the Navy (since Kokoshin was openly being considered for the position

of Russian Defense Minister at the time) or the easy way out; i.e. it would be easier establish a large navy on his initial platform and if necessary to later say Russia could not afford or did not need one than it would be to subsequently argue that Russia needed a large ocean-going fleet.

We were also told that Kokoshin was supposed to get the job as defense minister and that it was not clear why he did not. Apparently the Russian military backed Kokoshin since they wanted a civilian who could and would say "no" to Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. We were told that the military did not want the man who eventually was appointed Russian Defense Minister, General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, because the military was afraid that a serving officer would simply do what he was told and not resist Yeltsin if necessary. When we asked about the importance of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, we were told that he is not as important as he once was now that Russia has formed its own armed forces.

The concept of the CIS as a political replacement for the old USSR is not well understood by the Western media. No Russian or Ukrainian ever referred to or used the term CIS during our trip. What was used, is the name of the nation that we were in. We observed a resurgence of strong national pride. We came away with the conclusion that the military of the Ukrainian republic is primarily loyal to Ukraine and not to Russia or the CIS. We had received earlier suggestions from Russians that the Ukrainian armed forces would actually be manned by Russians as the solution for how the Russians were going to protect their southwestern borders. That concept appears to be a Russian dream not shared by anyone that we met in the Ukraine.

The Russians and Ukrainians appeared to have settled the Black Sea Fleet by first deciding the type of political relationship they wanted and letting that determine the importance of the fleet controversy. The politicians did not let their military leaders determine the outcome of this issue, which seemed to us to be a very healthy sign.

After noting with a number of Russians the openness of the current era and contrasted it with other historical periods of similar disclosure, we asked when this current period would close. The answer that we were most often given was "soon." Our conclusion was that we should take full advantage of the current opportunity to learn about the Russians and Ukrainians from visits such as ours.

Russian Military Science

There has been an age-old debate over how Soviet military science organized war. We attempted to learn how well the West

actually knew Soviet military science. Regarding war's technical characteristics, the Russians acknowledged that local/global was the first order of distinction; the choice of nuclear or conventional weapons was a secondary or tertiary issue. We were also told that the former Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov, spoke out against relying on nuclear weapons as early as 1966 at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy. This early date appears to be not known in the West and we were promised a copy of the transcript of this very early lecture.

We were told that the strategic missions of the Soviet armed forces found in the 1987 book *The Navy* and elsewhere⁴ are **not** new and that they can be inferred from the published mid-1970s lectures from the Voroshilov Academy.⁵ Upon our return, a comparison of the strategic missions contained in *The Navy* and those found in the mid-1970s Voroshilov Academy lecture notes reveals significant differences in emphasis and content. As we know, the strategic missions contained in *The Navy* also differed significantly from those published by Marshal Vasiley Danilovich Sokolovskiy in his book *Military Strategy*.⁶ Everyone that we talked to agreed that the strategic missions of the Russian or Ukrainian armed forces will be different than either of these once new military doctrines and strategies are approved.⁷

We also had a series of discussions about the similarity of future ground warfare with naval warfare and were told that the Russians were researching this subject. This appears to be one of their lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war⁸ and parallels research previously published in the West.⁹

Russian Military History

The Russians defined military history as anything that happened through yesterday; hence they felt more "comfortable" in discussing the history of the Persian Gulf war, or the history of the initial Yeltsin period, etc., rather than emerging doctrine and strategy. Our discussions of history often were surrogates for discussions of today's issues. The Soviet military reforms of 1924-1925 were most often used for such purposes and we spent a considerable period of time considering the applicability of that period to today. The Russians made sure that we received the message that they would **not** simply replicate the forces developed or the military strategy during that era.

Most of the instructors at the Frunze Academy said that they have no substantive knowledge of Czarist-era Russian military history, especially during its final days. They are only now being allowed to research this period and hope to use history to replace the legitimacy for their regime that was once provided for by ideology. We were told, however, that it is neither new nor unusual for Russians to research the defensive or initial period of the Second Great Patriotic War.¹⁰ The recent research

that we have seen published in their literature about the defensive is **not new** research, but rather research that had been performed previously. This research was not, however, available to those outside of the "system" since it was previously classified secret.

We were told by the Russians that we should take advantage of military historical research that they have done already so that we would not need to perform it. Under "scientific" socialism, once a topic has been thoroughly and correctly researched, it need not be done again by anyone again since only one answer was possible. We were somewhat surprised that this view is still alive and well in newly "democratic" Russia.

The Western Theater of War

We had numerous discussions about the Western reports of old Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear war plans for the western theater of military operations (WTVD). These plans were recently published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in their journal *Survival*.¹¹ Most Russians were aware of the publication. This subject was perhaps the most sensitive of all that we addressed with the Russians. **At least one individual acknowledged the existence and authenticity of these plans and stated that nuclear operations were indeed to begin early in any war with the West but they would have been limited to the WTVD.** We asked numerous individuals if the leaks were authoritative and were told yes and that plans were being changed.

These plans did not correspond to themes used in articles, speeches, and books of Marshal Ogarkov during the 1980s. It seemed to us in the West that Ogarkov had not advocated nuclear strikes during strategic operations in the WTVD and we had taken his writings as evidence that Soviet military strategy and operational art had changed to deemphasize nuclear war fighting. We were told that **Marshal Ogarkov did not speak for the military when he wrote those articles and monographs and that we should have never interpreted those as anything more than his personal views.** If this is true, then much recent content analysis of Soviet military literature may be fatally flawed.

Others in our group, not from NPS, were more interested in proposed operations in the Northwestern TVD (NWTVD) and asked similar direct questions. They were told that Soviet war plans did **not** call for an invasion of Finmark under normal circumstances, but that there were contingency plans to go through Sweden and occupy northern Norway as far south as Tromsø. Such operations were not, however, to be central to the overall war effort.

We were asked how it would be interpreted in the West if a variant three defensive military doctrine (Battle of Khalkhin Gol surrogate) would be replaced by variant two (Battle of Kursk surrogate). The Russians hinted that they were headed in that

direction but that the offensive counterattack might take place primarily with air power (but not only with those forces). The Russians said that such a change should not bother us with buffer states now between Russia and Germany.

Russian Military Education System

We confirmed that the business of the Frunze and Vasilevsky Academies is operational art and tactics. We were told that there are no Air Force or Navy officers (students or faculty) at these academies. This somewhat surprised us since many in the West assumed the Soviet educational system for the command and general staff-level was similar to our own. Frunze students study very little outside of their own ground forces; for example, the Normandy invasion is studied at the Frunze Academy only as a defensive operation and not in the context of projecting power from the sea.

Each military service has its own schools for command and general staff. "Combined arms," at the operational-level of warfare as taught at the Frunze Academy, is restricted to integration of all branches of the Ground Forces. The first time the Soviet/Russian military gets together for multi-service, or "joint," education is at General Staff Academy. This means that the Western perception by many that "combined arms" operations (at the operational-level of warfare) was a Soviet strength was incorrect.

We asked about the impact on the curricula of academies of the demise of an ideological role for the armed forces. We were told that they had already revised their curricula but did not add any new materials. Apparently they allowed for additional in-depth coverage of what was already specified instead. We were also told that the Frunze Academy previously spent 90% of their time teaching nuclear or nuclear-related aspects of war and armed conflict but that this is now down to around 10%.

We concluded from discussions of correlation of forces and how to construct equivalent division and effective equivalent divisions that our methods were very similar. The Russians made great pains to use Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-approved numbers. We also had a discussion about net assessment as a methodology. We discussed the use of the IISS Military Balance numbers rather than "real" numbers for education and training. Most Russians seemed familiar with this document and said that they used it for basic classroom exercises. None used it for homework since, as we were told, Russian military officers are not assigned any homework nor at-home readings while attending academies.

How do the Russians Learn About us?

A discussion which we had with virtually every instructor with whom we talked involved how did the Soviets and how do the Russians develop specialists about other nations? We were told that this is strictly the role of intelligence services and that there is no counterpart to Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) or sub-specialists as found in the U.S. armed forces. At the Frunze Academy instructors are merely given materials about the U.S. to use in the classroom and are not expected to deviate from that material. We discussed a wide variety of alternative plans and sources of information.

We asked most Russians and Ukrainians if they were familiar with the KGB's Operation RYAN, as reported by former KGB General Oleg Gordievsky.¹² All said yes and that Operation RYAN was real. This topic was used in many additional discussions as an example of how bad the KGB understood us and how dangerous it was to place all their emphasis on learning about the U.S. on a system that could have produced RYAN.

The Russians and Ukrainians seemed to not understand that in the U.S., there might be officially published service positions on the lessons of the Persian Gulf war that might differ with views published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although we can see this in their own writing, it seems to be a failure in understanding how to do proper content analysis of U.S. literature evidence. They also seemed to have great difficulty in understanding us since we did not use standardized terms in our politico-military literature. When Westerners use Soviet or Russian terms,¹³ they took this as evidence that we had finally adopted the "correct" (Russian) terms.

After reviewing comments on some of our own research and the lack of depth of sources from their own country, most of us concluded that although we are in America, we often have access to some better Russian sources than they do. Duplication and compartmentalization of efforts within Russia have resulted in a lack of awareness of what internal resources are already available. The definition of initiative does not appear to include researching any areas that have not been "assigned."

Nuclear and Other Issues

We were told that Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) already had a permissive action link (PAL) system to prevent inadvertent launch. PAL authorization would have to be received in data form in order to be useful, i.e. an alternative scenario of telephone authorization would not be sufficient to "unlock" the systems. We were also told that the Russians would move more of their nuclear weapons out to sea

on board SSBNs and might be willing to give up the other two legs of the triad.

We also discussed Soviet nuclear targeting and Russian President Yeltsin's statement that Russian missiles were no longer targeting American (and other) cities.¹⁴ This "shift" did not require actual changes since, we were told, cities were not targeted by design, only as an unfortunate consequence. Hence when some in Russia said that nothing has changed as a result of Yeltsin's actions, they are right.¹⁵

We were told that the Soviets had "fooled us" over the Tu-22 BACKFIRE bomber and that it obviously was an intercontinental weapons system. We were told that they could retrofit the refueling probe within hours. We were also told that since superpower nuclear weapons issues are now essentially settled, the numbers of warheads were going down substantially, and no one was arguing internally over the role of nuclear weapons, the Strategic Rocket Forces would be ranked lower in the overall precedence of military services.

Regarding a new revolution in military affairs, we were told that although a new revolution was regarded as theoretically possible (due to advances in technology), it would not happen due to the realities of the economy. There would be no opportunities for serial development of many new weapons and the Russians will shift to a prototyping system to keep up with the West.

We were told that the Russian fleet would be limited to the Barents and Northern Norwegian Seas, the Bering Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, and the Northern Sea of Japan and specifically that it would not deploy along the U.S. sea lines of communications.

What Were They Interested in From Us?

Russians questions of us involved six main areas: American politics and politico-military doctrine and strategy; nuclear issues; naval forces; NATO and Europe; war gaming; and about themselves.

In the first area, the Russians were interested in: the probable results of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections; how would we implement our new military doctrine and strategy; how could the new military doctrine and strategy actually have been developed in a top-down manner; the status of the Competitive Strategies Initiative (CSI); the difficulty of conversion and reconversion of industry; what were America's unilateral capabilities to wage a strategic-level war and operational-level campaign; and the lessons of the Persian Gulf war?

In the nuclear area, the Russians asked us: if the recent agreements on nuclear arms between Presidents George Bush and Yeltsin would require a revision of our new national military

doctrine and strategy; if lower numbers of strategic nuclear warheads might suggest a shift to countervalue and non-prompt nuclear targeting; how long it would take from receipt of warning until our nuclear forces could respond; how the American military viewed the deep reductions in nuclear forces; if the U.S. military thought they would reprogram nuclear resources into conventional forces; and what was the future of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) and the global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) program?

Regarding naval forces, the Russians asked: if any of the documents concerning the new U.S. military doctrine and strategy addressed sea communications and if we assumed any opposition at sea; if we would now revise the AIRLAND battle doctrine and if would it become an Air-Land-Sea doctrine; what was the future of the U.S. Sixth Fleet; about naval arms control, specifically an attempt to control naval arms through budget limitations; and why the U.S., the British, and/or the French were still patrolling off their coasts in the new international security environment when they had ended all patrols off our coasts?

With regard to NATO and Europe, the Russians asked: what was the impact on NATO of the creation of Western European Union (WEU) armed forces; what was the number of U.S. troops and divisions to be left in Europe under the current plan and our best guess for the post-election period; whether the West ever had serious plans to invade the Warsaw Treaty states; and why were we upgrading the Pershing missiles? In discussions about military capabilities versus intentions we were asked why each of us had looked first at capabilities instead of intentions. They wanted to know why we did not have plans to fight France or the United Kingdom since these nations had capabilities to attack the U.S.?

The Russians also wanted to know how we do simulations and war gaming; man/man or man/machine and if we had special teams to play the enemy or computer models instead? We were told that they now use green and dark blue to represent two opposing sides. Regarding themselves, the Russians and Ukrainians asked us about future cooperative security actions and how we thought the Russian/Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet issue should be settled.

One thing that surprised us was what they did not want to know. During questions and answers that followed a presentation about our new national security strategy, the Ukrainians did not want us to explain our planning scenarios, saying that they already had studied those and understood them.

Conclusions

From the perspective of the participants of the trip and the sponsors who funded it, the benefits appear to be well worth the costs involved. Each student will take with him/her the experiences from their three-week exposure to the Russians and Ukrai-

nians and use that experience during their military career. From the perspective of a faculty member, it is clear that both NPS instruction and research will benefit as well.

The participants of this research trip intend to prepare additional technical reports as well as student theses based upon their experiences while in Russia and the Ukraine. It is hoped that the successes of this first endeavor will lead to repetition while the current "window" of openness remains open and an expansion of DALASP/QofA funded activities for students and faculty in other areas of the world.

Notes

(1) For details on the assumptions behind the new national security strategy, see James J. Tritten, "America Promises to Come Back: The President's New National Security Strategy," *Security Studies*, 1, no. 2 (Winter 1991): 173-179.

(2) Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN, "Beyond the Cold War," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 118, no. 5 (May 1992): 55.

(3) Yelena Agapova interview with Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, deputy director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, with additional questions by Fred Hiatt from the *Washington Post*, "Before You Form an Army You Should Know What it is for - Expert Andrey Kokoshin Believes," *Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda* in Russian, March 17, 1992, pp. 1, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-053, March 18, 1992, p. 27); and Aleksandr Putko interview with Andrey A. Kokoshin, "The Army Can Become a Platform for Accord," *Moscow Kuranty* in Russian, April 15, 1992, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-074, April 16, 1992, p. 28). A strong Navy statement is attributed in the translation to Putko, but from the context of the remarks and the placement of subsequent identification of who spoke when, it is very likely that this is a translation error and Kokoshin make the comment.

(4) Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov, ed., *The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment* in Russian (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988): pp. 34-42 (Naval Intelligence Command translation, pp. 27-33); and Captain 2nd Rank V. Dotsenko, "Soviet Art of Naval Warfare in the Postwar Period," *Moscow Morskoy Sbornik* in Russian, no. 7 (July 1989): 22-28 (NIC-RSTP-113-89, pp. 31-39); and Georgiy M. Sturua, "A View on the Navy Through the Prism of Military Perestroyka," *Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* in Russian, no. 5, 1990 (JPRS-UMA-90-016, July 11, 1990, pp. 49-51). In addition, two of the new strategic missions, "repelling of a missile attack from space" and the "utter routing of the armed forces and military potential of the enemy," were specifically criticized by Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, thus indicating that they exist. See his "Defense Sufficiency and Security," *Moscow Novoye v Zhizni, Nauke, Tekhnike: Seriya "Mezhdunarodnaya"* in Russian, no. 4, 1990, pp. 1-64 (JPRS-UMA-90-008-L, June 20, 1990, p. 20).

- (5) *The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy*, Vol. I: Issues of Soviet Military Strategy, Compiled by Ghulam D. Wardak, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., gen. ed., Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, June 1989, pp. 72, 81, 250, 257.
- (6) Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiley Danilovich Sokolovskiy, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3rd ed., with an analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott, ed. (New York, NY: Crane, Russak, 1980 - 1st paper ed.), pp. 285-303.
- (7) For example, new strategic missions were proposed in the draft Russian military doctrine of May 1992. See, "Fundamentals of Russian Military Doctrine (Draft)," *Moscow Voyennaya Mysl* in Russian, Special Edition, May 1992, pp. 3-9 (JPRS-UMT-92-008-L, June 16, 1992, pp. 3-4).
- (8) General-Major Yuriy V. Lebedev, General-Lieutenant (Retired) I.S. Lyutov, and Colonel V.A. Nazarenko, "Persian Gulf War: Lessons and Conclusions," *Moscow Voyennaya Mysl* in Russian, nos. 11-12 (December 1991): 109-117 (JPRS-UMT-92-005-L, March 23, 1992, p. 64).
- (9) James J. Tritten, "Is Naval Warfare Unique?" *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 12, no. 4 (December 1989): 494-507.
- (10) We previously knew that the Soviet participation in World War II was referred to as the "Great Patriotic War" but we learned that this war will be referred to as the "Second Great Patriotic War" in deference to a previous war in defense of the homeland when Russia was invaded by French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte.
- (11) Lothar Rühl, "Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact," *Survival*, 33, no. 5 (September/October 1991): 442-450.
- (12) Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), pp. 582-593.
- (13) James J. Tritten, "The New American National Security Strategy," *Moscow SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* in Russian, no. 12 (December 1991): 28-43.
- (14) Sergey Kuznetsov reports carried by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 0125 and 0753 GMT, January 26, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-017, January 27, 1992, p. 1).
- (15) N. Zhelnorova interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, "I Do Not Want to Overpower Russia," *Moscow Argumenty I Fakty* in Russian, no. 8 (February 1992): 1, 3-4 (FBIS-SOV-92-041, March 2, 1992, p. 54); Viktor Litovkin, "Three Days on the Typhoon -- Part I," *Moscow Izvestiya* in Russian, February 29, 1992, morning ed., p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-048, March 11,

1992, pp. 3-4).

"Touring" Russia and Ukraine

In July 1992 the authors participated in a tour of Russia, Estonia, and Ukraine under the auspices of the DALASP (Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program). Three are students in the new NPS intelligence curriculum with an emphasis on Russian area studies. The trip was organized through the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) by Professor James Tritten, CDR, USN (Ret), and LTC John Sloan, USA (Ret). The tour was officially organized for the study of Russian military history, and was sponsored by the Russian Military History Institute. The trip included a number of professionals from that field, and related fields such as political science, from around the world. One of the participants who joined us from Norway was CAPT Robert Bathurst, USN (Ret), former assistant attache in Moscow, a former NPS faculty member, and a frequent contributor to the Quarterly. Other participants from NPS included LT Scott Stanley (currently Asst. N2 at CINCUSNAVEUR), one Army FAO in training, and three Air Force officers funded under the Quality of Analysis program. The DALASP participants were on the trip for advanced language and area studies familiarization and proficiency training.

Needless to say, this was a very exciting opportunity for in depth and first hand study of the former "Evil Empire"! We have all cut our teeth on Soviet order of battle and intently studied passing Soviet warships while wondering what really was going on in the heads of our counterparts across the waves. For the authors the chance to sit and talk with our opposite numbers on their

own territory was most gratifying. And we do mean our opposite numbers, since the interpreters assigned to our group informed us they were either GRU officers or cadets learning English.

We had conversations with numerous military officers on a wide range of military historical topics as well as general social topics that we hoped would shed some light on the character of the Russian and Ukrainian military. We met with faculty, researchers, and students of the Russian Military History Institute, the Frunze Academy, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, and the Vasilevsky Air Defense Academy in Kiev. We found them all very eager to discuss our observations of Russian and Ukrainian military topics, and to a lesser extent to offer their own observations on us. This exchange of ideas was very fruitful and is recorded in detail in an NPS technical report by Professor Tritten.

The Itinerary of the trip was as follows: St. Petersburg July 3-7; a tour of northwestern Russia July 7-10; Moscow July 10-15; tours of the "golden ring" cities surrounding Moscow July 15-22; Kiev July 22-24; and a return to Monterey July 25. While in St. Petersburg we toured the Kronstadt Naval Base, the Naval Museum, the cruiser Aurora, the city of Viborg, as well as the Artillery, Engineering, and Signals Museum. The latter included naval ordnance and firearms. There we held discussions on a wide range of subjects, including the presentation by LT McIlmail of an NPS student research study on an expected course for the future of the Russian Navy. During the tours between the major cities we also were treated to stops at the Armor Museum at Kubinka and

the Aviation museum at Monino.

In Moscow further discussions were held at the Military History Institute, U.S.A. and Canada institute, and IMEMO. We had a particularly good exchange at IMEMO with Vice Admiral (Ret.) Markov of the Russian Navy. All of these tours and discussions were very helpful for the authors in gaining a better understanding of the Russian military establishment and how it operated in academic arenas. Numerous in-depth seminars were held with faculty of the Frunze Academy while en route. These were most enlightening on the subject of operational art.

For our fellow naval officers the time spent in Kronstadt, at the Naval Museum, on the Aurora, and at Monino probably offers the most interest, so we will address them in a little more depth.

The naval base at Kronstadt is located on Kotlin island just outside St. Petersburg in the Gulf of Finland. The base has been a mainstay in Russian and Soviet defense since it was captured by Peter the Great in the Northern War. The revolt by the sailors of Kronstadt against the Bolsheviks in the 1920's is probably the best known battle fought there. Formerly a closed city, it was quite a thrill for us as naval officers to be allowed onto the base. CAPT Bathurst kept insisting we take his picture there!

We arrived at the base following a bus ride from St. Petersburg over a new system of earthen dams under construction to connect the island with the mainland and for flood control. The appearance of the base was cleaner than St. Petersburg, but otherwise unimpressive. Considering that this is to be the

new headquarters for the Baltic Fleet this was somewhat surprising. Few ships were there: and old Icebreaker and several training ships, all in a state of disrepair, and two Whiskey and one Foxtrot submarines. Infrastructure on the base was poor with most of the buildings in need of major repair. There were few sailors or civilians seen in the streets.

The Officer's Club was the site of a reception for the tour group by the deputy base commander and the town's Deputy Mayor. Conditions at the club were below the standard of our own Navy's clubs, enlisted or officer.

All in all, the Kronstadt visit was eye-opening for us as this was our first to a Russian military installation. We were not impressed. This was not the case for some of the other points of naval interest that we visited.

On the afternoon of the 5th of July, our group visited the Central Naval Museum. The Institution was founded by Peter the Great, who decreed that a model must be kept of each ship built in Russia. The museum is located on Pushkin Square on Vasilevsky Island in the Neva river. The main building is of classical design, and was constructed in the early 19th century. Prior to the Revolution, the building was the Stock Exchange building. In front of the building is a small park at the Strelka, Russian for "the Spit," which offers a magnificent view of the city. The location previously served as the center of the commercial harbor. Reminders of this function, are found in the two monumental Rostral Columns, each over one hundred feet high. For years, oil was burned in bowls at the top of the columns to serve as navigation aids. The columns are distinctively decorated with the prows of sailing ships to

commemorate Russian naval victories. This style is in imitation of the Roman rostral columns commemorating their victory at sea over the Carthaginians.

We were warmly greeted at the museum by Captain First Rank Yevgenyy Nikolaevich Korchagin. We split into groups to see the collections. Those of our group who spoke Russian were at a distinct advantage because the museum guides did not speak English, and we were not forced to be constantly waiting for the translation. Those of us speaking Russian were escorted by a retired Navy Captain whose knowledge of the collection was as enormous as the collection itself. Among the 800,000 exhibits the museum contains many historical treasures, including a 3,000 year-old boat recovered from the Bug River. There is a boat constructed by Peter the Great, as well as some of his hand tools. There are a great number of very detailed ship models, ensigns, jacks, uniforms, examples of naval weaponry, and the personal effects of Russian and Soviet naval heroes.

A visit to the cruiser Aurora provided an interesting example of political correctness in Russia today. The exhibits and the presence of the ship herself speak one story, but the guides spoke another. The cruiser was launched in 1903, and fought in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In October of 1917, while the ship was scheduled for repairs, the crew joined the revolutionaries, and by the order of the Military Revolutionary Committee sailed up the Neva and trained her guns on the Winter Palace where the Provisional Government was meeting. On the evening of the 25 October (7 November), the crew fired a blank shot to signal the storming of palace, and the beginning of the Bolshevik

Revolution.

As a result of the historic role played by the Aurora and her crew in the Revolution, the cruiser, now part of the Central Naval Museum, is lovingly preserved, and designated ship #1 of the fleet. The ship is filled with exhibits recounting the Revolution and Civil War, and the later careers of the sailors who sailed aboard her in that October. But to listen to our guide, also a retired Navy Captain, the significance of the Aurora is that she is a fine example of naval architecture at the turn of the century. It is also important to show people how the average sailor lived in the Russian Navy, and, oh yes, she did play some role in the Bolshevik Revolution. It would seem that many Russians are having a difficult time with a history that serves no propaganda function.

Perhaps the most impressive of the museums which we visited was the Monino Air Museum, located on the outskirts of Moscow. Any aviation enthusiast visiting Moscow must see this museum. The museum houses aircraft from not only the Soviet Air Force but also Air Defense and Naval Aviation. The exhibits span the ages from frail World War One era scouts such as the Nieuport and Sopwith Triplane to modern fourth generation fighters, including the SU-27 (prototype) and the MiG-29.

The main hall of the museum includes small fighter-type aircraft from both World Wars as well as dioramas and displays of the history of Russian and Soviet military aviation. In the post-war exhibition area, our guide hurried us past some wreckage from Col. Powers U-2 and seemed noticeably relieved when no questions were asked about it. Interestingly, no lend-lease aircraft were on

display in the Great Patriotic War section although our guide mentioned U.S lend-lease aid a great deal.

The larger static displays are displayed in a park near the main hall. Unfortunately, the elements seem to be taking their toll of the displays. All postwar aircraft are displayed there, beginning with the MiG-9 Fargo, Russia's first jet fighter and proceeding to the current generation, with only the MiG-31 in absence. Bombers are well represented with Bear, Backfire, Badger and Bison, among others, on display. Naval Aviation displays included the YAK-38 Forger and a BE-12 Mail, as well as naval helicopters.

The real crowd pleasers were the experimental aircraft. An example of the sleek SU-100 Mach 3 bomber, similar to the U.S XB-70, was on display. The nose of this aircraft covers the cockpit and drops only during low speed flight, meaning that at high speed the crew must fly on instruments only! The guides said that they had built ten for the Air Force, in addition to ten for civilian use. Other interesting exhibits included a sub-scale mock-up of a small space plane and a high-speed drone, probably for reconnaissance.

Rounding out the museum is a separate hall which includes record-breaking Russian Soviet aircraft, including Sikorsky's famous Ilya Murometz four-engine bomber from 1914. In years past, our guide stated that they could not say that the aircraft was built by Sikorsky as this would raise unwholesome questions and instead said that it was built by a "consortium." All in all, this is a most impressive museum and a must see for anyone interested in aviation or military history.

Although most of our time was spent in museums, at historical battlefields, and in scholarly discussions with academics, perhaps the most important part of the trip was the time we spent with ordinary Russians and Ukrainians. From them we received insights that one cannot get from reading reports. The nations of the former Soviet Union are in a tremendous state of internal ferment. The people are very confused about what the future will hold for them, and many are even unsure about what path they want their nation will take. Although the Soviet Union is no more, and the military preparedness of the successor states is reduced from previous times, internal conflicts are raging, and show every indication that they will continue in the future.

Some have expressed to us that this is not a good time to be a specialist in the former Soviet Union. We disagree. The most interesting intelligence work is always done when change is occurring, not in a period of stability. We are convinced the former Soviet Union will be an unstable place for many years.

CDR James Tritten, USN (Ret)

LT David Hanson, USN

LT Mark Admiral, USNR

LT James McIlmail, USN

Administrative Section

2-3 July (Thursday-Friday): Flight to St. Petersburg, Russia.

Uneventful flight to Russia. On the flight over, I completed the index to my forthcoming book on America's new regional defense strategy, and I delivered the manuscript to the Federal Express office in Frankfurt, Germany for delivery to the publisher. Upon arrival at St. Petersburg, we immediately noticed the inefficiency of the country in the manner of operations in the airport terminal, specifically baggage. The St. Petersburg airport is smaller than the Monterey Peninsula Airport. We all needed to declare all of our money and customs officials searched our baggage coming **into** country. Met by LTC John Sloan, USA (Ret.), organizer of the participants of the tour. Met also by Valentine Navara, co-leader of the St. Petersburg portion of the tour.

Our first dinner included the Commanding Officer of Artillery, Engineering, and Signal Troops Museum and the Naval Museum. The Artillery Museum commander, Yevgeny Nikolaievich Karchagan, is a ground forces colonel that listened more than he talked. I pressed him on current Russian military doctrine and strategy and he replied that his job is to preserve hardware and not get involved in such matters. He knew name of Aleksey G. Arbatov [from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations - IMEMO] and the commander gave very strong impression that he disliked him and that his type knew nothing about military matters. The commander was very critical of perestroika and Gorbachev when he finally opened up.

Our dinner also included the commanding officer of the Naval Museum. He is a Captain 1st Rank and appeared more friendly but our conversation had little substance of modern issues. Switched to history as a surrogate and I got some interesting answers when pressed on lessons learned about DESERT STORM [history is anything that happened until yesterday]. The Navy officer appeared surprised when I said that we [U.S.] did not learn the same lessons that Russia did about this war but he did not press me to explain what I meant. He only said that the Persian Gulf war proved that navies were shown to be very important.

There was some friction apparent services, but I could not put my finger on exactly what. Discussions of the "decisive" role of airpower in DESERT STORM was a trigger for intense discussion between these Russian officers, in Russian. Another Russian civilian tour leader for the St. Petersburg portion of the tour, Vladimir A. Snitkovsky, whose card describes him as a chief expert analyst for ALKOR Technologies, Inc., said he would talk to me later about Russian military doctrine and strategy but only after vodka. This conversation never takes place.

During dinner, a photographer took everyone's pictures. That evening, LT Scott Stanley USN, on of our tour participants, is robbed in his hotel room while he and his roommate were in the room. A police report was filed the next day in hotel and at police substation near hotel. There was much discussion amongst tour participants about precautions to be taken to safeguard ourselves and our possessions. Met the leader of the entire tour, Vyacheslav Stepashkin, from ASK Tours in Moscow. Two of his staff, Maxim and Dmitriy Alekseyevich Ivanov, are introduced as our translators. Also met Valyeriy A. Kudashkin, editor of Orel military history magazine, and was told that he would be accompanying us on the entire tour.

- - - - -

4 July (Saturday): St. Petersburg, Russia.

Tour group visited the Artillery, Engineering, and Signal Troops Museum. The photographer who took everyone's pictures the previous evening was there and appeared to complete his mission. None of us ever saw the pictures nor were we offered any for sale later as you would find with a normal Western tour company. Captain Robert Bathurst, USN (Ret.), a tour participant, told us that he had tried to get into the museum for many years but had failed. He was most excited about what he saw. The museum commander kept everything on tight schedule and was rude to his civilian employees. These civilians looked like they were dressed in their Sunday finest. The museum commander showed great respect for retired Colonel participant in Great Patriotic War. We were shown pieces of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 and a B-52 shot down in Viet Nam. The museum contains many modern missiles and other hardware. It includes naval missiles but there is no obvious naval officer participation on the staff (each other combat arm had one deputy).

The museum commander showed open disrespect for his communications officer deputy and communications troops. The schedule appeared more important than substance. One woman staff member was the daughter of the inventor of a famous rifle. Signal and engineering troops were given second place. I presented the museum a plaque from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at end of tour.

We then visited the beautiful Naval Museum. We were told that it might soon again be made into a stock exchange. There was no mention of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov despite a display of his bust, uniform, and other associated memorabilia. A display of Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov was likewise ignored. New aircraft carriers were on display. No "history" of the post-communist period yet but everyone made a great point of the forthcoming switch to St. Andrew's flag. Museum staff stressed leaders like Admirals Maka-

rov and Ushikov. The Russian Navy itself was not important unless a great leader was available to make it into something. Discussed the difference with U.S. naval traditions with students and other tour members. Great respect in the museum for accomplishments of technology. The Russians claim that they invented everything. I presented an NPS plaque to the museum commander, Captain 1st Rank Yevgenyy Nikolaevich Korchagin, and he seemed quite excited about it.

We visited the armored cruiser AURORA which was added to the program at last minute apparently due to my discussion at dinner the previous evening. The AURORA is ship #1 on the roles of the former Soviet and revitalized Russian Navy. Did not have NPS plaque with me but I arranged to have one presented later by LCDR Jeff Kuipers, the Assistant U.S. Naval Attache in Moscow, because I did not trust the tour organizers to actually deliver the plaque to the AURORA.

A reception was hosted that evening by ALKOR, a private corporation, at a St. Petersburg sports arena. I was asked by LTC John Sloan to give a 4th of July speech, which I did. It was videotaped and I later learned that it appeared on regional television along with a report of the reception. In the speech, I stressed the importance of historical opportunities for world peace, challenges of capitalism and democracy. After the reception, I decided that they do not yet understand capitalism. It was like they read a book but they had no idea what they were really doing. Some of the Russian participants thought that we were people who could contract to buy their products or services. LTC John Sloan told us to ignore this and that Snitkovsky was using the group to demonstrate to the Russians in attendance that he could produce Americans and other foreigners.

During the reception, I encouraged the Russians to try to succeed at capitalism and democracy despite the obvious difficulties. There was a presentation of Russian cultural singing and dancing. We saw lots of new technological opportunities; lasers and crystals used in nuclear science especially. Some members of the tour were lobbied quite heavily and some were even offered contracts.

At the reception, I met with the Executive Officer from the Kronshtadt naval base and he said that he would see me the next day. He spoke no English and the conversation was superficial. I also met with a Ph.D. who said that he was from the naval archives. He spoke very good English and I tried to engage him in more contemporary topics. He resisted and I switched to historical surrogates. The conversation did not go very far. From time to time on the rest of the St. Petersburg portion of the trip, he would show up, including in strange places like our hotel bar. No other Russians went there except for our interpreters. He did not attempt to engage me in any serious conver-

sations after that time and instead I noticed that he spent most of his time with the Swedish tour participants.

5 July (Sunday): St Petersburg, Russia with day tour to Kronshadt Naval Base.

Toured Hermitage and noted that it had been preserved despite the "revolution" of 1917. Promised a tour of the special military collection but this never occurred. Bus trip to Kronshadt naval base. Enroute, we go through the industrial center of St. Petersburg. It does not appear in good shape. We are told that the building where we just passed is where they used to make the SS-20. Dmitriy says that this is proof that there are no more secrets between us. We note on this leg and subsequently that none of the smokestacks in the city (or elsewhere in Russia) are "smoking." We also went over a major water project between Kronshtadt and the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland. We learned that it was being delayed due to cost overruns. Its purpose was flood control and the project has 15 gates and 1 ship channel. LTC Stellan Bojerud, Swedish officer at Royal Staff College and Lars Ulfving from the Swedish Ministry of Defense, exhibited extraordinarily high interest in this portion of the trip and took numerous photos. CAPT Bathurst was also very excited about being in Kronshtadt since he also said that it was extraordinary to be allowed to visit there.

Kronshtadt has been a closed city and was specially opened up for our tour. Special permission was needed and had been obtained. Cleaner and nicer than St. Petersburg. At a reception in the officer's club, we were introduced to the city's Deputy Mayor who appeared to be a serving officer. I noted that on an upper floor of the officer's club, which was too large a building to serve only as this, there were numerous radio antennas and electronics equipment and enlisted men on duty wearing headphones. In the port we noticed two WHISKEY and one FOXTROT submarines, plus an armed training ship. We were told that this was one of four such ships. Upon my return to the U.S., I consulted a commercial ship identification publication and now know that I saw a SMOL'N-YY class training ship.

The base Executive Officer said that Kronshtadt will take bulk of Baltic Fleet and headquarters soon. We wondered where since the necessary infrastructure did not appear to be there. Plaque presented to Executive Officer in honor of our visit. We noticed that the local churches had been destroyed by the Bolsheviks during their rule and the major one on the island was converted to a naval museum and auditorium. We toured the museum and did not notice anything spectacular.

6 July (Monday): St. Petersburg with day outing to Mannerheim Line and Vyborg Fortress.

Tour led by Yuriy Koltsov, curator of the Suvorov Museum. Learned that in the Winter War with Finland, strategic intelligence that had been obtained by the Soviets was ignored by Stalin. The Soviets apparently had an agent in the Finnish military headquarters and reconnaissance teams had been sent in to explore the Mannerheim line itself. The evidence was ignored, however, the data locked in safes, and men with the access were killed during the purges. The Russians made repeated statements that the Winter War stupid and an embarrassment.

During the bus ride, the Taiwanese tour participants exhibited extraordinary interest in my recent research paper on America's new regionally-focused defense strategy. I gave one of them an interview with the standard disclaimer. The first of these identified himself as Tai Wan-chin, director of Institute of Russian and Slavic Studies, Tamkang University, Taipei. The second identified himself as Cheng Ching-Jung, reporter for *China Times Express*. I was told by the senior U.S. Air Force tour participant later that the Taiwanese were openly pumping everyone. I concurred and warned all the students to be on guard. At Vyborg we saw a KGB STENKA go out to sea. The bus passed through a tank training area. We saw no obvious defensive preparations in this border area. While on the bus tour, we noticed that statues of Lenin still were in all the outlying towns and that fresh cut flowers lay at the base of each.

I believe it was on this trip that the students reported to me that they had been "interrogated" by one of the U.S. tour participants. The students reported that he asked them very detailed questions about who we were and who I was and he recorded the information in a journal. This subject of this journal was subsequently mentioned by me to John Sloan but he said that he had no knowledge of what this individual was doing. I encouraged the students to not contribute to this individual's efforts since I was not sure for what purpose they were ongoing.

LTC John Sloan became involved with a hotel hallway theft from an American citizen non-tour member. LT Scott Stanley concludes that this was the same man who robbed him in his hotel room. Much activity with militia and no obvious resolution of the incident since the perpetrator claimed he was the son of a militia general officer. I held a meeting of all the participants from our school and decided to inform CPT Evelyn Conlon, USAF, our school's female tour participants, that no one appeared able to guarantee her safety. Additional discussions held with most senior tour participants and consensus decision to file a formal complaint with Consulate. I volunteered to go since with an official passport, I could argue that the lack of safety in our hotel was interfering with an official mission of the U.S. government (which it was).

- - - - -
7 July (Tuesday): St. Petersburg

I was asked by Vladimir Snitkovsky if wanted to discuss naval modeling. I responded with a list of individuals from the shipyard that I would also like to meet with. One of the individuals had apparently designed the TYPHOON submarine. The list had been given to me by a friend in Washington, D.C. and included people that he would meet with later in the Fall. Snitkovsky agreed to try to arrange for this.

I went to American Consulate in St. Petersburg to report crimes. Spoke to Bradford H. Johnson and Gregory P. Hulka, Vice Consuls, James C. Wellman, Director of Security, and a female political officer. Consular officials were very helpful. Given blank forms for reports to be filled out and delivered to American Embassy when we arrived in Moscow. Our translator Max accompanied me but was not invited into the consulate. Mr. Wellman came outside and talked to he and I about the theft and other crime in city. Mr. Wellman told Max that the tour group should hire a guard for our group or otherwise do what was necessary to ensure our safety.

I rejoined the group at the programmed seminar being held at the Artillery Museum. I took advantage of the opportunity to openly take notes during the seminar. Most of the seminar was simply uninteresting old historical reports. A paper was given on importance of Battle of Midway by Russian who works at the History Museum of the Peter and Paul Fortress. The author argued that the Battle of Midway was even more important than the Battle of Stalingrad. A Captain 2nd Rank, Commanding Officer of the cruiser AURORA, got terribly upset at this paper and a 15-20 minute debate occurred (in Russian) that was not translated. The afternoon session was not attended by Russian Navy participants.

LT James McIlmail, USN, one of our NPS participants, gave his paper on the recommended future of the Russian Navy. A reception was held after the seminar and it included active conversation with two Colonels who were the deputies and our student participants. Noticed that the reception room had a picture of Lenin with fresh cut flowers on the table underneath.

Snitkovsky said that he could not arrange my special meeting and instead set up one with Professor V.I. Nikolaev, director, research laboratory of the automatization of the designing ship's power installations, department of ship's power installations, Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. Unfortunately, no translator was provided and all we could do was look at each other. Finally, he gave me a proposal written in English (attached to this enclosure). I turned it over to the appropriate NPS faculty for evaluation and they were quite excited about it.

Returning from the seminar, we visited the Nikolaskiy Maritime Cathedral. They opened the second floor to us and we were told that no foreigners had ever been there. We were also told that this is where high Communist Party officials had been baptized in the past ("You would not believe who has been baptized here"). The second floor included two new plaques dedicated to loss of two or three submarines. The Taiwan "journalist" took pictures and said that he will send to me. I told him that I would send him a copy of a recent technical report of mine in trade (not received as of yet). One plaque was marble looking and represented a loss of a submarine in 1989. The crew included two Captains 1st Rank. The other was black in color and included two dates (hence my supposition that it was for two submarines perhaps) and had the number "K-19" on it. The second had the crew's names without their ranks.

8 July (Wednesday): Day trip to Narva, Estonia and overnight in Pskov, Russia.

When we woke up, we found that a guard had been posted outside of our rooms all night. No incidents occurred overnight. We then drove to Narva, Estonia. No apparent military build-up on either side of the border. Learned that the Estonian border guards are high school student volunteers armed with total of 1,000 submachine guns. The border crossing appears to represent a desire to establish themselves as independent and subject Russians to some degree of humiliation by forcing them to show passports and perhaps to collect a visa fee. The Estonians have taken down the section of museum at the fortification in Narva covering the Soviet occupation period.

We got the general impression that they are a happy people who are better off than the Russians on the other side of the border. Before going on trip, we did not understand that Narva was in Estonia and we did not request specific clearance for the 2½ hours (or so) that we spent there. We then drove via some extremely bad roads to Pskov. Learned from Swedes that the new patrol boat that they sold to the Estonian Navy is for internal use on Lake Peipus, not for service on the Baltic Sea. The Swedes are either selling them a new boat or modifying the first one for internal lake service.

9 July (Thursday): Day trip outside Pskov to Precherisky Monastery, Russia, drive to Novgorod, Russia, and train to Moscow.

Saw military airfield outside Pskov and learned there was a Guards Airborne Division in the vicinity. Drove to Novgorod on bad roads. Learned that the city of Novgorod reduced to 40

people by the Germans during the Great Patriotic War. Novgorod was totally resettled and rebuilt to a current population of 200,000. We took the night train to Moscow. We posted guards all night and wired our doors shut. Upon arrival, we learned that the train staff was told to stay up all night and look after us. We concluded that this was done due to my visit to the consulate and obvious concern for the group's safety.

10 July (Friday): Moscow and day trip to Monino.

Arrived and met by Military Historical Institute staff Colonels Vitaliy Bogdanov (speaks superb English) and Slava Terekhov and Senior Lieutenant or Captain Aleksandr Fedoseyev (speaks fair English). Learned that ASK Tours had bought the truck used to transport our baggage from someone in the military for two bottles of vodka. Introduced to two young translators, Anatoliy Kamyshnikov and Nikolay Zubchuck and told that they were cadets in what was a parallel to our Defense Language Institute (DLI). I asked if that meant they were in the Army and they said yes. I asked if that meant they were GRU and they said, not yet, that this would be a choice once they graduated. Our students dubbed them "GRUlets" and openly referred to them as this throughout the Moscow and outlying area portion of the trip.

Taken to Air Force Museum at Monino. Security was much tighter here than anywhere else. Nice briefing and lots of good history. Asked about Korean war involvement since that was missing from the display. I was told that a book was coming out on this episode. Obtained Russian photographs of the aircraft on display. We were told by Colonel Bogdanov that 3 pictures allowed per person. Then he winked and said that maybe we could take 4 or 5. Learned that the Russians produced 10 civilian and 10 military copies of an SST like plane that our U.S. Air Force tour attendees stated they never knew went into serial production, let alone that there was a military version. Many prototypes and aircraft that never worked. Noted that the Tu-4 was "designed" by them. Wartime women in biplanes as a honored exhibit. Naval aircraft were present and included in the history of aviation. Presented NPS plaque at the end of the tour. The civilian director wanted me to take a copy of his book on the museum. I told him to send it to me after he had it translated into English. Senior Lieutenant Fedoseyev said that he could do this. Nothing has yet arrived.

Enroute to our hotel, Senior Lieutenant Fedoseyev "sneered" at the Russian White House, as the seat of Russian democracy. Learned that he is a former airborne officer, now general type, and former enlisted man with 10 years service. He said that he is not vulnerable to the forthcoming cuts in the military since they are going first after those with over 20 years service.

Tried to discuss with him the implications of additional cuts in the U.S. armed forces but he did not appear to be interested.

In the afternoon, a delegation from the tour visited the Military History Institute. Colonel Bogdanov took us to the office of the department head for foreign military history, Captain 1st Rank and Professor Valery N. Vartanov. We learned that Captain Vartanov did his thesis on Battle of Khalkin Gol (there was a big map of the battle on his wall behind his desk). Vartanov's sole job appeared to be to organize us and to take us to the General-Major who commands the institute. Learned from someone that the commander is also the editor-in-chief of the General Staff journal *Voyennaya Mysl*.

Our meeting was essentially non-productive. All we were told is how wonderful it was going to be. When LTC John Sloan tried to press about when we would get into substantive discussions, we were again told how wonderful it was going to be and not to forget that the Institute was a part of the Ministry of Defense. We were told that any further research would have to be approved once we had presented them with written copies of our papers. Since I was the only one from NPS at this meeting, I provided them with copies of my forthcoming technical report on the Soviet/Russian views of the lessons learned of the Persian Gulf war and a draft of my work to date on emerging Russian military doctrine and strategy. I told the general that my students and I would like to talk about those issues and not history.

11 July (Saturday): Moscow.

Morning visit to monasteries modified by Harriet Scott so that we could visit a cemetery with famous individuals from Russian and Soviet history. Most students and I joined her. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov had big modern monument with his full rank. I was under the impression that he had been demoted and retired at a lesser rank. We were told that the monument is original and not replacement due to his rehabilitation. This means that when he was buried, he was allowed to use his full rank or that it was restored. Saw grave of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Georgevich Gorshkov. No marker yet. Told that it is being built and it will be grander than that of Admiral Kuznetzov. Told that Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey F. Akhromeyev was not buried there.

Met with Assistant Naval Attache, LCDR Jeff Kuipers, USN. Asked him if he wanted to present a NPS plaque for us to the cruiser AURORA. He said that he did and that he would do so. I gave him the plaque. Briefed Jeff on the incident at St. Petersburg and gave him the incident reports to send to the consulate.

Afternoon window tour of Moscow and walking tour of Red Square. Anything is for sale on the streets. Visit to the Central Museum of the Armed Forces. Again the focus is on technology and how individuals have led the Soviet and Russian armed forces to greatness, not on the greatness of the Russian people or individual fighting man. Interesting model of a ballistic missile and its silo. Presented the director an NPS plaque and thanked him on behalf of the school. He appeared surprised that I gave him the plaque and he went in back and came out with small pins from the museum that he presented to everyone on the tour.

Attempted discussions with Colonel Bogdanov and Senior Lieutenant Fedoseyev and was told that I must go tomorrow with Frunze Academy faculty for such substantive discussions. Tried again by asking their personal views and was told that we can arrange private discussions for the following Monday or Tuesday. These private discussions were never held. I told Fedoseyev that I would be willing to accept the book by the aviation museum head even if it was in Russian since a publisher might be willing to translate it. They said they would attempt to get it for me. They never did get it and never again brought up the subject.

- - - - -

12 July (Sunday): Moscow and day trip to Tula.

Morning bus ride to Tula included a three-hour discussion with Colonel Vitaliy Leonov, and instructor from the Frunze Ground Forces Academy. Vitaliy spoke excellent English and said that he was assigned to the Department of Military History. His subjects included teaching about mostly local war but also global war. Another instructor, Colonel Yuriy Pavlovich Babich, kept to himself and did not engage me in conversation but did spend a substantial amount of time with CPT Jim Jaworski. See Enclosure (5) for notes of my substantive conversation with Vitaliy.

The Taiwanese "academic" Tai Wan-Chin entered the conversation towards the end of the trip (I suspect that he had been listening and perhaps even taping our conversation) by pumping Vitaliy for details. Tai Wan-Chin's efforts were embarrassing. Vitaliy told me that he was going to have to report our conversation. I told him, "naturally," and I gave him my card. I suggested that next Frunze instructor assigned to our group should spend some time with me talking about our military doctrine and strategy. I then gave him a copy of the *National Military Strategy of the United States*. He did not appear to be familiar with it and thanked me. I also gave him a copy of a recent technical report dealing with America's new regionally-focused defense doctrine and strategy.

Vitaliy is an infantry officer. He has a wife and two children. He is a graduate of Frunze Academy in the same class as

the new Russian Minister of Defense, General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, then a major. Vitaliy also served previously as an Assistant Military Attache to India and in Germany in early 1970s. One of his sons is studying at civilian academy of aerospace and another just entered higher military school. His wife does not work but will return to work soon and again teach school. Vitaliy is retiring in one month and has no plans. We discussed Russia's veteran's retraining programs (essentially nonexistent). I gave him examples of how we do it. Vitaliy stressed that he was acting as our host for this portion of the trip in capacity as military historical society member and not as service officer. I presented him with an NPS plaque to be displayed at the Frunze Academy and thanked them for their contributions to our knowledge of history.

- - - - -

13 July (Monday): Moscow.

At breakfast, Swedish LTC Bojerud expressed surprise that Vitaliy had expressed no apparent interest in my offer to discuss new regional defense strategy. He must have learned this from the retired general who was there at the time. Tai Wan-Chin joined our conversation and tried to find out more information about our new strategy. LTC Bojerud expressed an interest in the number of troops and America's POMCUS commitment in Europe. Russian Colonel Bogdanov came to our table and reported that all our research topics presented to his general at the Military History Institute had been approved. I did not go with the tour group during the morning since I had set up my own meeting with a researcher at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute. I had met this researcher in Monterey last year and have corresponded with him since then. We had arranged this meeting by telephone a few days earlier. See report of this visit contained in Enclosure (5).

After my meeting at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, I went to the Military History Institute. Upon arrival at the Military History Institute, I was asked to wait in the office of Captain Vartanov. In the office was an editor and feature writer for the Russian military journal *Sovetskiy Voin* who said they were there to cover our seminar. Upon the arrival of the rest of the group, we were ushered into a hall with displays of the great history of the institute. I saw a map of the Great Patriotic War (now to be renamed the 2nd Great Patriotic War with the 1st being the defense against Napoleon) and pointed out actions in the Baltic to our Swedish colleagues. They knew every action and said that some of the Soviet claims of sinkings were bogus. The Swedes thanked me for pointing out the map to them.

After a brief welcome talk in the hall, the director took us into an auditorium for a more formal welcome in the company of some 100 personnel. I sat on the stage and presented the director with an NPS plaque and thanked him in advance for the open

exchange of views. I also gave him a copy of the *National Military Strategy of the United States* and a recent technical report discussing our new regionally-focused defense strategy and told the audience that these were the benefits of open exchanges of views.

We then split into three groups with all of us going into the group that would look at modern issues. The students were later told that the Russians did not want to form this third group but did so after I kept insisting on dealing with more modern issues. The other two groups dealt with the medieval Russian and American (sic) period and the era of the Great Patriotic War. Our group was headed by Captain 1st Rank Vyacheslav P. Zimonin, Ph.D. and Vice-chief of the Institute. In the audience were 2 retired General-Colonels (also Professor/Doctors), 1 retired colonel who spoke excellent English, 3 active colonels including the editor of the *Military Encyclopedia*, 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, and 2 civilians. See report of this seminar contained in Enclosure (5).

Captain Zimonin came to me at the end of the seminar and said that, I know you have questions and he introduced me to General-Major Anatoliy G. Har'koff, Professor and Doctor, Deputy Chief of the Institute. I apparently was to be seated with him at dinner. I asked if I could instead sit with Major Victor M. Gobarev, Ph.D. and President of the Council of Young Researchers and was told Gobarev was not invited. I then asked him when I was going to discuss substance with anyone from the Institute. I quickly suggested the next morning and it was approved on the spot. My boldness appeared to catch them off guard but I made it clear that it had not yet been "wonderful" as promised by the general who directed the institute and that we had given in papers for prior approval in good faith. I then told Gobarev he should come to the dinner so that we could talk a little and he got an invitation but I was still seated with the general and never got the opportunity.

Dinner was pleasant and I made a short speech with a toast to peace, security, prosperity, and above all freedom. The general deputy director and I talked and I learned that he was not familiar with the term strategic culture. I gave him a short course. The general was concerned with whether Russian vodka was accepted as a drink of distinction amongst American society. I told him it did not cost very much. I was extremely impressed with their concern over participants in World War II so that they could be honored with a toast as well as the lengths to which the generals let a very old retired Captain 1st Rank, Igor Amosov, who had fought in the war, go in making a similar and extremely emotional speech and toast. Amosov's toast was quite touching and probably taught us more about the depth of feeling about the war than anything else on the trip.

- - - - -

14 July (Tuesday): Moscow.

I took a group of students and returned to the Military History Institute to meet with General Har'koff. The meeting was cordial and the general was most forthcoming. We met in his office and there was no indication that he was afraid to discuss any issue even in the presence of the "GRUlet" translator. I openly took notes at this seminar but tried to not write down everything so that I could concentrate on getting into the general's mind. See Enclosure (5) for report on this meeting.

We then got rid of the "GRUlet" translator and went unaccompanied to a special seminar with students at IMEMO authorized by Dr. Aleksey G. Arbatov, head of the department on disarmament. I had met with Aleksey in Monterey two weeks before I went on this trip and he had sent me a letter outlining who to call. When I called Gennady K. Lednev, a senior researcher in the department, he appeared to be expecting my call. In attendance was Gennady, who came in off leave, Vice Admiral (Ret.) Nikolay Pavlovich Markov and two others who did not introduce themselves. One of these may have been named Sasha since he gave me a copy of a journal to give to Professor William Potter at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS). The journal copy said something like "regards, Sasha." Since I was talking initially, I opened a folder containing my briefing notes and I took advantage of the opportunity to write down their questions and other remarks. They also openly took notes. See Enclosure (5) for a report of this meeting.

- - - - -

15 July (Wednesday): Bus ride to Smolensk.

Bus ride to Smolensk included participation by two instructors from the Frunze Academy. One was LTC Viktor I. Kuznetsov and the other was LTC Oleg Orekhov. Both have candidate degrees, and neither initially appeared to speak English. While on the bus trip, they gave a narration on how their academy trains officers, conducts field exercises, and did so in the past. It sounded much like what happens at our command and general staff colleges. They invited us to attend the academy as students and gave instructions on how to apply. While on the bus, I was sent back a recent copy of *Pravda* which had the article on the organizational development of the armed forces of the CIS and Russia. This article by Shaposhnikov had been mentioned on the trip to Tula by Colonel Vitaliy Leonov and apparently provided to me by him through these new instructors.

We went via the armor museum in Kubinka which is not open to Russian citizens. Had almost a full division worth of foreign and domestic armor - 380 vehicles, none of which looked like they were in working order. No modern weaponry observed although

there were differences in opinion between U.S. Army officers in the group whether there was a T-80 on display that had been re-labeled incorrectly. The most modern tank that I saw was a T-72 with reactive armor. What struck me, however, was that unlike other museums, none of the land equipment was for naval forces and no naval personnel appeared present. There were some armored patrol boats in a rear grassy area but these were not restored for display. Retired Swedish Major General Claes Skoglund attempted to correct some of the displays of Swedish-designed equipment, but the retired Russian colonel conducting our group appeared ill at ease with making any changes to the approved displays. From what I could learn, the Swedish general was correct. U.S. Army officers in our group were told that they would not take pictures but when the guides were not around (we had the freedom to walk around) there was nothing to prevent the taking of pictures.

Museum is commanded by a major of armor, Mikhail Chobitok. The total staff is only seven individuals. Chobitok was willing to sell uniforms off his back at very inflated prices. A team of workers arrived while we were there and they brought in a truck worth of World War II-era battlefield debris; i.e. stacks of German helmets, badges, medals, etc. Was this deliberate or are they still digging up the past?

After dinner, had social gathering with the two Frunze Academy officers. Viktor made a conscious and overt effort to meet with me and monopolize my conversation. He wanted to know how much I made and how much I had to spend for housing. We discussed my personal life to some degree and what types of aircraft I had flown. He is married to a woman that he met in Novosibirsk (mid-Siberia) and has served in the air forces, rocket forces, and ground forces. He also did not drink very much and finally stopped drinking altogether. I concluded that he was GRU since why else would he have served with so many armed services? Viktor was not subtle and he was loud.

Viktor wanted to engage in a substantive discussion. He opened with a question about how America will view the military might of Russia now that there has been a break-up of the former USSR. I replied: (1) that this is what we were here to learn, (2) that it would depend upon how the CFE Treaty was implemented, and (3) that of course Russia would be viewed as a considerable military power. He kept interrupting me and clearly wanted to engage in a substantive discussion.

Viktor asked me if I would be willing to discuss American military doctrine and strategy if it was not secret. This was what I had suggested to Colonel Vitaliy Leonov on the trip to Tula. I made sure that he understood exactly what I was willing to talk about and then I agreed to do so the next day if he would be willing to discuss the same to my students. We agreed to have a one hour discussion by me and then one hour by them.

16 July (Thursday): Smolensk.

Toured the Museum of the Armed Forces and the Great Patriotic War. MiG-23 aircraft in rear with steps to look inside cockpit. Bust of Stalin inside may be the first and only one that we have seen on the trip. Guide made sure that we knew that during the Great Patriotic War, Stalin had never actually visited the front; he had, however, visited near the front northeast of Smolensk. Had meeting with students to try to decide what we had not seen. First was a lot of military aircraft in the skies. Second was any political posters. Third was pregnant women. We then tried to ascertain what we had seen that surprised us. First was the number of statues of Lenin and their decoration with fresh flowers. Second was the absence of freedom.

Evening staff car tour of defensive operation at Smolensk. Covered the advance of the German Army on same day 51 years ago. A very interesting experience that will help me better understand land warfare when I teach it. Retired Swedish General Skoglund appeared very knowledgeable about the matter. I later learned from him that a Swedish exchange officer had been serving with the Germans during this battle. Upon my return, I found no one that knew that the Swedes had exchange officers with the Germans during combat operations in World War II. The Swedes have apparently published a great deal about this but very few people in the U.S. reads Swedish. Skoglund is a former chief of staff for the Swedish Army.

Evening seminar with students and Viktor via Dmitriy, the tour translator. I was surprised that he was the one selected since I had asked one of the "GRUlets" to come and translate. I think it was at this time that one of them told our students outside of the seminar room that Dmitriy was KGB. Viktor also had brought in a woman from Smolensk, a director for one of the museum displays that our group had visited this morning. I was introduced to her and she appeared to speak no English. I told Viktor that she should go next door where there were a number of single young men who would enjoy practicing their Russian. Viktor said that she would stay. I decided that she was either his mistress or a Russian intelligence operative who was getting a demonstration of English. I made sure that no American was in the seminar room with Viktor and the others without at least one other American.

See Enclosure (5) for a report on this seminar. The evening ended with Viktor and Oleg remaining in the room with the female from Smolensk. I heard them lock their door and she emerged with them in the morning. She was very good looking and we were given no explanations. Most of the tour group noticed that she apparently spent the night with them.

- - - - -

17 July (Friday): Bus ride to Zagorsk.

Two students told me that they were going to take the train to Zagorsk instead of riding the bus. We had all talked about this the previous day and I did not have a problem with it. John Sloan and a number of the Russian tour guides had all heard us discuss it and had not objected. The bus ride was going to be very uncomfortable and I told the tour directors that I had considered it myself. When the bus went to leave, the Russians got very upset that the students had left. We were told that the tour guides were "responsible" for us. I defused the situation by telling them to simply go the train station and pick them up. We did and I asked Sloan how we needed to obtain permission to deviate from the scheduled plan. I was told that we simply needed to apply ahead of time. This was not what we had done in the past and was not what I had confirmed in writing to Sloan before we left on the tour. I showed Sloan the written confirmation I had sent him and reminded him that he had read it and said yes that we could deviate. Sloan did not back me up, however, during this incident and kept saying that he had never said that we could deviate from the programmed tour.

The students then asked Sloan if instead of traveling to Vladimir and Rostov in a few days, they could they return to Moscow where they would stay with a family arranged by Professor Roman Laba, an NPS faculty member staying in Moscow to perform research. Sloan appeared to say that he would make this formal request. It also became obvious that the Russian tour director and Sloan were of the opinion that some of the students had already spent the night in Moscow with this family. I tried to correct this misapprehension a number of times but it was obvious that this was what they believed and they would not change their opinion.

The bus trip all day to Zagorsk was tense. The Frunze instructors continued briefing on defensive military operations in vicinity of Smolensk. When I attempted to reengage Colonel Oleg Orekhov on the subject of Henry Trofimenko, he said that he didn't know what I was talking about. I left him alone. While at a stop, Dmitriy engaged me in a conversation while we were alone and behind the bus. He began to talk to me about further incidents and our safety. In the presence of Colonel Kuznetsov, Dmitriy gave me an explicit warning that any further modifications of the itinerary would lead to an "incident" that would be photographed and reported in the press and would not be to the liking of the U.S. or Russian governments. Kuznetsov appeared to agree with what Dmitriy was saying although he supposedly did not speak English. Dmitriy specifically warned me that the incident would involve our female officer.

I met with our students and told them to double all precautions and withdraw all requests for modifications of the programmed itinerary. We discussed possible translation problems and I concluded that I had indeed been given a direct warning. For additional details, see Enclosure (6).

Upon our arrival in Zagorsk, we were met by Colonels Bogdanov and Terekhov and Captain Vartanov who provided some of the tour group with copies of papers and books that they had requested. We did not see them later and I do not think that they spent the night.

18 July (Saturday): Zagorsk.

Day tour of local fortifications. I had a private two-hour discussion with a new Frunze instructor, Colonel Pëtr Fyodorovich Vashchenko. There was another instructor, a retired colonel in civilian clothes. Pëtr is an infantry officer and a former regimental commander in Afghanistan. He later told one of the students that he was the chairman of the department of the History of Military Art. Instead of viewing a religious procession, we held a discussion focused on how to teach military history and military art. One of the "GRUlets" translated. See Enclosure (5) for a report of this substantive discussion.

Pëtr held an afternoon seminar with the students, retired U.S. Army Colonel and Dr. Edward Bruner, Lars Ulfving, and the retired Swedish General Skoglund. I did not stay for all of this session. Most of the session again dealt with the reforms of the 1920's. By now we all realized that this was the appropriate historical surrogate for discussion of today. Pëtr also discussed with the students how the Soviets had not learned the proper lessons of the Spanish civil war. When I returned, the Swedish general was asking questions about independent airborne operatsii. Pëtr told him a few times that these were simply not planned for and that independent airborne combat actions would only be taken at the tactical-level of warfare. The Swedish general kept up with this theme in many other sessions.

During a routine dinner, an apparent drunk physically accosted LTC Dianne Smith, USA, causing an immediate reaction by the twenty (or so) tour participants at our table. The perpetrator left voluntarily but under the escort of some hotel employees. We thought the incident had passed but then the apparent drunk returned into restaurant. He made threatening gestures to the entire group but none of us reacted. He was escorted out again by hotel employees and the militia but again returned. This time he appeared to bump up against the individual who sat at the end of the long table, NPS student CPT Jim Jaworski.

Perpetrator threatened Jim and appeared to pull something out of his pocket. We later learned from Jim that it was a knife. Most of the rest of the table stood up and gathered around Jim for protection. No one made any threatening gestures nor said anything provocative. At one point one of our tour participants, Mr. Vladimir Poltoratzky, self-identified as a U.S. Army intelligence civil service employee, who is quite large, Slavic, and speaks fluent Russian, went over to the apparent drunk, shook his hand, and looked like he was trying to calm down the situation.

The Russian tour group leadership made no effort to handle the situation. Mr. Valeriy Kudashkin and the one woman in charge of this portion of the tour were at our table but did nothing to participate. John Sloan came in from another room and attempted to take charge and get the hotel staff or militia to eject the perpetrator for good. Our tour translators refused to get involved or even translate the reports of the incident into Russian. The "GRUlets" were nowhere to be seen. Hotel staff made one more attempt to contain the situation and then disappeared. Initial militia attempt appeared serious but the perpetrator returned anyway. Militia finally came back in with a force of around six men including one in beret. John Sloan again took charge to have this individual ejected and charged with a crime. John told the militia that incident would be reported to the embassy with a recommendation to place the establishment "off-limits." John appeared to be quite serious in his efforts to handle the situation.

John Sloan returned and said that he was going to file a report with the militia and wanted a witness. Jim Jaworski was the obvious candidate and he went off with the group. After twenty minutes or so, Jim returned saying that he had never left the hotel and that the militia wanted to release the individual since he was *mafia*. John came back in and said that we were going to insist that charges be filed. Jim Jaworski came back from the militia station and told us that no charges looked like they were going to be filed. He also said that there were three "friends" of the perpetrator who were waiting outside of the hotel and then had gone to the militia station as well. John Sloan finally also returned but could not tell us what was going on.

I discussed the situation with all of the students, some of the more senior retired military in the group, and with John Sloan. General consensus from students that they were afraid for their safety and they did not consider staying in Russia as worth the price we were having to pay. I agreed and decided that it did not matter if the incident was a set up by the KGB or the case of a *mafia* drunk out of control. John indicated that he was considering canceling the entire tour. I told him that I was calling the Assistant Naval Attache to ask for guidance and I instructed two students to arrange for the call.

I talked to Assistant Naval Attache LCDR Jeff Kuipers and told him what the situation was. I asked Jeff for his recommendation on our course of action and he recommended that we leave Russia. I agreed and asked him to repeat it to John Sloan who was there. John could not hear Jeff and the message was relayed via one of the students. I got on the phone again with Jeff and started to tell him where we were going and how to reach us in each city. When I tried to be more specific, the line went dead.

I asked tour group leader Maxim if it were actually possible to go to Moscow airport tomorrow and physically leave Russia. I was told yes that this was possible. I therefore notified Max that I wished to withdraw my group from the trip due to the lack of physical safety. I was told that this would be possible. His wife, Natasha, another tour director, came and asked me again why we were leaving and I said because the tour group, nor the hotel, nor the militia could guarantee the safety of our group. She agreed that this was true but asked me again why that meant we wanted to leave and thereby cause her to fill out much paperwork with her government.

I told Natasha that she should ask Dmitriy what had been said to me the day before. Since she did not appear to understand (she had not been on that portion of the trip), I told her that Dmitriy had warned me about incidents involving our group and that we had seen that warning demonstrated tonight. She immediately terminated the conversation and walked away to a seat all by herself and sat down. I then saw her go over to Dmitriy, who had suddenly appeared on the scene, and talk to him. Dmitriy registered no facial reaction to whatever she said and when they were done talking, Natasha went over to a corner and sat down by herself and looked rather upset. She made no further effort to speak with me. Max and I discussed further the plans to obtain new airline tickets and I told him to have someone make reservations on the first planes out of Moscow which would get us started on our return to Monterey. He agreed to do this and told me that his wife was going to the airport the next morning.

I went to the room of one of the group who was leaving to return to the U.S. and was being taken to the airport by Natasha the next morning. I asked him to call the Department of National Security Affairs at NPS and sketch out what had happened to our group and that we would be returning early. My intent was to ensure that NPS would know that we were leaving early but that they would not have to do anything but approve any telephone requests from airlines to change our airline tickets. He agreed to call NPS on Monday morning and apparently he did. This individual also agreed to take a computer disk back to the U.S. as a backup and that I would call him upon my return with instructions to mail it to me if our disks here were confiscated. I assured him that there was no classified material on the disk and that I was nothing more than a professor at NPS.

- - - - -
19 July (Sunday): Vladimir.

Swedish LTC Bojerud told me that his group was also very considering pulling out of the tour and wanted to know what was happening with us. I briefed him on the situation. I was then told by the Russian tour company directors that I would be impossible to go to the airport until we had tickets in our hand. I replied that we had tickets and we would take care of exchanging them ourselves if they would simply take us to the airport. I was then told that they had already checked (Natasha had gone to the airport) and there were no reservations available until after we were going to leave Russia anyway by train. The situation was obviously that we now were being told that we could not leave the country except via the scheduled tour route. I concluded that we were being held against our will and were essentially prisoners of the tour company.

Talked to students and was told by some that they were afraid for their safety and they wanted to leave. All agreed to abide by my decision. During a bus stop, I met with and struck "deal" with Dmitriy, the Russian tour leader responsible for that portion of the trip, and John Sloan to withdraw our request to leave and to remain with tour if Dmitriy (I pointed my finger directly at him) would ensure that there were no further incidents. Dmitriy agreed.

The bus then reloaded and I was taken to a telephone within five minutes (we were in the middle of nowhere) where connection made with our Assistant Naval Attache, LCDR Jeff Kuipers. I told Jeff about the "deal" with Dmitriy and that we were no longer going to seek an early departure. He asked me to file a report with the regional security officer and I said that I would. Asked Jeff to contact NPS Department of National Security Affairs and let them know what was going on and that we could not get out of the country early. Jeff said he would FAX NPS a short memo which he apparently did. Jeff then asked me when we were returning to Moscow so that we could be met at the train station. Before I could complete the reply, the line went dead. Max was outside of the room listening to my entire conversation.

I was soon notified by CPT Jim Jaworski that the militia had never bothered to take his statement last night. John Sloan and I discussed this and we both agreed that neither of us knew what was going on but that the new compromise solution would probably work.

We continued on our all day bus trip to Vladimir. Toured a museum of the Russian fleet located near the lake where Peter the Great sailed when a young man. Saw working models of WHISKEY Twin Cylinders and YANKEE submarines. Also some naval guns and

ordnance at this museum. No opportunity to discuss substance with two new Frunze Academy instructors who rode the bus but departed before we got to the hotel.

20 July (Monday): Bus ride to Rostov.

Bus tour of countryside north and northeast of Moscow with two new Frunze instructors. These later were most likely identified as LTCs Yuriy Gordyeiv and Anatoliy Myzdrikov. There was no opportunity for a substantive discussion and they left us midday without any fanfare. Upon our arrival in Rostov, I went up to the two new Frunze Academy instructors, Colonel Valentine Aleksandrovich Runov (looks very much like Bill Clinton) and LTC Pavel Dmitriovich Alekseyev, who were waiting on the steps of the hotel and asked if they could meet with me and a few of the students. They agreed and a special seminar was held.

Details of this seminar are contained in Enclosure (5). Additional comments are made in Enclosure (6).

21 July (Tuesday): Bus ride to Moscow and train to Kiev.

The Frunze instructors accompanied us on tour of Rostov area. No substantive discussions or follow-up from the previous evening. Again told by Swedish LTC Bojerud that they would leave the tour also if there was any way to actually do so. I confirmed that we had withdrawn our request to depart early. While at dinner in Zagorskand later in Moscow, I gave copies of my computer disk to others from the group who were leaving early.

Somewhere and sometime during the last few days, I had a discussion with the "GRUlets" concerning their fate at the end of training. I learned from them that the old contracts for language training did not specify in which nation they would serve upon graduation. At the end of their training, therefore, each would have to decide which Army they would enter. One of the cadets was from the Ukraine and seemed especially proud of this heritage. He was undecided, however, in which Army he would serve.

Met at the train station in Moscow by Colonel Oleg Orekhov who was accompanied by his wife (we were never introduced). He asked one student and one translator to find me so that we could talk. He immediately went into subject of Henry Trofimenko. He said that Henry was indeed helping them (implying at the Frunze Academy) to understand America. I replied that Henry was a good man who understood us. Oleg asked if I knew him personally and according to CPT Jim Jaworski, who was present, offered to introduce me to him. The "GRUlet" did not translate the offer. I

replied that I knew Trofimenko and that he had provided insightful comments on my forthcoming book. Oleg seemed impressed.

Oleg then asked me to come back to Russia and take a vacation with him. He added that I should bring my wife and that we would get a "presidential" dacha. I said that this might actually be possible since I had been asked to consider working next Summer with Aleksey Arbatov at IMEMO. Again Oleg seemed impressed. He then started a conversation about how the military was against rapid military reform and the civilians wanted to proceed to quickly. Most of this did not get translated well and I learned of it later from CPT Jaworski. The train was starting to leave and we said goodbye and departed. I considered Oleg's discussion most unusual and his offer for a vacation most out of character.

Uneventful passage to Kiev. We did not post guards this time since it seemed that the locks on the compartment doors were safe. I also met a medical research scientist, Sergey, who spoke fluent English. He assured us that this train was safe. Sergey said that he had worked in New York for 6 months and had visited the Asilomar conference center on the Monterey Peninsula.

- - - - -

July 22 (Wednesday): Kiev, Ukraine.

Met at train station by Vera Novoselova from INCOMART, the tour agency responsible for this portion of the trip. Also met by two new translators in civilian clothes. I asked them if they were cadets like the "GRUlets" from Moscow. They responded that they had already graduated. I asked them if that meant they were in the Army and the GRU. They responded, yes, of course, what did you expect?

Initial tour of the city and selected fortifications. Tour of the Museum of the Great Patriotic War and visit to exhibits on public display. Display included SS-20 missile, aircraft, armored vehicles and boats, and some naval ordnance. Tour was met by retired General-Major Gavrish. I asked Max if there were any more modern armored vehicles, such as the T-80. Max said that there was no T-80.

Our initial impressions of Kiev was that it was very different. The streets were clean, the grass cut, and flowers were being tended. The people seemed happier. Discussion session held with students to see if anyone agreed with my assessment that countervalue targeting of Russia would not serve U.S. interests. Another thought is that since they seem to respect technology (witness what we were shown at museums and they thoughts on DESERT STORM), can we use superior technology as a "club" in threats to bolster conventional deterrence? Discussion of what we had been shown there; a people used to invasion and destruc-

tion with rebuilding as the solution (even a hundred times). Clearly the Russian leaders do not value their people nor cities. Russia can be run by a handful of people who can control the media and the military/militia. The people have been trained to obey and serve. They merely await orders.

Meeting at the Ukrainian Military Air Defense Academy of the Army named after Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. This is not the same as the national air defense troops (*Voyska Protivovozdushnoy Oborony V-PVO*) but rather ground forces dedicated to air defense (*Voyska Voyskovoy Protovovozdushnoy Oborony*). Formal welcome by three general officers (waiting outside for us). Commander of the academy is a General-Major B.I. Dukhov (with 40 years of service). His deputy is a Colonel Somel? Also present is a General-Lieutenant (probably retired) who has been at the academy for 30 years. He is the senior instructor and a doctor/professor whose specialty is short and medium range ballistic missile defense. Retired General-Major Gavrish was also present.

We were given a handout (attached to this enclosure) about the academy and then told about it. Point was made that it is part of the Ukrainian Republic and not a CIS establishment. Students attend the academy after serving with field forces for 5 years. The program lasts 3 years and is limited to operational art. The current, and probably future program, is to train officers for all countries in the CIS and then return them to their native land for payback service. Admitted that the future is not very certain. Students are Captains or Majors that are promoted to Lieutenant Colonel upon graduation.

When responding to questions, commander did not want to get into the relationship of his troops to the V-PVO. Translator botched question about relationship to naval infantry and coastal defense forces but implied that there is no relationship yet (note subsequently in museum saw evidence of interaction with naval forces). Dodged questions about how curriculum had changed due to new defensive doctrine (said they are only a defensive force). Question from U.S. Army Major Kristi Crosby (self-identified as working for military intelligence) about whether they taught in Ukrainian. The general said that they were not yet teaching in Ukrainian but this may come later. In response to another question, he said that he was not willing to discuss lessons or Persian Gulf war in this audience.

Tour of museum of the academy. Saw some minor displays indicating that naval forces were included (photographs of exercises). No U-2 at this museum. I decide to take it upon myself to offer a special seminar on the new national security strategy. I attempt to have Dmitriy translate for me but he ignored my request and takes Max over to an air defense gun and pretends to be aiming and shooting it.

I ask one of the other translators to talk to the academy commander. I tell him although his academy is concerned with only operational art, certainly he and some of his senior faculty members have been educated in doctrine and strategy. He concurs and I then ask if he would like a presentation about the new U.S. regional defense strategy. He looks at me without answering and I explain who I am and that I have just written a book on the subject. He replies that he would very much like to hear what I have to say. We discuss when and it appears that he is busy the next day but he quickly offers up his Colonel deputy. I agree to meet with them the next morning.

Following the initial discussion and agreement for a supplemental meeting at the Academy the next day, I notice that the deputy goes and talks with Max and Dmitriy and then Max and Dmitriy have a long discussion. I go over to Dmitriy and ask him to ask the colonel if they would mind if a few of my students accompany me tomorrow. Dmitriy responds that he thinks they will be too busy to meet with me tomorrow.

We were then taken into an auditorium and shown a movie about the Great Patriotic War with emphasis on the Kiev area. While departing the museum, I walk alongside the colonel and tell him that I will see him tomorrow. He looks surprised and says that he was told that I would be busy with the programmed events. I respond that I will skip those events and would be more than happy to meet with him if he still wants to meet with me. He said that he would be very happy to meet with me.

That night we had a banquet with the general officers (one more two star was added) from the academy. I talked to some of them outside and asked if they would mind if I brought even more students. Eventually, I increased the amount to 6 and included Swedish LTC Bojerud. The retired General-Lieutenant asked me if I was really only a retired Captain 2nd Rank, clearly I must be a retired general officer. I replied that in our country it was not uncommon for individuals of my rank to study doctrine and strategy. I then introduced him to two students (rank Navy Lieutenant) and told him that they too would study this subject. He shook his head and walked away.

During the banquet, a toast was offered to the newly independent republic of the Ukraine. The students said that the commander of the academy did not drink to this. I presented a plaque from NPS and thanked the generals for their openness and for the opportunity to meet with the faculty tomorrow. I then offered a very emotional toast for the veteran's of the Great Patriotic War and those who had not returned from battle. I was told that we should not clink our glasses for such a toast since those who had not returned were not there to drink with us. After the banquet, one translator came up to me and said that he had been assigned to take me to the meeting the next day.

John Sloan told me that tomorrow he had set up a meeting with an advisor to the Ukrainian Minister for Security and that I was invited to attend. I agreed. Mark Monnahan, the senior U.S. Air Force attendee on our trip told the Air Force students that they would not attend this meeting since this was more official than meeting with academics and it had not been prearranged with the embassy.

July 23 (Thursday): Kiev, Ukraine.

At breakfast, I was introduced to Dmitriy I. Vydrin, an individual who was described by John Sloan as the advisor to the Ukrainian Minister for Security. This ministry is concerned with KGB-like activities and not defense, per se. I got his address and promised to come to his office in the early afternoon. Two translators showed up (one was new) to escort us. The translators would not use the taxicabs in front of the hotel and insisted that we go down to the main street where they were cheaper. The driver got lost going to the academy.

Upon our arrival, we were ushered into the deputy commander's office and we sat at the table. Also present was the retired General-Lieutenant, senior instructor. I introduced everyone and got ready to begin. The colonel said that although he had agreed to meet with me, unfortunately, we would not meet since the Deputy Minister of Defense decided that he wanted to meet with me instead. We were taken outside by the retired General-Lieutenant to two cars and I noticed that one of the translators was leaving. He came to me and said that he had some new tasking. I told the Air Force students that were accompanying me that it would probably be highly embarrassing for them to leave and I suggested that they stay with me, despite the concern of the senior Air Force individual on the trip that his "people" not get into an "official" meeting. They all agreed.

The remaining translator was Ukrainian (by birth) and spent the ride telling me how independent they were. I specifically asked about the loyalty of general officers and he said that they all had their opportunity to leave and probably could not do so in the future. The implication was that a line had been drawn in the sand, similar to West Point at the beginning of the Civil War, and those who stayed had made their own bed.

A report on the substance of the meeting with the Deputy Defense Minister is contained in Enclosure (5). Following this meeting, the General-Lieutenant came with us to the gate, and provided us with a small bus and driver. They took me to the next meeting I had scheduled and returned the students to the hotel.

My last meeting on the tour was at the Center of Political Innovations with Dr. Leonid S. Tupchiyenko, General Director, and Dmitriy I. Vydrin, Scientific Supervisor. The latter is apparently the political advisor to the Ukrainian Minister for State Security (Marchek, the former chief of the KGB). These individuals stated that they were attempting to set up a Ukrainian version of RAND. Also at the meeting were a number of other tour participants, LTC John Sloan, and a German graduate student from the University of Maryland (studying under Dr. Katherine McArdell Kelleher).

Our discussions included a wide range of subjects, including how one should design a military educational structure. In response to my question about coalition defenses for the Ukraine, I was told that the Ukraine was not interested in any collective security arrangements that would once again involve their loss of freedom. Actually I had meant arrangements with the West and obviously the answer involved Russia. They stated that any collective arrangements would first involve the Black Sea. They also denied any interest in ballistic missile defense and stated that NATO was a better alternative.

After this meeting, I called the U.S. Embassy in Kiev to report the meeting with the Deputy Defense Minister. I was told by the ambassador's secretary that the defense attache had yet to arrive and that the assistant, a chief warrant officer, was out of the office until next week. I told her to tell him that I had the meeting and would send him a report of the meeting upon my return to the U.S. I left my name and telephone numbers.

July 24 (Friday): Kiev, Ukraine and flight to Frankfurt, Germany.

Departed Kiev airport in early afternoon. No problems encountered during customs search other than confiscation of two medals that had been purchased by CPT Jaworski. He was given a receipt and told that he could have them back when he returned to Kiev (during the next three years). I had passed out copies of my computer disk to every student so that if my computer was "dropped" during the customs procedure, or confiscated, my notes would get through. There were no problems.

Upon arrival in Frankfurt, held two impromptu discussions to consider what we had learned during our trip and whether it had been worth it.

July 25 (Saturday): Flight to Monterey

Uneventful flight home.

Note: also attached to this enclosure are all the business cards from foreigners that I received during the trip.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

SECRET HISTORICAL NOTE

THE MILITARY AIR DEFENCE
ACADEMY OF THE ARMY NAMED
AFTER MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET
UNION VASILEVSKY A. M.

The Military Air Defence Academy is quite young academy. Till 1962 the officers with high education for the Army Defence forces were education in the Artillery Academy, at the commanding faculty of anti-aircraft artillery.

In 1962 that faculty was given to the Kiev High Engineer College of the Army Defence Forces. In 1974 the Academy branch was made on the basis of commanding faculty. And in 1977 this branch was changed into the military Air Defence Academy of the Army.

For short term of its existence the Academy was transformed in the leading military training college of the Army Air Defence Forces.

Mainly the College authority is determined by gradulators. The Academy gradulators serve almost in each military unit of the Air Defence Forces.

They provide high combat readiness, active participation in the personal combat training, learning of the new combat materiel, organization of its technical maintenance.

Hundreds of the Academy gradulators were awarded the USSR orders and medals.

For 3 years the officers are trained in basic models of weapons and automatic control systems, the organization of the maintenance and combat employment.

The structure of the officers training includes 3 integrated systems :

fundamental theoretical training

basic practical training

supervised training in duties.

The main task of the system of fundamental theoretical training is to form the strong, fundamental knowledge in the sphere of the social development, military struggle, tactics and minor strategies, the structure and development of the Army Air Defence armament,

the means of its employment and the methodic basis of the management. Approximately 30% of the training time is given for this purpose and the means of their combat employment.

The material basis of this system of training is the new perspective (basic) weapon systems, large units and units of the Army Air Defence forces equipped with the latter. Approximately 40% of the training time is given for the purpose.

Approximately 30% of the training time is given for supervised training in duties.

The main efforts are concentrated in creating the officers' skills and abilities to control units as in peace as well as in war time.

This structure of the training system provides the highly qualified specialists, and the main distinctive feature of the specialist should be the ability to the active study and providing in practice all progressive matters in the military affairs, sciences, education of the personnel.

Such specialist must combine the wide and deep training on the whole complex of theoretical and practical disciplines with the ability to self-finding of the new principal decisions of the military problems, to understand in the flow of military-technical and socio-political information.

The active approach is widely used in the training and education process in the academy and also the following modern active methods of the training are used : business games, command and staff training, discussion, self supervised training, battle control training, individually plans training, which gives the possibility to intensify the training process, to rise activity of the officers in the classes.

The academy has modern training facilities, which can help to conduct the training process with the use of latest achievements of the science and technics, computers, simulators and technical means of education.

During the short period of time the Academy became the leading science center of the Army Air Defence troops. The biggest scientific researches and inventions are put into modern technics and armaments and influenced greatly on the armament development.

Adjuncture and doctorature functioning in the Academy became the basis for the good developed system of the scientific and pedagogical personal. This was achieved due to the special advisory committees work on the awarding of scientific degrees of Doctor and Candidate of Science.

Total number of the scientists during the academy life is more than 750. Many of them head the faculty collectives in the Academy and other colleges, successfully work in the scientific and research institutions.



Stellan Bojerud
Lieutenant Colonel
LKrVA KLÖS

Royal Staff College
Box 27805
S-115 93 STOCKHOLM

Tel: Int +46 8 788 93 81
Fax: Int +46 8 788 94 99



FÖRSVARSTABEN

Lars Ulfving
Avdelningsdirektör

Fst/Op 5
Box 80001
104 50 Stockholm
Tel: 08-788 81 47

Eskadervägen 46
183 54 Taby
Tel: 08-756 90 85

Cheng Ching-Jung
REPORTER
CHINA TIMES EXPRESS

132, DA-LI ST., TAIPEI, TAIWAN, R. O. C.
TEL: (02) 3067715; 3082221 EXT. 5926
FAX: (02) 3021341

Tai Wan-chin

DIRECTOR
INSTITUTE OF RUSSIAN AND SLAVIC STUDIES
TAMKANG UNIVERSITY

7TH FL., 46, LANE 325, CHUANG-CHING ROAD
TAIPEI, TAIWAN.
FAX: (02) 7230487
TEL: (02) 3928284 (O) 7221579 (H)

ALKOR
TECHNOLOGIES INC.

SNITKOVSKY
Vladimir A.
Chief Expert Analyst

Ap 79, 27, Krylenko st St Petersburg
Russia
Office (812) 235-70-15
Home (812) 585-98-62
Fax (812) 585-98-62, 235-54-35

LENINGRAD SHIPBUILDING INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT SHIP'S POWER INSTALLATIONS

Prof. **NIKOLAEV V. I.**, Sc. D.

Director, Reserch Laboratory of the automatization
of the Designing Ship's power installattons

USSR, Leningrad, 196211
Gagarin st. 18/1-29
home tel. 264-19-43

USSR, Leningrad, 190008
Lotsmanskaya st. 3
tel. 11480-21
113-89-36

Deputy Chief of
the Institute of Military History

Anatolii G. Har'koff

Doctor of History, Professor
Managerial Council Member of
the International Institute on
Prisoners of War Problems - USA

tel: 258-37-29
147-45-61

INSTITUTE OF MILITARY HISTORY

Captain 1-st rank

Prof. Valery N. VARTANOV

Chief of the Department
of Foreign Military History

Moscow
Universitetsky prospect. 14

ph. 147 44 45

REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

Captain the 1st rank

Vyacheslav P. Zimonin

D. Ph. in History, Corresponding Member
of the Academy of Natural Sciences RF

Vice-chief of
the Institute of Military History,
Ministry of Defense RF

Moscow, 117330
Universitetsky av., 14

Tel. 147-45-68
319-65-51

Fax.

Gennady K.
LEDNEV

Senior researcher
Department on Disarmament

Bozris N.

Makeyev

Capt. 1st Rank
(Ret.)

Academy of Sciences
of the USSR

23, Profsoyuznaya str.
117418 Moscow USSR
Fax (095) 3107027

tel 120 4229

IMEMO

Institute for World
Economy and
International
Relations

Yuri Mikhailovich Prokofiev

ПРОКОФЬЕВ

Начальник Управления военного образования
Министерства обороны Украины

Министры обороны тел.: сл. 213-28-00
дом. 216-82-96

Institute for Military History

MAJOR

Dr. Victor M. GOBAREV

Deputy Chief of Section
President of Council of Young Researchers

Moscow 117330
Universitetsky prospect, 14

Telephone: 147-21-71

LTE Oleg Orehov
St. Marshal Golovanov 7
Moscow 109369
Russia
tel 357-66-73

Center of Political Innovations «InnoCenter»

Leonid S. Tupchiyenko

General Director
Ph. D. (Philosophy), Professor

254119, PO Box 2
KIEV, UKRAINE
Fax (044) 213-71-02

Tel.: office 211-44-67
211-45-85
home 474-47-61

Substantive Research Findings

12 July (Sunday): Discussion on Day Trip to Tula.

Bus ride to/from Tula discussions with Colonel Vitaliy Leonov, and instructor from the Frunze Ground Forces Academy, supplementary to materials contained in Enclosure (4). Vitaliy and I had a detailed discussion of the breakdown of the technical categories of war and he said local/global was the first order of distinction. Vitaliy also said that there was no distinction for nuclear weaponry; war is war and the choice of nuclear or conventional weapons is a secondary or tertiary issue. This coincides with my own analysis. We continued our discussion to include the separation of warfare into its three levels. He used examples right out of the matrices that I had developed for my own classroom use. I plan to send him my matrices and ask him for comments.

Vitaliy stressed that the concern at the Frunze Academy is operational art and tactical only. I wanted to expand the discussion to the strategic-level. Vitaliy said that each service has its own schools for command and general staff and the first time the Soviet/Russian military gets together for "combined arms" education is at General Staff Academy, formerly named for Voroshilov. He said that the Frunze Academy is getting smaller but will continue in future including training for foreign officers. I assumed that his definition of "foreign" included nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but I did not ask him for clarification. Vitaliy said that there were no Navy officers at the Frunze Academy. This is unusual since at U.S. command and general staff colleges, all services are generally represented. I decided to follow-up this theme with additional instructors.

Vitaliy stated that the teaching method is to have all the instructors meet as a collective before a new series of classes and then agree what will be taught. He said that all Frunze instructors are military officers and none are civilians. When we were discussing opportunities for him upon retirement, Vitaliy said that an instructor's academic rank does not stay with them when they leave the Academy and he did not know of any opportunities to use his academic experience at a civilian school. He also said that he could not assign his students reading as homework; everything needed to be presented in class. This may help to explain why the curriculum at the Frunze Academy is three years long. He also said that the Soviet/Russian military did not send officers to civilian schools for advanced political-military education. I discussed the advantages of different methods of education, especially to help them learn about us. This is a theme that I returned to with virtually all Frunze instructors.

Vitaliy seemed interested in why I retired and now work at same place as a civilian.

Vitaliy said that the instructors at the Frunze Academy have no knowledge of Russian military history. Only now are they being allowed to look at this subject for first time. He made it clear that history is defined as anything that happened through yesterday. Hence he felt more comfortable in discussing the history of the Persian Gulf war, or the history of the Gorbachev era, etc., rather than the implications of the war on emerging doctrine and strategy. The discussions of history, however, were really implications for today. Regarding the Persian Gulf war, Vitaliy thought that value of navies had been proven. I disagreed (to get a discussion going) and he seemed surprised but he did not press me. We then had a discussion of the concept of official service positions vice official ministry-level or General Staff-level views and how one might have to understand that when reading lessons learned issued by either the U.S. or Soviet/Russian governments or defense establishments. Vitaliy seemed to agree that the ground offensive was needed in Operation DESERT STORM.

I asked Vitaliy about the impact of the demise of any ideological role for the Russian armed forces. He said that they already have had an opportunity to revise the curriculum. They apparently did not add any new materials but allowed for additional in-depth coverage of what was already specified. We had a discussion of correlation of forces at the Battles of Kursk and Stalingrad, and during the Manchurian Operation. We then had a technical discussion of how to construct equivalent division and effective equivalent divisions as a classroom exercise.

I decided that our methods were very similar and that Vitaliy made great pains to use Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-approved numbers. We then had a discussion about net assessment as a methodology with these use of equivalent and effective equivalent divisions as examples. Tanks as other examples with Vitaliy offering up CFE-approved values for various tanks relative to others.

We got into a discussion which I later used with virtually every instructor with whom I talked. It involved how do you develop specialists about other nations. Vitaliy stated that this is role of intelligence services. I suggested that line officers and civilians have major role to play as well. He said that as an instructor at the Frunze Academy, he was merely given materials to use in the classroom and could not deviate from that material. I asked from where the material was obtained and he replied that the academy is given material by the intelligence services to use about the U.S. and they did not develop their own specialists. Vitaliy appeared very knowledgeable about U.S. military doctrine and strategy and interested in discussing it. He knew about Henry Trofimenko's book *U.S. Military Doctrine*. I

told him that I used it as a textbook as well. I also told him that I knew Henry and corresponded with him on my research activities.

Discussion and in-depth analysis of what the term "initiative" means. Vitaliy offered an example of **not** doing something that obviously does not need to be done, since it was unexpectedly already done by someone else, and instead doing the next logical thing. He said that war plans are never complete and one must always be prepared to initiate logical actions. Plans are designed to be fleshed out on the field and not followed blindly. Discussion of responsibility of division-level commanders. Overall message is that there are boxes of responsibility and authority and that you can do anything in your box but you cannot exceed the box.

I discussed with Vitaliy my plans to meet later during our trip to Moscow with staff from the U.S.A. and Canada Institute and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). We started a discussion about the future organizational development of the armed forces and he referred me to a recent article in *Pravda* by Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). I said that I did not have it and he agreed to try to find it and send it with the instructors that would accompany us to Smolensk. He did this and I have the article.

We then started a discussion of nuclear issues. Vitaliy conceded that we all need to reduce nuclear armaments to much lower levels. I agreed. We discussed the use of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) *Military Balance* to use for training. He seemed familiar with it and said that they use it at the Frunze Academy as well for basic classroom exercises. From this I learned that his students are not assigned any homework at all.

I then opened with a discussion of the report of Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear war plans for the western theater of military operations (WTVD) found in the September/October issue of IISS's journal *Survival* [refers to article "Offensive defense in the Warsaw Pact," by Lothar Rühl on pp. 442-450 of that issue]. Vitaliy got upset with the question and at an ill-timed stop of the bus for a break, he returned with retired Major General Claes Skoglund, the tour's Swedish general, who he then put between us. All substantive discussion was terminated.

- - - - -

13 July (Monday): Seminars at U.S.A. and Canada Institute and Military History Institute

Report of seminar held at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute supplementary to lead-in found in Enclosure (4).

Igor Sutyagin, researcher at the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada Studies, picked me up at my hotel and escorted me to the Institute. He presented me with a set of prints of Soviet uniforms for the students. He was wearing a pin that I gave him last year in Monterey. Upon arrival at the institute, I was left alone in his office for one hour while the department had a meeting to discuss a researcher's dissertation. While in the room, people would come in, from time to time, and expressed no surprise that someone that they did not know was sitting there. A computer had been left on, which I did not touch. I used the time to read Igor's written comments on a draft of a paper that I had sent him in May (attached to this enclosure).

I was then escorted to departmental meeting and introduced to Sergey M. Rogov, head of the department on military-political affairs. I was told to introduce myself and make about a half hour presentation on America's new regionally-focused defense doctrine and strategy. I asked Sergey if I should assume that the audience had read my paper and he said "no." I gave a fifteen minute overview of the new strategy and told them that they could read more about it in my article "The New American National Security Strategy," in their own journal *SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, issue no. 12, 1991, p. 28-43. The audience size was about twenty, including at least two retired general officers. The talk was the same that I give at general audiences in the U.S. and that I gave on the USIA-funded AmPart speaking tour last January.

I asked them for detailed questions to serve as the focus for my remarks and I spent another fifteen minutes answering them. Their questions included: (1) the probable results of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, (2) the impact on NATO of the creation of Western European Union armed forces, (3) the future of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, (4) the difficulty of conversion and reconversion of industry, (5) future cooperative security actions, and (6) how to deal with the Russian/Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet issue. Since I used my notes to give my own talk, I felt free to write down their questions. I gave diplomatically correct answers and carefully identified my opinions as my own where it was warranted.

After the questions and answers session, Igor and I walked back to his office and then to lunch at the institute buffet. Along the way to lunch, Igor pressed me about our competitive strategies initiative and he told me that he was surprised that one of the professors in the audience did not ask me about net

assessment since the professor had written a study about the process. I told him what I knew about competitive strategies.

Lunch cost less than twenty-five cents and the retired generals also ate there. Igor told me that for one month recently no one at the institute had been paid due to the lack of money. Igor asked if I would like to go and see a special air museum where I could sit in the cockpit of a fighter. I told him that I was interested but that I did not have the time. Igor told me that he had been in touch with Rear Admiral Vladimir S. Kryazhev, Deputy Head of the Naval Directorate, at the Russian General Staff. I had written the admiral a letter asking for an audience while I was in Moscow but found it impossible to obtain the address to write him or deliver a Federal Express package. I had eventually sent my letter for the admiral to Igor and asked him to deliver it. The admiral had indeed either received or heard about my request for a visit and told Igor that he could not see me since he was on the general staff. I passed this information on to the U.S. Assistant Naval Attache when I next saw him and remarked that the U.S. Navy had hosted Kryazhev in Monterey and I was very disappointed that he could not reciprocate. Jeff seemed to indicate that the embassy could use this lack of reciprocity to their advantage.

A similar letter had been sent to Captain 1st Rank Vlasov at the Main Navy Staff but this too was undeliverable. In that case, I instructed Federal Express to deliver it to the U.S. Embassy to the LCDR Jeff Kuipers, the Assistant Naval Attache. When I spoke to Jeff a few days earlier at our hotel, he indicated that he never received it. When I returned to the U.S., Jeff told me that he eventually found it in their office but that it had never been brought to his attention.

We returned to Igor's office where I discussed the notes that he gave me with comments on my paper. It was obvious that even though I am in America, I have access to some better Russian sources than he does. This was a similar pattern repeated elsewhere. There were a number of sources in my endnotes that were marked by him indicating that he had not yet seen them and would search for them.

Igor asked me whether the West ever had plans to invade the Warsaw Treaty states. I said no. I asked him if he was familiar with the KGB's Operation Ryan, as reported by former KGB General Oleg Gordievskiy. He said yes and that it was real. I then used this topic for many additional discussion held with other Russians as an example of how bad the KGB understood us and how much improvement was needed in their efforts. Igor and I then had an in-depth discussion on the subject of military capabilities versus intentions and why each side had to look first at capabilities before they should look at intentions. Igor wanted to know why we did not have plans to fight France or the United

Kingdom since they had capabilities that could hurt the U.S. I gave him diplomatically correct answers.

One of Igor's comments was that now retired Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay V. Ogarkov had spoken out against relying on nuclear weapons as early as 1966. He said that he learned of that from Voroshilov General Staff Academy lecture notes that were not available to the West. I asked him if I could be provided with a copy or at least an academic citation. He said that he would provide this. It has not yet arrived.

We then had an in-depth discussion of the use of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in the WTVD, as reported by the IISS journal *Survival*. Igor's written comments included an acknowledgement that nuclear operations were to begin early but would have been limited to the WTVD. I asked him if the leaks in *Survival* and in the Soviet press were authoritative and he said yes.

Igor also said that Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) already had a permissive action link (PAL) system to prevent inadvertent launch. In response to a follow-on question, he said that the data would have to be received in digital or analog form (I do not recall which) in order to be useful, i.e. an alternative scenario that I posed of telephone receipt of authorization would not be sufficient.

Igor seemed eager to ask me how it would be interpreted in the West if a variant three defensive military doctrine would be replaced by variant two. He seemed quite sure that this was the direction that they were heading. He hinted that the offensive counterattack might take place primarily with airpower but not only with those forces. He said it should not bother us with buffer states now between Russia and Germany. I told him that we would obviously be more comfortable with a variant three defense.

We also discussed Soviet nuclear targeting and Russian President Boris Yeltsin's statement that Russian missiles were no longer targeting American (and other) cities. According to Igor, apparently this "shift" did not require actual changes since cities were not targeted by design, only as an unfortunate consequence. Hence when some in Russia said that nothing has changed as a result of Yeltsin's actions, they are right.

The final discussions concerned the strategic missions of the armed forces. Igor strongly suggested that the missions found in the 1987 book *The Navy* are not new and that if I looked at the published Voroshilov Academy lectures from the mid-1970s, I would see them there as well. I have done so and do not see the evidence Igor said was there. He added that he always understood that these 1987 missions were the strategic missions of the Soviet armed forces.

Somewhere in the middle of all of this, I asked Igor about the pro-Navy articles that had been authored by Andrey A. Kokoshin, now Deputy Defense Minister for Russia, and formerly the Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute. He said that these articles were either an attempt to buy favor from the Navy (since Kokoshin had been picked to be the new defense minister) or the easy way out (it would be easier later to say Russia could not afford or did not need a large fleet). Igor repeated that Kokoshin was supposed to have the job as defense minister and he added that the military backed him since they wanted a civilian who could say "no" to Yeltsin. Igor stressed that the military did not want General-Colonel Grachev since they were afraid that he would simply do what he was told.

Somewhere else on this trip, someone told me that General Grachev still thought like a division commander and did not have what it takes to be the head of the military. Igor seemed to put down Grachev in the tone of his voice. We also discussed the possibility of another military coup and Igor expressed the opinion that this would not happen.

At some point, we discussed the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. Although neither of us had a solution, Igor lamented that some of his senior colleges were split internally on this issue. One side of them wanted to advance the cause of democracy and allow the Ukraine to take a part of the fleet. The other side of the same individual was nationalistic and wanted to retain the fleet. Igor said that a solution was reached and that it will be announced soon. I suggested on Navy day and he said perhaps. He also indicated that his own institute had sent a recommendation to the Supreme Soviet to not make the fleet the major issue but rather instead concentrate on keeping good relations with the Ukraine. This was how I had answered the question posed to me during the seminar. Igor conceded that the issue might really be over who will sell the fleet.

I asked Igor about the revised ranking of the services and asked him how that was going. He said that he had been unaware of this until he read it in my paper. He thanked me for the information. His attitude was that since nuclear weapons are settled and going down in numbers, hence the Strategic Rocket Forces would be ranked lower. No one was arguing over them.

At some point in the discussion, I asked Igor about the importance of Marshal Shaposhnikov. Igor agreed with my suggestion that Shaposhnikov may not be as important as he was in the past now that Russia has formed its own armed forces.

Igor was interested in further collaboration. I gave him a note from Brassey's publishers concerning his idea for a Russian Jane's using Russian formerly classified material. I told him that he did not need to go through me. I also specified the conditions under which we could co-author a piece and suggested

that he work with the materials that I had already sent him; i.e. the new U.S. national security strategy or lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war. We agreed to attempt to publish something both in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* and/or *Morskoy Sbornik*. I asked him what ever happened to the follow-on to my article in *SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* and he told me that the editor told him that one article on that subject was sufficient.

Upon leaving his office, we agreed to stay in touch, I gave him a key chain from Monterey and a small Navy pin. A number of times during the day, he had indicated that we might get together again before I left Moscow but I put him off due to other commitments. We departed his office and went by taxicab to the Military History Institute. Igor accompanied me so that we could continue the discussion despite the shortness of time. At no time did Igor back away from any discussion of issues and he spoke freely in the cab. Only one in his office did he lower his voice when I asked about the future of President Yeltsin. When we parted, Igor said that we could not meet tomorrow since it was his mother's birthday. My assessment of this department of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute was that it was hungry for materials from the U.S. since it lacked a budget to buy it for themselves.

Report of seminar held at the Military History Institute supplementary to lead-in found in Enclosure (4).

At the Military History Institute, Captain 1st Rank P. Zimonin said that we should start and I gave the first presentation for a little over five minutes. It was an overview of our new regionally-focused defense doctrine and strategy. I only covered sources, decision-making, and my conclusions. I then said that I would like to give them the opportunity to ask me questions since they could read my paper at their leisure (my recent technical report had been provided in the main auditorium previously). Since this was an open seminar and I needed my notes to make the presentation, I openly took notes of my own.

The first question was from a civilian who wondered if the U.S. had finally adopted proper terminology. I replied that we had not and that I was deliberately using Russian terms so that they would be translated into proper Russian and the audience would better understand what I was talking about. He then followed with why we didn't use the correct terms. I gave him a lesson in freedom and democracy and the lack of standardization.

The second question was if we had dropped our competitive strategies initiative. I suggested that he read our reports from the Secretary of Defense to the Congress and draw his own conclusions. I also described the office's location in the Pentagon. I then said that the concept was still in many people's minds even though there might not be a prestigious office nor a lot of discussion in our programming documents.

The third question was if we would revise the AIRLAND battle and would it now be Air-Land-Sea. I suggested that he look at my paper on the Soviet/Russian lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war (provided Friday) and that perhaps we did not agree with their lessons. He did not follow up.

The fourth question was from Major Victor M. Gobarev, Ph.D. and President of the Council of Young Researchers. Victor spoke excellent English and appeared to have a lot to say about what the Russians were doing at the symposium. He appeared to have some authority over the translators. Did this mean that he was a GRU officer? Victor made a conscious effort to flatter me by referring to my prize-winning article "The Bear's Carrot" which appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* in 1986. He wanted to know that if it was ideology that held the USSR together, what would do that in the future. I replied that the work of the Military History Institute would be vital since Russia needed to discover its roots and heritage and this would provide the basis for national cohesion.

At this point, Captain Zimonin ended the questions. Other papers were presented but questions were held to the end of the seminar rather than the end of each paper. After the last American paper was presented, there was a break and only a few of the Russians returned. The two retired general officers had apparently been delegated the responsibility of a formal reply to our research. One, General-Colonel and Professor Doctor stated that the U.S. had only changed the socio-political aspects of doctrine and not its aggressive military-technical nature. He went on with a polemical criticism of the U.S. and NATO. There was no opportunity to reply. The general also gave an explanation as to why Soviet defense expenditures were so high, to which retired Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) senior executive servant (SES) Bill Lee stated "nyet." A lively give and take followed.

The other general officer asked questions and was a bit more subdued but again there was no opportunity to reply. The editor of the *Military Encyclopedia* was more civilized and wanted to know about geographic/horizontal escalation but there was no opportunity to reply. He also stated that there should be more joint research. We were informed that we were holding everyone up for dinner and the session ended. Despite our session being a bit of a problem for the Russians when we started, it was the most well attended and lasted well past the time that all the other sessions ended.

14 July (Tuesday): Seminars at Military History Institute and Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

Report of seminar at the Military History Institute supplementary to lead-in found in Enclosure (4).

Meeting with General-Major Anatoliy G. Har'koff, Professor and Doctor, Deputy Chief of the Military History Institute. The general began by introducing himself to the students with a short biography. The new information that he added was that his thesis was on combat readiness of the armed forces prior to the Great Patriotic War. He showed us a book that was the published version of his thesis. Har'koff is a member of some commission to investigate U.S. POWs. Details were taken down by one of our U.S. Air Force tour attendees.

Har'koff indicated that he was the author of a primary section of a major textbook that dealt with the reforms of the 1920s. This book is *The History of Military Arts: A Textbook for Military Academies of the Soviet Armed Forces*, by B.V. Panov, V.N. Kiselev, I.I. Kartavtsev, et. al., signed to press October 28, 1984 (JPRS-UMA-85-009-L, March 21, 1985). Har'koff also showed us copies of other books and articles that he wrote, one article was in English and had his picture.

I asked General Har'koff whether there was a historical parallel to a nation that attempted to defend its borders with light forces backed up by tactical and operational reserves and a large strategic reserve far in the rear with the possibility of counteroffensive operations beyond its own borders with only airpower. The general replied that it was not too important to study past parallels and that we should learn more about the new international security environment and devise military doctrines and strategies based upon these new realities. I was surprised at his answer since it did not correspond with past practice of the use of historical surrogates and indicated his willingness to do away with the need to couch our discussion in historic terms. It may have also indicated that the historical surrogate I used (what I thought was where they were headed) has not been researched, indicating that it is not the direction of future doctrine.

General Har'koff indicated that my conclusions on the Battle of Khalkin Gol was correct, Marshal Zhukov won because of his commitment of strategic reserves at the correct moment. I had not implied this in my question. Perhaps this was a translation problem and perhaps there was something he was avoiding?

We then got into a discussion of the importance of studying the military reforms of 1924-1925 since they were very instructive for the situation today. He then said that he would answer my previous question. He described the defensive doctrine of that era as being one with border cadre troops and mobilization

forces for the strategic reserves. He then said that they will not necessarily repeat this history but merely use it to select what worked the best. I noticed that Har'koff used the technique of initial brief answers to my in-depth questions and then returning to them later with a more substantive answer.

I followed this with a direct question about the size of the fleet. He indicated that the fleet would stop growing. I asked for a historical parallel for the future fleet and he indicated that it might be the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Then he got excited and told me to look at the 9th Army or Corps (translation problem) and see that today it would be professional versus mobilized forces. He indicated that the history of joint warfare during this period was very instructive today. I am not familiar with the period that he referred to. I wrote the general a letter and asked him to clarify what he said.

The general indicated that he was writing a monograph on the history of the Cold War for the RAND Corporation. I asked him who he was working with and he got vague saying that he did not remember the name and that it was somewhere on his desk. Later he pulled out a Russian newspaper that had a picture of Ben Lambeth. I asked him if Ben was who he was working with and he said yes. He said that he did not have a FAX number for RAND and that he only met with Ben when he came to Moscow for other reasons. I know Ben and will talk to him about Har'koff.

The general hinted a first and then openly solicited for an invitation to the U.S. I replied that if he were going to the U.S. anyway, our school might be able to cover the costs of a visit to Monterey. This needs to me looked into since RAND might be interested in partially paying his way if he is really working with them. He said we must ask for him by name and that he can only come if we pay the total costs.

The general stated that he needed better sources for the new U.S. military doctrine and national security strategy. I told him that much of this was already in his country and he needed to make use of the resources at the civilian academic institutions. It would take some 4-5 hours to copy all of the source materials that I have. He asked if I could send him a copy of my book and I agreed. This opened a further discussion of how we could swap books and other source materials.

I asked the general if he was familiar with the article by General-Major Yuriy V. Lebedev, General-Lieutenant (Retired) I.S. Lyutov, and Colonel V.A. Nazarenko, "Persian Gulf War: Lessons and Conclusions," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, nos. 11-12 (December 1991): pp. 109-117 (JPRS-UMT-92-005-L, March 23, 1992, pp. 60-64). He said that he was. I asked him about a specific paragraph dealing with the use of land rather than the holding of land as a concept for ground forces operations. He got quite excited and indicated that he agreed with my assessment that

there was a great similarity of such operations with naval warfare. I asked him if they were researching this area and he said yes. I told him that I had done research on this area already and published two articles that he might find of interest. He did not ask me for them. Instead he indicated that the new coastal divisions were a recognition of the similarity of land and sea warfare.

The general responded to a student's question about a revolution in military affairs by saying that although this was theoretically possible due to advances in technology, it would not happen due to the realities of the economy. There would be no opportunities for serial development of new weaponry, indicating that they will shift to prototyping. The general also said that tanks have outlived their usefulness.

At some time later in this discussion, the general told us that we should take advantage of research that each of us has done already so that it would not need to be performed again. I believe that this was a serious comment and indicated that under "scientific" socialism, once a topic has been researched, it need not be done again. Under such a system, there would not be any need to review conclusions by others nor tolerance for a diversity of views. Based on similar comments by others later, I feel that this was a legitimate comment and represented how they think rather than an attempt to solicit research results.

Twice during discussion, the general gave the impression that he accepted the view that peace would be maintained by a parity of nuclear weapons. I clarified and asked him if he accepted deterrence as a concept and he said yes. I made sure that our "GRUlet" translator correctly used deterrence from the concept of punishment rather than denial.

I offered to collaborate with the Institute in some jointly authored article, monograph, or book on military doctrine and strategy or the lessons of the Persian Gulf war. He said that I should send him a proposal in writing and specify exactly what the Russian participant would be expected to do. I will do this soon.

I asked the general if he was familiar with the published "leaks" of Soviet war plans in the WTVD. He said that he was familiar with them. I said that we had followed the articles of Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, former Chief of the USSR General Staff, and seen that he did not appear to advocate relying on nuclear strikes for strategic operations in the WTVD. I then asked the general to comment. His reply was that Ogarkov did not speak for the military when he wrote his articles and monographs and that we should have never interpreted those as anything more than his personal views. He then rambled a bit but appeared to confirm these war plans by saying they would be changed to conventional plans.

Report of seminar held at IMEMO supplementary to lead-in found in Enclosure (4).

We then went to IMEMO and had a second substantive meeting of the day. I assumed that the attendees already knew about the new U.S. national security strategy, hence I simply opened it up to questions after presenting them with a copy of the *National Military Strategy of the United States* and a recent technical report of mine on our new regionally-focused defense doctrine and strategy. The Russians deferred to Vice Admiral (Ret.) Nikolay Pavlovich Markov, who spoke through a translator. Everyone else spoke English. The firsts question was if any of the documents concerning the new American doctrine had anything to do with sea communications. I responded with lift and prepositioning goals contained in the annual reports of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Follow-on question wanted to know if we assumed any opposition at sea. I responded with an outlining of planning scenarios contained in the *Joint Military Net Assessment* and those found in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* reporting on leaks from the *Defense Planning Guidance*. I did not say that these scenarios were authoritative but merely said they were useful in talking about future warfare. After going over the framework for scenarios, I said that in most of these, there would be no assumed threat on the open oceans for most but that in certain cases, depending upon who was involved with a crisis, it might involve nations that had a naval force of substance.

The admiral came right back at me by directly asking why we, the British, and/or the French were still patrolling off their coasts in the new international security environment when they had ended all patrols off our coast. I gave him a diplomatic answer with multiple possible explanations and let him decide which he wanted since I obviously did not really know.

Gennady K. Lednev then asked if the recent agreements on nuclear arms between Bush and Yeltsin would require a revision of the strategy. I said no, that they were consistent with our doctrine and strategy. I did suggest, however, that lower numbers of warheads might suggest a shift to countervalue and non-prompt nuclear targeting. They appeared to agree by nodding.

I then asked to have the students begin their questions. The first had to do with the depth of operations from the land for the future Russian Navy. The admiral stated that the fleet would be limited to the Barents and Northern Norwegian Seas, the Bering Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, and the Northern Sea of Japan. He said it would not deploy anywhere else. He then made it even more clear that it would not deploy along the U.S. sea lines of communications. A follow-on indicated that both sides should withdraw from the Mediterranean as if they still deployed there. The admiral seemed to accept the division of the Black Sea Fleet

and didn't seem like this was an issue anymore. He also spoke favorably about joint exercises and joint peacekeeping deployments in the future.

I was then asked about naval arms control and gave them a canned lecture on the subject which I have used in a wide variety of audiences elsewhere. They wrote it all down. They then asked why not control arms through budget limitations and I responded that this was being done by both nations legislatures already. This might be an area for future joint research with IMEMO.

They then wanted to know about how the American military viewed the deep reductions in nuclear forces and I said they viewed it favorably. A follow-on wanted to know if the military thought they would reprogram that money into conventional forces and I said that most of us assumed it would be lost to other non-defense programs. They then suggested that some of the high ranking military planners thought that the Russian air-breathing leg of the triad was unnecessary and that the sea-based leg was the way to go in the future.

I offered to work on a collaborative basis with them on military doctrine and strategy or the lessons from the Persian Gulf war. They suggested that I contact Captain 1st Rank (Ret.) Boris N. Makayev, who was currently on leave. I remembered his name from my June meeting with Aleksey Arbatov. He is supposedly the ghost writer for the late Fleet Admiral Gorshkov. I left a copy of my paper on the Soviet/Russian lessons learned of the Persian Gulf war since they said he would be interested. I asked if any of them were coming to the U.S. and they rolled their eyes saying that Aleksey used all the travel money. The meeting ended on schedule and we all shook hands.

16 July (Thursday): Smolensk Seminar.

Report of seminar held in hotel at Smolensk supplementary to lead-in materials found in Enclosure (4).

The seminar with LTC Viktor I. Kuznetsov was a very interesting session that lasted around five hours. I took no notes but CPT Edgar may have done so. One of the students later told me that Kuznetsov identified himself as the co-author of an article with Colonel V.F. Yashin, "Army Counteroffensive Operations (Historical Experience)," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, No. 1, January 1992, pp. 26-34 (JPRS-92-UMT-006-L, May 14, 1992, pp. 15-20). The subject of the seminar was to first include a presentation by me of the new regionally-focused defense doctrine and strategy. Rather than a formal presentation, the session became a free-for-all discussion. At one point we discussed the openness of the current era in contrast with other historical periods of similar disclosure. I asked the question when the current

period would close. I could not tell if it was Dmitriy or Viktor who actually answered, but the answer that I was given was "soon." One of the students who was at the seminar later told me that Dmitriy was adding much of his own words to whatever Viktor was telling me. I agreed since many times Viktor's answer was measured in seconds while Dmitriy's translation often went on for minutes. I also made mention of my discussion on the Tula trip with Colonel Vitaliy Leonov and said that I had probably asked him one question too many. Viktor appeared to agree.

Viktor was most interested in discussing the future of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) and appeared unfamiliar with the planned system for the global protection against limited strikes (GPALS). Viktor was rude and kept interrupting to make points about the need to give up all nuclear weapons. Wanted me to explain to him how you could tell the difference between an offensive and a defensive nuclear missile. I responded with classic lecture on differences between counterforce and counter-value targeting. He never seemed to get it and I decided that he was trying to see if I would become exasperated. I did not.

Viktor asked me, about four times, straight out how long it would take from receipt of warning until our nuclear forces could respond. I replied in each case that this was old thinking and that under countervalue targeting each side could eliminate a hair trigger posture in favor of a much more delayed response of punishment. He did not appear to be serious in his efforts to learn about the new U.S. regional defense strategy. I decided that he was not really an instructor. He never discussed his joy in teaching nor how he taught his students despite my attempts to engage him in such discussions.

Viktor told us that the Soviets had fooled the Americans regarding the Tu-22 BACKFIRE bomber and that this was obviously an intercontinental bomber. He said that they could retrofit the refueling probe within hours. He tried to make the same point with ballistic missile defensive systems by saying that these too could be turned into offensive systems.

Viktor also told me that it was not unusual nor new for Russians to be researching the defensive or initial period of the Great Patriotic War. He said that in the Czarist-era, they only researched what did not work well (defense) but that under the Soviet system, they researched everything but showed us only research on the offensive.

Viktor told me that war is broken into offensive, counteroffensive, defensive, and defense from weapons of mass destruction. Did not appear familiar with the breakdown according to traditional military-technical aspects. This further reinforced my conclusion that he was not an instructor and I do not believe that he was the same person who had just authored a major article in *Voyennaya Mysl*.

Finally, I asked Viktor how Russia would handle its new defense problem on the southwestern theater of strategic military operations, i.e. there would be no Russian ground forces in that sector. Viktor told me that this would not be a problem since the Russians would man the Ukrainian armed forces.

I then spoke to the other instructor, Colonel Oleg Orekhov, and he started out the conversation by saying that he was not GRU. We then had a pleasant discussion of how we taught our students. I gave him the routine pitch about how to break out of the shell of limited his knowledge about us that was handed to him by the intelligence services. He appeared to have done more work in trying to learn about us but conceded the main sources were those provided by his own government. He did say that the Frunze Academy employed some civilian specialists who knew about the U.S. I told him about his own Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada Studies and other sources he could use. He seemed familiar with the works of Henry Trofimenko and said that he would talk to me about this later. His sources of information about the U.S. were the journal *Foreign Military Review*, intelligence information, special collections, government books, and a few U.S. subscriptions. He also said that the Frunze Academy had civilian instructors. No one else had ever said this.

Perhaps the most interesting thing was that he asked me to describe Soviet military doctrine in the 1960s. I did so and he said that I had it right. He then asked me why it had changed from reliance on nuclear primarily to a shift towards conventional weapons. I said that it was probably a combination of the change in leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev and foment from below. Obviously it might have also been a response to NATO's new military strategy of flexible response (MC 14/3). Oleg told me that since Brezhnev was the leader of the government under Khrushchev, it was impossible for them to have different views. He did not say anything further about what might have caused the changes otherwise.

18 July (Saturday): Zagorsk discussion.

Report of discussion with Frunze instructor held in Zagorsk, supplementary to lead-in provided in Enclosure (4).

I had a private two-hour discussion with a new Frunze instructor, Colonel Pëtr Fyodorovich Vashchenko. Pëtr is a co-author of the very interesting article "In Aid of Those Studying Military History: Military Reform in the USSR," *Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 12, 1989, pp. 33-40 (JPRS-UMA-90-010, April 25, 1990, pp. 58-63). I think that it was during this discussion that he said that his students basically had no homework. Went through same discussion of how do they know about us with same

suggestions of alternative sources. He seemed to be a genuine instructor.

During discussion of Frunze military reforms of 1924, he repeatedly stated that at that time, the defensive was only allowed at the operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level of war, the offensive was the only option. He described that offensive as being able to cross the borders of an enemy state and to penetrate to a depth of around 250 kilometers.

In a discussion of the Persian Gulf war, Pëtr stated that this operation was not simply an episode but a model for future war. It was not, however, the only model. Seemed very concerned with precision guided munitions. We also got into a discussion of the similarity of war at sea to war ashore but he did not seem interested in pursuing it.

I pressed Pëtr about their recent research into the defensive. He stated that this was not new research, but rather that research about the defensive period of the Great Patriotic War, and wars in general, had been ongoing constantly. Such research was not, however, available to those outside of the Academy since it was classified secret. This is new information.

20 July (Monday): Special Seminar at Rostov.

Report of special seminar held in hotel in Rostov, supplementary to lead-in provided in Enclosure (4).

The Frunze instructors provided to us for that evening were Colonel Valentine A. Runov and LTC Pavel Dmitriovich Alekseyev. Runov is a co-author of the very interesting article "In Aid of Those Studying Military History: Military Reform in the USSR," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 12, 1989, pp. 33-40 (JPRS-UMA-90-010, April 25, 1990, pp. 58-63).

I decided to openly take notes at the seminar. One of the "GRUlets" acted as a translator. There was a discussion of how each side taught military history and military art. One of the major participants in this portion of the seminar was Colonel Webb Kremer, USA (Ret.), a former armor officer. There was a lot of discussion of number of classroom hours devoted to each subject area. No one made any attempt to ask about NPS or the Naval War College even though I was there. Mr. Peter Tsouras, self-identified as working for U.S. Army intelligence, asked about how lessons learned at Frunze Academy were transmitted to field. The Russians replied that was often Frunze faculty learned lessons from the field itself (so his question assumed something that was not necessarily the case) but the academy often provided lessons via their students returning to the field, articles and books

produced by the students, faculty, and staff, and special discussion seminars.

Pavel stated that his primary field of research was the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. He stressed that this was important today. Valentine stated that he was interested in local wars and the history of the Russian Army. He also stated that local wars were of interest today. Pavel stated that Valentine was writing a history of the Frunze Academy itself.

The Russians fumbled question of mine about the characteristics of war and armed conflict. It appeared more that I interrupted something rather than that he could not answer the question. In their answer, they did say that they previously spent 90% of their time teaching aspects of war that were nuclear or nuclear-related but that this was now down to around 10%. I consider this significant. Also said that they are concerned with defense against high technology weapons of great accuracy. Tsouras asked for clarification on defense or employment and defense was repeated. At a later time, the Russians tried to answer my question and offered the opinion that the military-technical classifications of war were (1) those between regular forces armed with high technology weapons used in classical military operations, and (2) those where one side had all types of weapons and regular forces and the other side has irregular forces as in Afghanistan. This is not consistent with previous characterizations of war. Is it new or an off-the-cuff answer?

Response to student question about Persian Gulf war got response that tanks were still important in the ground operation of any future war. Response to my question about Navy faculty and students was there are none even though admitted studied Normandy strategic amphibious operation. Then added as an afterthought that they did have some "marines." I asked clarification if that meant naval infantry or coastal defense divisions and they got all upset and ducked the question. Study of Normandy without Navy logistics means to me that the case is presented as a defensive operation and not offensive in the context of projecting power from the sea.

I asked about the similarity to war at sea to warfare ashore and got garbled answer that seemed to imply that the Naval Academy had the job or researching naval art and the Frunze Academy was trying to sort out military art only. Implication is that no one is talking to each other at the operational-level of warfare and that such combined arms discussions only take place at the strategic-level. This would also mean that the U.S. perception that combined arms operations (at the operational-level of warfare) is a former Soviet strength was incorrect. The correct perception is apparently that combined arms is the province of instruction at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, hence it is at the strategic-level of warfare (or perhaps operational-strategic) only.

Retired Swedish General Skoglund asked about independent airborne operations and received the same replies as in the past. Airborne combat actions are at the tactical-level of warfare. The general pressed them and got a response that the 4th airborne operation during the Battle for Moscow was the classic independent model (rather than Normandy). They disagreed whether this was an operational or tactical-level action.

Response to my question about how they did simulations and war gaming was that they did man/man and man/machine. I followed with clarification if they had special teams to play the enemy (not really) and if they had computer models to represent an enemy (yes). They used green and dark blue to represent two sides. They stopped the flow of the discussion and asked me about our methods. I responded with Naval War College team to play enemy and efforts by RAND Corporation to replicate the behavior of other nations by the use of computer models. They asked if Russia was now the enemy. I responded with regional defense strategy with multiple enemies. U.S. Army civil service tour participant Peter Tsouras provided clarification that Russia was not the enemy, including the precise use of the term in Russian. This interruption and quizzing of me was most peculiar and stood out.

I asked them if they had any questions for me about the regional defense strategy and base force. They responded quickly by asking what type of defense did we feel that Iraq had during Operation DESERT STORM. I deferred to the various active and retired U.S. Army personnel in the room who said basically that it was a classic Soviet model. I added that antilanding defenses were as well but that it was usual for our Army to ignore the maritime aspects of warfare.

Second question to me was about whether Russian membership in NATO would lead to long-term stability. I replied with alternative and unilateral actions by Russia that could lead to same result.

July 23 (Thursday): Meeting with Deputy Defense Minister, Kiev, Ukraine.

Report of meeting with Deputy Minister of Defense for the Ukraine, held in his office, supplementary to lead-in provided in Enclosure (4).

We arrived at an office of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and were ushered into the office of General-Major Yuriy Mikhailevich Prokofiev, Deputy Minister of Defense and Head of Military Education and Training. A colonel from his outer office also stayed in the room and took notes. Both the minister and the

retired General-Lieutenant took notes as well. I gave a one hour presentation on our new regional defense strategy, asking along the way if they knew about this or that subject, trying to tailor it to what they did not know. They did not want to talk about scenarios, saying that they already had studied those. Implication again, one something has been studied, it does not again need to be reviewed since the answer has already been obtained.

Their questions included: numbers of troops and divisions to be left in Europe under the current plan and my best guess for the post-election period; what were America's capabilities to wage a strategic-level war and operational-level campaign; lessons of the Persian Gulf war; why were we upgrading the Pershing missiles; and how would we implement our new doctrine and strategy; how could the new doctrine be developed in a top-down manner. The generals revealed their own bias that strategic-level war could be won by air forces in the future. They also stated twice that their emerging doctrine and strategy will be internal only.

We then shifted to a brief discussion on what type of degrees were offered by the various U.S. military training and education institutions. I explained the general processes as well. The minister was interrupted by a telephone call from the Air Force commander-in-chief. The translator suggested that we continue with the general (who was expressing some concern to the translator about the time that we were taking) and I asked the general if we should not wait until the minister returned. He shrugged his shoulders and said yes. I replied that this is what we would do in our country as well. The minister then asked a perfunctory question about Sweden. General Prokofiev then said that he assumed we would like to know about his own country. We said that we would.

The minister then talked for about one hour on the plans for the Ukrainian armed forces. He did not pause for questions, nor did we interrupt except for translation clarifications. I took notes. He started with a long passage about Ukrainian history and took great pains to stress the differences with Russia. He also corrected history by stating that there never had been a treaty with Russia at the time of Peter I and that the Ukraine had been enslaved and not joined Russia of its own volition.

The minister continued with his own version of the events of 1917-1920. He ensured that we knew that the Ukraine had been deceived by Russia in joining the USSR and that they were essentially forced to join. He then spoke of the time that citizens were shot on the streets for speaking Ukrainian and that the world should know about the truth of this era and not the propaganda from Moscow.

Skippping the Great Patriotic War, the minister stressed that the Ukraine had provided 95% of its output for the center in the old Union. He also said that the old Union had devoted 37% of

its effort for defense. He specifically criticized the building of large tank formations. According to the minister, the Ukraine had only been allowed to keep 5% of its output for internal use and of this, 20% was taxes. Those who knew the truth, in the past, either left for the U.S. or went to prison.

The minister then discussed the problems facing the Ukraine with large numbers of demobilized troops. He likened the situation to that in Yugoslavia. He stressed that their military doctrine would be an anti-bloc doctrine but that they would have some sort of defensive arrangement with neighbors. The Ukraine did not seek parity with their neighbors. Cooperation with other nations would be sought; specific examples included cooperation with the U.S. or Sweden in the field of terrorism, collective research, and intelligence.

The minister talked about how difficult it was to get "arms" out of the heads of officers who had been educated under the old system. He talked in terms of the need for mental rather than physical resources. He again complained about how much the Ukraine has suffered at the hands of the USSR. His goal was to create a military training and education system second to none in the world. It would be better than that in the U.S. He discussed the need to keep men in uniform as a temporary social welfare program.

He then shifted to the subject of the Black Sea Fleet and stated that it was not a strategic asset. His proof was that it cost much less than some other fleet, lost in the translation. It might have been the Northern Fleet since the word "Kola" came out in the translation. The minister stated that the Ukraine was not interested in the Mediterranean. He said that their investment in the fleet was 17% plus the value of the shipyards and that Russia was only offering 10-15%.

The minister said that it was not necessary for Russia to keep bases on Ukrainian territory for the long term, specifically Sevastopol. He then said that Russia would be offered a small portion of bases that were Ukrainian to serve their temporary needs. He then brought up the destroyer that had sortied from Sevastopol a few days earlier and had sailed under a Ukrainian flag to Odessa. He said that following this incident, the issue of the bases had been settled with Russia and therefore, there would be no further incidents of this type. The clear implication was that the incident had been staged to obtain the concessions that he announced. The minister then closed by saying that there were other naval units still being considered, those not an actual part of the fleet and neither a part of the base structure. Those units would need to be settled in the future.

I closed the meeting by thanking the minister and telling him how impressed we were with his country and what we had learned while visiting. I assured him that everything that we

had seen or been told would be passed on to others in the U.S. and Sweden. I then offered to perform joint academic work with any of his people on emerging U.S. defense doctrine and strategy and I left him my card.

I

Has "Cold War" Ended?
(American questions and possible Russian answers)

Comments on
"Military Strategy in the Former Soviet Union"
by
James John Tritten (May 13, 1992 Draft)

"P." will stay for "page", "prg" - for "paragraph"

"Has the Soviet threat to the United States and NATO gone away? Is the danger of a superpower war so remote today that we should shift our strategic planning focus to contingency operations and nonmilitary threats?" (p.1, prg.2)

Sure, the answer is "yes". That is extremely important - *1st strike nuclear weapons with a military strategy that included preemption.*
now to understand that such the threat has never existed - *- CPSU rhetoric - Eastern Europe*
exactly as the opposite "American threat" to the USSR. My point is that grounds for those "threats" laid in common misunderstanding and misperception. The Soviet Union simply went far further along the line *si vis pacem, para bellum* than the West. The Soviet Union was ready to accept much heavier burden to ensure military security than the West did. There were a lot of reasons for that and totalitarian character of our society was not the least among them. *Yes this has taught me much about society*

Nevertheless all the time the Communist leadership of our state was preoccupied with the task of defense of the country. Look at the history - were there any example when the Soviet Union behaved aggressively in the connection with strong power? All examples of "Soviet aggressions" widely discussed in Western literature are examples of actions "strong against weak": Poland in 1920, Baltic states, Poland and Finland in 1939, Hungary in 1956, Afganistan in 1979. Checkoslovakia of 1968 could be the only possible exception - if one proved that the West really planned invaded the country that time as was stated in the Soviet Union to justify the action. Do you know did the West plan? *see Brookings study.*

1968, Damanskiy Island. Conflict with China. Strong against strong? Aggressive and resolute actions? Wrong - the Soviet Union began threat with nuclear weapons only when has disclosed that Chinese *panicky feared* that the Soviet Union would threat with the weapons and could try to put that threat into life.

✓ In 1941 Stalin was sure that sooner or later Hitler would attack - and prohibited troops to take defensive prepared positions in order not to give to Germans occasion for provocation. Stalin was sure that the UK along with France were in collusion with Germany and prepared hostile actions against the USSR. Who could reassure him in the light of the "strange war" in Europe? And Stalin signed pact with Germany - to reduce (or even prevent) possibility of surprise attack.

Stalin's attempt failed - and proved for a long period that diplomacy and treaties were not the best way to ensure military security of the state. Since 1917, the October Revolution, Soviet leadership lived and acted under the slogan "We live in hostile [imperialist] encirclement". Psychology of "surrounded fortress" became ground on which almost all plans and actions were made. And German invasion gave to it so strong momentum that inertia is obvious until now.

It is necessary to add that after-World War II actions of the West were not without sin too. If you equal fascist (as a form of imperialist) Germany and totalitarian communist Soviet Union, if you state that all country develop to the common point ("theory of convergency") - why then you decide action aimed on sharing of markets and spheres of influence (Persia, 1945-46; Germany, 1948; Korea, 1950; Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc) as a Communist threat to the Free World and not as simply another example of tensions inside common imperialist world? The United States attacked Grenada, Panama too, didn't they? Lenin began in 1918 with "state-monopoly capitalism". His successors forgot to change the line. Then where is communist threat?

Sure definite differences between the West and our country really existed. Not the least among them was that totalitarian regime could not (and can't at all) allow wise people to influence the leadership. I am awfully sorry but it seems for me that our leaders degenerated tremendously fast. May be being even wise in the personal but not political sense they did not understand what happened around and feared that "hostile imperialist encirclement" would try to destroy them, their power and the state for which they were in charge. Tragic example of Great Patriotic War has proved that was not idle fear. Try to imagine what Pearl Harbor would be for the American people if in the result of it Japanese in a couple of week would take Chicago and Boston, blockade (for three years!) New York and stay in ten miles from Capitol Hill?

And after WW II imperialist states continued the line: American military bases encircled the USSR, atomic bombers began patrolling, nuclear missiles appeared in Turkey, the UK and Germany. What that was? For what purpose? Preparation for new June 1941? Why did the West prefer to play with double rules: one, fair, for himself, another, hostile, for the USSR?

Those all were applied upon problems the country felt in economy. Over-centralized model proved itself to be insufficient, the state began to lose positions. To re-establish them, support or (later) even revitalize former influence and greatness of the state - that was important task too.

Operation
Ryan
Gorderevsky
leak

Military power was good solution for that kind of people. (Let's remember: the weaker any (and quite capitalist!) state is the more attention it pays to military attributes.) It was easily understandable. And it allowed to kill some birds with one stone. Military power allowed to ensure military security. Military power and influence could compensate lack of economic power and influence. And military power allowed to soften influence of imperialists' "double rules of a game" during attempts to establish political or economical presence in remote regions. As you remember Germany after Versal began with military power too...

Germany was too small to stop and began world war. The USSR exactly as Russian Empire was self-sufficient and had not necessity to take territory - may be except those which were critical for freedom of actions. (But the USA controls the zone of Panama channel too!) Markets and spheres of influence - that what were necessary. Where are differences between that position and the position of the current United States? And, therefore - where are grounds for the threat of attack against the Western Europe? Where is military threat to the United States and NATO?

I'd like to add a small detail which could be both interesting and important: those separate tank regiments located just on Western borders in Groups of Forces had in classified Soviet regulations name "regiment of border cover". How do you think - is it appropriate name for units whose task is to invade?

Sure, contradictions between current great imperialist powers really exist. Does it mean the danger of Japan-American or Anglo-French war exist today? Considering all above mentioned it seems to me possible to decide that the danger of Soviet-American or Soviet-Western war does not exceed the threat of the formers. Could we shift in these conditions our strategic planning focus to contingency operations or we couldn't? Frankly the answer is obvious for me. What would be your answer?

You can argue me considering Soviet military plans in connection with employment of nuclear weapons in the Western Europe. That's interesting point! It would be productive to discuss it along with some other related problems which are important for better understanding of current situation - and possible perspectives.

First of all I'd like to make short historical review of Soviet position concerning nuclear weapons. Till the end of 1953 the Soviet leadership saw nuclear weapons itself as instrument of American political pressure upon the Soviet Union. That was continuation of the line began by Stalin in Potsdam when he refused to "understand" Truman's words about atomic bomb in American possession. Soviet ideological instruments worked hard to low importance of the Bomb. The USSR refused to understand American pressure

- and that reduced value of the former. At that period atomic weapons were decided to be simply another extremely powerful weapon.

The second period could be named "romantic". Military (and politicians) understood that nuclear weapons are more than increased fire-power of troops. Those become "final and resolute instrument" - all could be resolved with it. Sokolovskiy's book is about it: future war will be all-out missile-nuclear one, strategic missiles and their actions on international scale will be the main essence of war, conventional battle on theaters will only use results of the former. That means war will be on necessity *blitzkrieg* - any delays could take place only because lack of nuclear weapons. It's necessary to add that in that situation high readiness of forces on day-to-day basis is essential order. We began it that time - we continued it up to now.

Meanwhile the period lasted since roughly 1955 to 1969. As early as 1966 on the All-army meeting Oqarkov stated attention paid to nuclear weapons was too high. On my opinion first of all he said about strategic weapons. That was beginning of acceptance by the Soviet military and political leadership of the state of nuclear stalemate on strategic level. And Brezhnev's speech in Tula was simply formal statement that the period of strategic nuclear stalemate was on scene. As an logical result in 1976 the Soviet Union and the United States signed Agreement on prevention of nuclear war.

Nevertheless the "syndrome of surrounded fortress" along with the perception of Western threat has not gone in our country with the beginning of that new period. And the task to ensure military security of the country against "the most probable" threat still stood intact. According to political guide Soviet military designed war-fighting plans which should serve purposes of war-termination.

One clever man said almost a century ago "'decently" or "indecently" does not exist in policy, there are only "profitable" and "unprofitable"'. I am awfully sorry because cynicism of these words but history displays he was right. I am afraid there is really no place for absolute idealists in *realpolitik*.

There were really Soviet plans of employment of tactical nuclear weapons against NATO command posts, communication centers, nuclear weapons means of delivery and their storages and important elements of transport infrastructure (bridges, road and railway junctions) on the territory of Western Europe. Fulfillment of these plans should start in the case of large-scale European conflict involving USA and USSR after break of fire and in the face of inevitable escalation. Soviet Army should not enter durable exchange of pin-point conventional strikes but resort to employment of nuclear weapons on early stages of conflict. Described kinds of targets should be destroyed in

what could be named a kind of pre-emptive strike. 513 tactical charges were allocated for that purpose. After fulfillment of the strike rapid offensive and seizure of all Western Europe should happen.

The main idea of these plans was single in its duality. To prevent development to steps of the "stairs of escalation" which suppose employment of American nuclear weapons against Soviet territory. And through quick seizure of Western Europe - where the USA had a lot of economic interests - make continuation of the war to intercontinental nuclear exchange unprofitable and senseless for the United States. That was extremely important that nuclear exchange was restricted both in level (tactical) and geography (Western Europe).

what about
M.S.
secretive
escalation

That is why these plans did not suppose and simply could not suppose employment of strategic weapons against North America. (Moreover - all plans of its employment were based on "second strike" or "launch under attack" ideas.) In this light one could better understand Brezhnev's statement that the Soviet Union would not use nuclear weapon first - the United States rather than the whole world was addressee of this statement! The USSR tried to tell to the USA its logic and prove absence of intentions to destroy America. The fate of Europe was not so clear. But American plans (Carter's for instance), as I remember, did not bring to Europe good news too.

Therefore, to my opinion, Europeans were quite right when worried about possible unwillingness of the USA to fulfill its nuclear guarantee and use nuclear weapons against Soviet territory. As I understand Soviet plans were constructed around assumption Americans would not risk their homeland if they would be sure Soviets would not try to threat them. Sure in attitude to Europe that was "indecent" policy. Was it "unprofitable" for the Soviet Union? And may be for the United States? Who knows... I think these facts could give birth to doubts that Soviet plans were absolutely aggressive. That is great problem - how to preserve your Motherland; may be not the best way was chosen but there were strong reasons to believe it would work.

OK - but why
today?

If somebody began to laugh or swear about those plans I would disagree with him. Are those plans more ridiculous or dangerous than American inter-war Basic War Plan "Red" on fighting against Great Britain or early-after WW II plans of war against Canada? That is job of military - to be prepared for a wide specter of possible (and sometimes even impossible) hostilities. It is very bad when politicians lose good sense and take these plans without serious consideration of their real essence.

✓

Hence one should decide the Soviet General Staff carried out political guidelines that there were possibility to limit direct East-West military conflict to

battle of Europe. And limit that battle to conventional warfare - i.e. to the kind of battle which could not pose direct threat to Soviet territory. Tactical nuclear weapon was one of numerous instruments of such the warfare. And such the Battle of Europe for the Soviet Union was not nuclear war - in definition.

What about political utility... It would be better to say that then Soviet leadership saw political utility in seizure of Western Europe in order to preserve Soviet national territory in any way. Tactical nuclear weapons were not the essence of the problem. Prevent intercontinental nuclear exchange - that was the task. Therefore view on political utility of nuclear weapons are simply not the subject of discussion because in this case we deal with Soviet plans of war-termination. Sure, on favorable for the Soviet Union conditions - i.e. before strikes would reach Soviet territory.

That is not surprising in these conditions that "there have always been differences in opinion (in the USSR and the United States) concerning whether a war with the United States could or should be limited to a single theater of origin" (p.5, prg.2). Wasn't "uncertainty and unpredictability" one of important principles of nuclear deterrence on its early stages? There were not serious differences: even among our leaders there were not suicides, simply limitations of scale of warfare decided to be task of wartime - before beginning of a war all should be done to prevent fire.

If one try to imagine that the opposite is correct let's ask him to explain why the Soviet Union did not start firing in Cuban crisis? Eventually all big American cities except Seattle were in range of SS-5 deployed at Cuba...

It was decided later by politicians that to maintain uncertainty on the level of intercontinental exchange was too risky business. Nevertheless principles of deterrence stood intact. Hence one should not be surprised that "the former Soviet leadership actually renounced only nuclear-rocket war on a scale that would equate to a world war, not all nuclear war" (p.5, prg.3). As I remember the United States also refuses to confirm or deny their plans concerning nuclear weapons in case of war.

You can tell me: "Okay, but existing offensive former Soviet nuclear forces far exceed that necessary for delivering a retaliatory strike - even under the worst case. Defensive systems and R&D program to improve those defensive systems are strong evidence that the Soviet never and the Russian still have never accepted the mutual vulnerability required under mutual assured destruction (MAD) (p.13, prg.5). Isn't that taken in complex an evidence of Aggressive intentions?"

Frankly I disagree with this quite possible statement. What do you decide to be the worst case for the Soviet Union? As you know over-centralization was essential feature of the Soviet model. Do you think such an important instrument of state policy as strategic nuclear forces avoided it? I think you are wrong if you suppose so. It's hard for you to believe in it but even Soviet SSBNs can not launch their missiles without order from the Center.

pal?

Hence the worst case for the Soviet Union was and for Russia still is the overwhelming strike against C³I which paralyze the whole forces and lead to full inability to carry out any retaliatory strike. That is why on my opinion the Soviet Union maintained huge strategic arsenal - in order to ensure that in the worst case at least a couple of missiles would be launched (thanks to Heavens!) as a result of convulsions of disabled C³ system. One should not forget also that McNamara's estimates of size of forces necessary to inflict unacceptable damage was quite popular that time in the Soviet Union too. The system seems to you to be (softly saying) strange? Sure, but we don't discuss the system itself now... We would have to start from the October Revolution to understand it.

how many?

What about the second part of discussed statement it seems to me there is definite contradiction in it with historical logic. Have the United States not accepted the mutual vulnerability required under MAD when proposed and began to construct ABM systems in 1960s and then in 1980s? Even the hypothesis has rights to live that those defensive systems and R&D aimed on their improvement could be taken as signs that level of unacceptable damage was even lower for the Soviet leadership than for the United States? (I understand all problems related with such a suggestion.)

MAD use
ABM not
enough.

And you do write that "an offensive-capable... nuclear force [as any other force - I.S.] does not automatically indicate an offensive military doctrine or strategy. Critics should remember that once the United States had total strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR - within an overall defensive military doctrine and strategy" (p.13, prg.5).

So it seems to me obvious that there were never real Soviet threat to the United States and NATO or the opposite - there were always only invented ones caused by misunderstanding and misperception of each other. That did not and does not reduce the danger of holocaust - but it is important to understand that reason for such a catastrophe would be not antagonistic contradictions between two our states or two our camps but unreadiness or inability to hear and understand each other.

yes

That is why I ask has "Cold War" ended. Have you ended it or continue to stay in it through maintaining of the disappearing invented threat whose time has already to have gone - by discussions about order of remoteness of the

Soviet threat to the United States and NATO? If the latter - you have real chance to lose the battle for peace. And the fact that another side will lose too will be poor satisfaction.

For further discussion of military strategy in the former Soviet Union it is crucial to agree on the point - is there Soviet/Russian threat to the United States and the West or there is no. Because it is this point which will influence upon your assessment of military doctrines and strategy in emerging new independent states. From my point of view those are simply attempts to reject the "syndrome of surrounded fortress". That is what on my opinion meant statement of Dr. Sergey Rogov, the Deputy Director of the Institute for the USA & Canada studies that "external events would probably not directly affect Russia's state security and that the most important threats are internal" (quotation on p.11, prg.1). Appeal to rethink heightened estimates of external threat - that is on my opinion the essence of the statement.

"Emerging military doctrine for the former Soviet Union, as of April 1992, therefore did not appear to be offensively oriented in the manner of the old theaters strategic offensive operation that worried NATO for many years" (p.11, prg.5). Well-known maxima is that "offensive is the best defense". Our fears simply reduced and necessity in such scale of "defense through offensive" disappeared.

sure

If you disagree with me on the point about existence of Soviet/Russian threat your assessment of the situation and perspectives can be just opposite. Let me clarify the latter.

You are greeting the idea proposed by Andrey Kokoshin and Maj.-Gen. Valentin Larionov in 1988 that Soviet/Russian Armed Forces should have capability and plan only "to repel the invasion to the border but not cross and continue the counteroffensive in enemy territory" (p.22, prg.3). What will you say if the new Russian military doctrine will contain in turn thesis that Russian troops in case of aggression will cross the border and take definite actions in enemy territory?

This will be wrong signal to west - did we really play to invade USSR?

And what will be your decision if in that case troops will not be "spread out along a forward edge" what "most likely indicates a defensive strategy" but rather will be "concentrated in... individual sectors of the front" so one will be able to "conclude that there are offensive plans" (quotation on Aleksey Arbatov, p.16, prg.4)?

If you decide Russian threat and danger of American/NATO-Russian war still exists you can remember the radiostation in small German town on the German-Polish border, attack on which became *casus belli* for the Second World War and decide that the peace in the world is in

danger. If you agree with me you can think over the situation and decide that Kokoshin's statement was rather a dream or articulation of peaceful Soviet intentions or even over-simplification of the matter than real basis for military doctrine.

good point
United Nations' troops in the Gulf did not cross border during the first stage of hostility. Nevertheless that did not interfere to bomb Baghdad and almost exhaust Iraq. The question is: will, for instance, limited aviation attacks be decided "crossing of border" or not? One can easily imagine situation when "continue counteroffensive in enemy territory" will be necessary to remove immediate threat to security - that is, for instance repelling of air attack carried out with pin-point strikes of air-to-surface missiles while platforms don't enter air space over victim's national territory.

Yes
 This will
 be
 acceptable

Almost the same about the idea proposed by Aleksey Arbatov on delimitation of offensive and defensive orientations (p.16, prg.4). Frankly I am not so big expert in tactics but I have some doubts that even in current situation of high mobility of troops there is no along Russian borders preferred directions of attack - which should be obviously covered harder. And in opposite - those sectors where attack is eventually improbable lack necessity to be covered. Taken in complex with possible Russian unwillingness to reject totally the possibility of counteroffensive this could serve as nice ground for concerns about aggressive Russian plans.

Another example: "Russian Federation President Boris N. Eltsin told his American television audience in January 1992 that nuclear missiles under Russian control would no longer target American cities... Yet reports in the Russia media indicated that despite these statements, nothing had really changed" (p.15, prg.1).

What will you say if obtain solid evidence Russian will have nothing changed in flight orders of their missiles? Will that mean that Russian reject line on improvement of relations and time of Cold War come back? (I don't even emphasize the fact that the United States refused to make the same statement but in turn confirmed that American forces continued to be targeted onto "objects most valuable for new states' leadership".) The latest time American cities themselves simply were not targets for Soviet missiles - the worst case was strike against military and military-industrial objects located in or near cities. But we still remain in the old framework of strategic relations and nobody promised yet to avoid military industry. (I'd like to discuss preferred on my opinion principles of employment of nuclear weapons for deterrence as a separate topic.) It was not necessary to change eventually anything to accomplish President's

statement - and nothing has been changed. Where is problem or unfair behavior? Is there any ground for concern or suspicion?

7
6
I can increase list of examples. One point concerning naval problems can be of special interest. Let's try to imagine that Russia rejects idea of SSBN bastions and let strategic submarines to carry out their mission alone. What is that - evidence that Russia is so sure there will be no war with the USA and West that doesn't feel necessity to defend SSBNs? But may be that is re-evaluation of sea-based strategic systems' value for Russia in real geo-political situation and desision to use ships covered SSBNs to enhance anti-SLOC forces? In this light will Sorokin's recommendations be the best case for the West (p.24, prg.1)?

I took your attention for so long time for the only purpose: try to clarify my point that we lived in world of invented threats which paradoxically created real danger for our well-being and even existence itself. I see the only exit from this situation - to "disarm" our own mentality, believe that if we pull down our guns, remove fingers from red buttons our security will improve, not disappear. *Si vis pacem, para pacem* - that should be motto. I would add: be ready for peace with full specter of its peaceful but extremely difficult problems.

As I remember in mid-1980s there was big NATO staff exercise with extensive computing of possible events in case of full-scale WTO invasion. The result was stupefying: it became obvious that invaded forces could march no further than twenty kilometers into German territory and at that point would be stopped and repelled. If I'm right there were only two reports on the subject - one in Western and one in Soviet military newspaper. May be the reason for absence of discussion on that extremely interesting result was that both sides were uninterested in it? May be it's time to reverse the way?

NOTES

p.4 Fig.1 SOCIOPOLITICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF WAR

"In support of allies" (applies to Russia) - I think it will stay "declaratory" until the situation become calm. The perception of it in Russia now is dual:

a) what's the necessity to defend somebody? (and possible continuation: if they claim us occupants; if we ourselves need at least normal life.)

b) Russia really concerns about statements on Russian neo-colonialism and needs very strong legitimate base for actions aimed on defense of anybody except Russia itself.

"Supressing liberation struggle" (concerning all republics) - I think that is mistake to define current probability of occurence as "low". Just opposite - it's high. Because unfair internal structure of the Soviet Union there are tremendously many territorial, national and even political (communists vs. democrats vs. nationalists etc) problems in republics. Current events prove my point: you can look at

- Karabakh (Armenia vs. Azerbaijan);
- Moldova ("democratic" Moldovians vs. communist/nationalists Ukrainian and Russian in Fridnestrovie and nationalists in Gagauzia);

- Ukraine - nationalists Carpathian region would be glad to separate, almost the same situation with Russian minority in eastern part of republic¹: Donbass, border regions;

- well-known Chechnya which is formally part of Russian Federation;

- Chechnya again with its own internal problem of Ingush people - the republic was Chechen-Ingush and now the second part tries to separate;

- Georgia which prevents unification of artificially separated Osetia (Northern in Russia, Southern in Georgia);

- Tadjikistan in the Central Asia which is getting torn now because internal political problems...

That is important to take into account that in all that places armed force is acting instrument.

"Defense of reactionary regimes" - "low". I'd better state "moderate" - for instance it seems Russia unofficially support communist Fridnyestrovie - is that support of reactionary regime? May be that is support for national liberation war? It is sensitive point and it should be thought over deeper.

¹ Which is minority only in Ukraine as a whole but majority in that region.

"Defense against internal reactionaries" - "high". First of all it's necessary to decide who are "reactionaries" - see the previous paragraph. In case of Russia this statement seems to be disputable: there are many doubts now that Russian army would fight against people (who's else "reactionaries"?) by the order of the government which managed to raise very sharp tension in the society. Many people doubt they should support not the line but definite specific actions of the government. "Defense against internal reactionaries" lays in this grey zone.

P.6, prq.1, footnote 10: <<new strategic missions, "repelling of a missile attack from space" and the "utter routing of the armed forces and military potential of the enemy">>. I think that is mistake - these missions exist at least for latest 20 years. You could look for instance at "Voroshilov lectures":

"Because of the likelihood of surprise enemy attack from the air, the National Air Defense Forces must be in constant readiness to repel massive and individual attacks by enemy intercontinental rockets, submarine-launched rockets, flights of strategic and tactical aircraft from different directions, and space means..."².

<<Counter-air and counter-space defense is among tasks of Voisk PVO Strany>>³.

"The achievement of the aim of war... would be accomplished through destruction of the main groupings of enemy armed forces... as well as the destruction of the enemy military-economic base, disruption of the government and military control systems..."⁴.

P.8 Fig.3 "Suppression of Enemy Mil-Econ Potential - Navy (Anti-SLOC)"

Here is again our disagreement on the assessment of the role of anti-SLOC mission in Soviet planning. What kind of "suppression of military-economy potential" do you suppose if we planned *blitzkrieg*? You applicate your own experience of two last wars and think future war with different advesary will be carried out on base of the same plans. You perfectly know lessons of failed German anti-SLOC campaigns: successful execution of that mission is impossible without sufficient air and support. Soviet Navy had not instruments for that support. Why do you think Soviet Navy wanted to repeat unhappy German experience for

² The Voroshilov Lectures. Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy" vol.2, p.19 - that is statement for foreign student of 1973!

³ "Razvitie protivivizdushnoy oborony" (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976) p.191. That statement was discussed for instance in "Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Doctrine" ed. by Gregory Flinn (London, 1989).

⁴ Voroshilov Lectures vol.1, p.235

the third time? There were simply not enough subs to run full-scale anti-SLOC campaign in addition to other missions!

✓ 1
P.11, prq.3 "ground forces with powerfull tank component were no longer required by Russia". I'd like to clarify - not ground forces with powerful component but powerful tank component in ground forces.

OK
P.12, prq.5 Discussion on necessary number of strategic warheads: I'd like to discuss it as a separate topic.

✓
P.13, prq.3 As I remember Russia cancelled not all building program for ICBMs but only definite part of it concerning production of MIRVed ICBMs.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Special Section on Incidents

17 July (Friday): Warning on Bus Ride to Zagorsk.

See Enclosure (4) administrative section for lead-in comments regarding the incident at the Smolensk train station and the warning I received from Dmitriy.

I discussed the warning with a number of U.S. tour participants who were serving or retired intelligence officers (each identified himself/herself to me as such and made no effort to conceal this information). They all agreed that we had been warned and they advised me that our group was making it difficult for the KGB/GRU to keep tabs on us since we were often going places that were not on the programmed itinerary. I explained that our agenda on this trip was not the same as the itinerary and they replied that there were forces within the Russian Ministry of Defense that did not want to see this tour succeed and that the itinerary was being manipulated to make it less productive than we wanted.

18 July (Saturday): Zagorsk Restaurant incident.

See Enclosure (4) administrative section for lead-in comments regarding the incident at the restaurant in Zagorsk.

LTC Dianne Smith, USA, had identified herself as U.S. Army counterintelligence enroute from a current assignment in England to the DIA. LTC Smith did not offer to file a report with the militia and she never took any interest in the subsequent events.

After the incident with the "drunk," I asked a U.S. Army civil servant who had identified himself to me as working for Army intelligence and who was sitting next to me, what had transpired when he talked to the perpetrator. He told me that the individual was **not** drunk and that the incident had been staged to reinforce the warning given to us yesterday. I was shocked and asked him what did he think that we should do and if the student was in trouble by attempting to file the report. He replied, no that CPT Jim Jaworski, USA, would not be harmed and that a play act would be allowed to continue with official reports filed and then forgotten. He told me to allow it to happen and implied strongly that he knew about things that were going on that neither I knew about nor did John Sloan. I asked another tour participant for advise, someone who had identified himself as having previous Air Force counterintelligence experience and a retired officer. This individual said that it was a mere case of a local

drunk who had been thrown out of the *mafia* and agreed that John Sloan and Jim Jaworski should press charges.

After talking to the U.S. Assistant Naval Attache on the telephone, I went back into restaurant and talked to U.S. Army and Air Force civil service employees traveling with us. They told me that they were very sorry I had acted as I had. I told them that I was only concerned with the safety of my students. I reiterated that we were merely a group of students and faculty.

- - - - -

19 July (Sunday): Bus ride to Vladimir.

Following comments pertain to time during the bus ride to Vladimir. That morning I was lobbied by some of our group to not pull out our group early. During the telephone call with the U.S. Assistant Naval Attache, I was told that some parties had indicated that they would be very "disappointed" if we were to depart early. This lead to a situation where although the vast majority of students told me that they were afraid for their safety and saw no reason to place themselves in jeopardy, some of them also told me they were afraid for their careers if they did not stay.

- - - - -

20 July (Monday): Rostov seminar.

See Enclosure (4) for lead-in to this discussion on the special seminar that was held in Rostov. See Enclosure (5) for a report of substance discussed.

I did not tell anyone that I was going to request a seminar in Rostov yet Colonel Valentine A. Rynov and LTC Pavel Dmitriovich Alekseyev responded to my request "of course." John Sloan quickly came over to us and told me that it had been already arranged. I wondered how could it have already been arranged since I had just asked for the special seminar, but I kept this to myself.

During the dinner, there was much discussion about the forthcoming seminar and John Sloan told us that it would be in his suite. John had never had a suite before on the tour. The hotel was odd as well. The students told me that they had seen where the doors had to be cut open with welding torches since they had been welded shut. It then became common knowledge that this hotel had been opened just for our group. The hotel was in terrible condition. Most of the light bulbs in the hotel were missing and I could only find one electric plug on our floor that worked. The place looked like it had been abandoned.

At the evening seminar, there were a number of individuals in attendance who never attended any of our previous sessions. One of these individuals seemed to monopolize the conversation and seemed irritated if anyone else asked a question. He also occupied the center of the table directly facing the instructors. No introductions were made, a significant departure from all previous seminars.

The initial period of the seminar was concerned with the passing out of documents by the Russian Frunze instructors and an evaluation by one member of our group. It appeared that the Russians wanted publishers and one of our group was agreeing to act as intermediary. The meeting ended when the main player in this seminar started packing up his notes and took the lead in thanking the Russians. No one asked me if I was done.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Associate Professor Jim Tritten

QI (Fall) AY-93

Section 1: Tuesday & Thursday 0810-1000 Root 200D

Section 2: Tuesday & Thursday 1310-1500 Ingersoll 285

Military Strategy in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia

NS 3450 (4-0)

Final Version

Catalog Description: The course examines the international factors that condition military strategy and doctrine in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. It focuses on contemporary strategic concepts and strategy: conventional war-fighting capabilities, strategy for nuclear war, roles played by the fleets in military strategy, threat and net assessment, and arms control. Emphasis is on the strategic and operational levels of warfare. PREREQUISITE: NS 3252 and SECRET clearance.

Course Objectives: By the end of the course, the student will **demonstrate** that s/he **comprehends** the structure and organization of the Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as available) military, military thought, and where the navy fits, can **apply** her/his knowledge of the subject area by **contrasting and describing** Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as available) and U.S./NATO military and maritime concepts and facts, and by a detailed **analysis** of one aspect of Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as available) military strategy. The student is expected to understand the differences between Western and Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as available) theories sufficiently to be able to **demonstrate comprehension** of differences that are often subject to "mirror imaging" and to understand the role of each military service in the context of military theory. The course is also designed to lead the student into follow-on instruction and research.

Clearance Requirement: The course is basically taught at the UNCLASSIFIED level to facilitate the taking of notes; however, certain classified supplemental readings will be offered and classified (up to SECRET) discussion is encouraged and will routinely take place in the classroom. Students are encouraged to read these supplemental materials and to participate in classroom classified discussions. No classified material will be used for any graded exercise or homework. **Notes shall not be taken of any classified classroom discussion** unless the student has an approved notebook for the safeguarding of classified material. **Taping of lectures is not permitted** to allow the free flow of classified discussion.

Grade: The final grade will be based upon three written assignments, one project, and two written examinations. The general weight assigned to each of these specific areas is as follows:

Written assignments (3)	15%
Project	25%
Mid-term Examination	20%
Final Examination	40%
TOTAL	100%

Any written project turned in late, without prior arrangement, will result in a **5-point loss** towards the student's final grade. Any written assignment turned in late, without prior arrangement, will result in a **1-point loss** towards the student's final grade. A grade of Incomplete (I) will be assigned until all instructor-provided materials are returned. Once given, grades are **not** subject to improvement by the completion of additional work. The average grade for all faculty members in the National Security Affairs Department has been directed to be a **B+**. Grades for this class will generally adhere to this mandated average.

Written Assignments: Three UNCLASSIFIED **one-page** (double-spaced) written assignments, worth a total of 15% of the overall grade, will be required throughout the course. These are to be original thought. What is expected is a logical development of your position or thoughts. These written assignments do not have to be typewritten as long as they are legible -- however **experience shows** that students who turn in handwritten assignments tend to write less than they would if they used the space allotted on a sheet of typewritten paper -- hence generally earning lower grades. Footnotes are not required **nor desired**. Do **not** attempt to gain more room for writing by adopting abnormally small text nor by using abnormally small margins (you will lose 1 point for each paper that you do this). Do not exceed one page. You do **not** need a cover sheet with your name, etc. Write whole sentences and **not** "bullets." Written assignments are due by COB on the dates specified in the syllabus. Any assignment that is **late**, without prior arrangement, will receive a **one (1) point deduction**. The instructor will grade these assignments and return them to the student in class.

The **first** assignment is an evaluation of a secondary-source article on Russian, Belarus, Ukrainian, or Soviet **military doctrine or strategy** from any political-military journal during the past nine months (since the demise of the USSR). Do not select an article that deals with military hardware or tactics. The student should select what s/he considers the most interesting article within this period and explain why s/he felt that way. Do **not** explain what was in the article; rather analyze why it was interesting and what you learned and why it is of interest to this class. The first sentence in this paper should contain the name of the article and journal it was published in, the date of publication, and the name of the author(s). This assignment is due by COB Tuesday, October 6. When you have finished writing

your essay, ask someone to read it and verify that you have followed the instructions.

The **second** assignment is an argument of why Russia needs intercontinental strategic nuclear forces instead simply eliminating all such weapons. The students should make the strongest argument that s/he can outlining the reasons why from the Russian perspective. The instructor expects to see **all** of the arguments made that are appropriate for Russia at this point in time, i.e. any view that the student can defend will be accepted. Be sure to use all the arguments that were discussed in class. Do not write a paper on what type of forces are needed, but rather why they are needed. This assignment is due by COB Friday, October 16.

The **third** assignment is to analyze some issue of what was discussed at the special seminar on Tuesday, November 17, with the students who visited Russia and the Ukraine in July and/or the thesis students discussing recent changes in military policy, doctrine, strategy, and force structure. Students are free to select any subject that they like, as long as it is deals with military doctrine or strategy. For the strategic planning students that will miss this class, they should write a report on how strategic nuclear strategy and/or targeting should/might change based upon their experiences during the trip to JSTPS. The student should analyze their individual issue with pros and cons and their own opinions. This assignment is due by COB Tuesday, November 24. Students who went to Russia should prepare an outline of what they will talk about and present it to the instructor one week prior to the seminar.

Projects: A type-written **project** or analysis of a book or monograph (or in a few cases a collection of related essays) will verify the students ability to apply her/his knowledge and demonstrate their ability to write an essay on the subject material from original source materials.

The book will be mutually agreed upon by the instructor and the student. A list of books recommended is attached but if a student would like to nominate additional titles (of original source materials), this may be done. Do not be deceived by the brevity or length of the varying choices: it is **possible** to write a poor analysis of a short book because you might think (incorrectly) that there is less substance available.

Although more than one student may analyze the same book, there are a number of reasons to avoid this option. First, the instructor has only one copy of each book. The second student to request a book will have to obtain it on his/her own. Experience **strongly** suggests that you will be unable to recall a book in time to meet the deadline. Secondly, if two students write on the same book, it is likely that one paper will be viewed as superior to the other. On the other hand, that may be a reason for someone to request the same book that another person has.

The book/monograph should be read by the date in the class schedule where that subject material is being discussed so that the student is prepared to ask questions about it or make a 1-2 minute summary of what s/he thinks is the essence of the original source materials. If the student elects to present a summary, it will be ungraded. The student's objective, should s/he desire to make a statement, is to learn from the instructor the context and/or perspective of the book/monograph.

The analysis of a book, monograph, or short collection should be no longer than **four pages** (double-spaced) without footnotes (none are required). It should **not be descriptive** but rather an **evaluation** of what are the main themes which the authors (etc.) are attempting to communicate. Assume that the professor has read the book or other material. If you must describe it, do so in **one (or two)** paragraphs. The student should not only read the book/monograph but s/he should attempt to read reviews of the work (in Russian or Western sources) and set the work and its author(s) into context. The first sentence of the analysis should include the name of the book, the author, and the date of publication. The final paragraph should summarize the essence of the student's findings or the essence of the book/monograph and contain a recommendation of who should read it.

All projects or analyses are due by COB, Thursday, December 10, 1992. Any turned in late, without prior arrangement with the instructor, will be subject to a **5 point penalty**. Book analyses will either be returned at the final examination or via guard mail to SMC addresses. **Books provided by the instructor may be written in and/or highlighted.** Books provided by the instructor must be returned; until this is done, a grade of Incomplete (I) will be assigned.

Examinations: A short in-class mid-term and comprehensive in-class final examination will be given to verify comprehension of minimal levels of factual knowledge in the subject area. Exams will involve essay-type answers, fill-in-the-blank, multiple choice, and/or matching from tables. Items contained on the mid-term will **also** be subject to review on the final. No classified material will be on any exam. Exams will be **open book** but do not require looking up the answer. The mid-term examination for each section of this course will be similar but not identical. The final examination will be identical for both sections. Examinations will not be administered early or late but will only be given during the scheduled examination times.

Special Project Option for Existing Specialists: Existing specialists will be given the opportunity to earn their grade via a formal written seminar paper which will count for 60% of their final grade. These formal written seminar papers are to be fully documented. The topic to be researched will be arranged via a

formal one-page proposal presented to the instructor by October 6, 1992. The instructor will evaluate the proposal and return it with approval and/or comments. All seminar papers are due by close of business, Thursday, December 10, 1992. Any turned in late, without prior arrangement with the instructor, will be subject to a **5 point penalty**. Specialists will complete the normal three written assignments. Specialist students will not have to take a mid-term examination but will be required to take a modified final examination worth a total of 20% of the final grade. These remainder of their final grade (5%) will be based upon class participation. Existing specialists are expected to make a significant contribution to the class in the form of discussion to supplement the instructor's lecture.

Written assignments (3)	15%
Project	60%
Mid-term Examination	N/A
Final Examination	20%
Class participation	5%
TOTAL	100%

Office Hours: Root Hall 102 most hours (except lunch) that I am not in the classroom. Please leave note on my door or in my mailbox (next to Root Hall 103C) with your name and phone number to arrange an appointment or leave message on my phone recorder x2143. Under unusual circumstances, you may reach me at home at 626-3938.

Texts to be Purchased

1. *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988).
2. *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990).

Text on loan from instructor

(this book on loan should **not** be written in)

1. *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984), extracts.
2. *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
3. *Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International Security* by Sergei Rogov, et. al. (June 1992) Center for Naval Analyses.

Texts provided by the instructor which may be kept by the student

1. "Soviets Feared Battle for Berlin Might Have Pushed Allies Toward Minsk," by Francis Tusa, *Armed Forces Journal International* (February 1992).
2. "Warsaw Pact Planned 14-Day Push to Atlantic," by GEN-MAJ Boris Surikov (Ret.), *Armed Forces Journal International* (Septem-

ber 1992).

3. "Evolutionary Problems in the former Soviet Armed Forces," by Chris Donnelly, *Survival* (Autumn 1992).
4. "The Changing Role of Naval Forces: The Russian View of the Persian Gulf War," by James J. Tritten (June 1992), forthcoming article in December 1992 issue of *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*.
5. "Foresight (General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War)," by A.A. Kokoshin & GEN V.N. Lobov, *Moscow Znamya* in Russian, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 170-182 (JPRS-UMA-90-009, April 13, 1990, pp. 15-24).

Recommended texts

1. *Strategy*, 2nd Ed., by General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin (1927) East View Publications, 360 pp. incl. introductory essays and reviews. One copy of this book is on reserve in the library.
2. *Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from Moscow* by Benjamin S. Lambeth (1992) RAND Corporation, 93 pp. Two copies are on reserve in the library.

Books for Analysis:

(listed in chronological order of publication date)
 (student should attempt to obtain from library first)
 (if necessary, instructor will loan copies)

Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics by VADM S.O. Makarov 1898, 300 pp. - emphasis of this report should be on comparison of Imperial Russian Navy views on seapower to contemporary views of Mahan, et. al.

Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Vol. I, Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Atlee (July 1941-November 1945), 2nd Ed. 1975, by USSR Foreign Ministry Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents, 403 pp. (small print - this book should be selected by a student who is already well-versed in history so that s/he gains the Russian perspective on events; not learns the events for the first time).

Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Vol. II, Correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941-December 1945), 2nd Ed. 1975, by USSR Foreign Ministry Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents, 291 pp. (small print - this book should be selected by a student who is already well-versed in history so that s/he gains the Russian perspective on events; not learns the events for the first time).

The Soviet General Staff at War: 1941-1945 by S.M. Shtemenko, 1970, Progress Publishers, 389 pp. (medium print - recommended for C3 specialist).

With the Red Fleet: The War Memoirs of Admiral Arseni Golovko Ed. by Sir Aubrey Mansergh (1960), 239 pp. - historical review of Northern Fleet during 2nd Great Patriotic War).

Submarine in Arctic Waters (Memoirs) by I. Kolyshkin (1966), 253 pp.

Military Strategy, 3rd Ed. by V.D. Sokolovskiy (1966) SRI translation, 494 pp. (medium print - extremely difficult book not recommended for someone new to this field, **5 point bonus** awarded due to size and complexity - strongly recommended for someone who wants in-depth knowledge).

Military Psychology by D. Volkogonov (1972), 408 pp.

The Initial Period of War by S.P. Ivanov (1974), Air Force translation, 1986, 311 pp. (large print - difficult book not recommended for someone new to this field).

The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy, Vol. I - Issues of Soviet Military Strategy (1973-1975) compiled by G.D. Wardak, NDU Press, 1989, 411 pp. (large print - difficult book not recommended for someone new to this field - **bonus of 5 points** awarded due to size and complexity - strongly recommended for someone who wants in-depth knowledge).

The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy, Vol. II - Issues of Soviet Military Strategy (1973-1975) compiled by G.D. Wardak, NDU Press, 1989, 222 pp. (large print - difficult book not recommended for someone new to this field).

Camouflage by GEN-MAJ V.A. Matsulenko, et. al., (1976) U.S. Air Force translation, 287 pp. (large print - recommended for ground forces officer).

Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control by D.A. Ivanov (1977) U.S. Air Force translation, 333 pp. (large print - recommended for C3 specialist).

The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 by M.N. Kozhevnikov (1977) U.S. Air Force translation, 233 pp. (recommended for air force officer).

The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development by S.A. Tyushkevich (1978) U.S. Air Force translation, 508 pp. (large print - recommended for anyone).

The Sea Power of the State, 2nd Ed., Supplemented, by S.G. Gorshkov (1979), JPRS L/9439, 12 Dec 80, 411 pp. (large print - recommended for someone interested specifically in the Navy).

Tactical Reconnaissance by R.G. Simonyan & S.V. Grishin (1980) U.S. Air Force translation, 199 pp. (large print - recommended for ground forces officer).

Local War -- History and the Present Day Ed. by GEN I. Ye. Shavrov (1980) JPRS L/10194 16 Dec 81.

Reminiscences and Reflections, by G.K. Zhukov (1982), Progress Publishers 1985 translation, 454 pp. (recommended for Russian specialist).

M.V. Frunze - Military Theorist by COL-GEN M.A. Gareev (1984) JPRS-UMA-85-027-L, 7 Nov 85, 349 pp., or Pergamon-Brassey's reprint (1988) 402 pp., (recommended for Russian specialist).

Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control by P.K. Altukhov, et. al., (1984) JPRS-UMA-84-022-L, 15 Nov 84, 157 pp. (large print - recommended for C3 specialist).

The History of Military Art by B.V. Panov, et. al., (1984) JPRS-UMA-85-009-L, 21 Mar 85, 485 pp. (small print - **bonus of 5 points** awarded due to size and complexity - strongly recommended for someone who wants in-depth knowledge).

Problems of Military Theory in Soviet Scientific Reference Publications by M.M. Kiryan (1985), JPRS-UMA-013-L, 26 Sep 86, 116 pp. (small print - difficult book not recommended for someone new to this field).

Forward Detachments in Combat by F.D. Sverdlov (1985), JPRS-UMA-87-014-L, 17 Sep 87, 160 pp. (large print - recommended for ground forces officer).

History of Military Art Ed. by GEN-LT P.A. Zhilin (1986), JPRS-UMA-87-004-L, 27 Mar 87, 328 pp. (small print - recommended for specialists or someone writing a thesis in area - **bonus of 5 points** awarded due to size and complexity).

The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles Ed. by GEN-COL F.F. Gayvoronskiy (1987), JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 Oct 89, 116 pp. (small print - recommended for someone who wants to make Russian military theory their specialty).

Tactics by V.G. Reznichenko (1987) JPRS-UMA-88-008-L-I&II 29 Jun 88.

Development of Foreign Submarines and Their Tactics by L.P. Khiyaynen (1987), JPRS-UMA-89-004-L, 24 Mar 89, 90 pp. (small print - recommended for submarine officer).

The Battalion Staff in Battle by COL Yu.M. Arutyunov (1988), JPRS-UMA-89-015-L, 19 Dec 89, 60 pp. (small print - recommended for ground forces officer).

The Motorized Rifle (Tank) Company in Battle by N.P. Moseyenko (1988), JPRS-UMA-90-011-L, 27 Sep 90, 122 pp. (small print - recommended for ground forces officer).

Submarine Tactics by V.A. Khboshch (1988), JPRS-UMA-90-002-L, 28 Feb 90, 100 pp. (small print - recommended for submarine officer).

Aviation in Local Wars by V.K. Babich (1988), JPRS-UMA-89-010-L, 2 Oct 89, 77 pp. (small print - recommended for tactical aviation officer).

Peaceful Waters for the Global Ocean by G.M. Sturua (1988), JPRS-UMA-91-007-L, 6 Aug 91, 47 pp (small print - recommended for someone interested in ocean policy or naval arms control).

Fundamentals of Military Economic Knowledge by Yu. Ye Vlashevich (1988), JPRS-UMA-91-003-L, 10 Apr 91, 105 pp. (small print - recommended with logistician or economist).

Tank Armies in the Offensive by I.M. Ananyev (1988), JPRS-UMA-020-L, 22 Nov 88, 193 pp. (small print - recommended for ground warfare officer).

Electronic Warfare by A.I. Paliy (1989), JPRS-UMA-90-011-L, 6 Oct 89, 251 pp. (large print - recommended for officer experienced in electronics warfare).

The Air Defense Battle by F.K. Neupokoyev (1989), JPRS-UMA-90-007-L, 8 Jun 90, 209 pp. (large print - recommended for someone interested in air defense).

New Thinking and Military Policy N.A. Chaldymov, Ed (1989), JPRS-UMA-91-001-L, 148 pp. (small print - recommended for Russian specialist).

Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2nd Ed., V.V. Myasnikov, Ed. (1989), JPRS-UMA-90-010-L, 26 Sep 90, 310 pp. (large print - recommended for someone interested in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare).

Development of Rear Services of Soviet Armed Forces, 1918-1988 V.N. Rodin, Ed, (1989) JPRS-UMA-90-004-L, 19 Apr 90, 147 pp. (small print- recommended for logistician).

The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR [April 1985 - October 1989] by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(1990), contained in *International Affairs*, Jan 90, 111 pp. (small print - recommended for Russian area specialist).

Ship-Based Aircraft by V.F. Pavlenko (1990), JPRS-UMA-91-005-L, 8 Jul 91), 273 pp. (large print - recommended for naval aviator).

KGB: The Inside Story by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (1990), 776 pp. (large print - recommended for intelligence student).

International Law and International Security: Military and Political Dimensions Ed. by Paul Stephan & Boris Klimenko (1991), 354 pp. (recommended for IO&N student)

Special Collections for Analysis

Collection of 11 articles and 2 collections of translations of documents contained in *Military History Journal* in Jun/Jul/Aug 83 discussing the Battle of Kursk (1983), JPRS 84726, 10 Nov 83, Mil. Aff. No. 1813; JPRS 84824, 25 Nov 83, Mil. Aff. No. 1816; JPRS 84935, 13 Dec 83, Mil. Aff. No. 1820, approx. 100 pp. of medium print. Two additional articles written explaining later views on battle relative to debates of late 1980s. Analysis would be an in-depth study of this battle. Also includes extract of video *The Unknown War: Battle of Kursk* (1978) - 24 min. and entries in encyclopedias.

Collection of translations from Soviet media highlighting Soviet intelligence services. This collection fills 2½ large black binders (already in chronological order) but contains many articles are of limited interest. Analysis would be to ascertain what we have learned about the KGB and associated KGB para-military functions from these open source reports. Small print - recommended for intelligence specialist.

Collection of translations of articles from *Izvestiya* outlining the events leading to and the results of the downing of KAL-007. Contained in one overfilled small binder with small print. Analysis would be on command and control or air defense aspects of event. Recommended for Far East, air defense, or command and control specialist. Student to use Western sources as well to contrast reporting of events.

Collection of translations concerning the activities reported in the Soviet press during and immediately after the August 1991 coup attempt. Analysis would be to understand the role of military and intelligence services during the coup. Small print found in one overfilled large black binder which is no longer in chronological order. Recommended for Russian specialist.

Collection of translations on Soviet/Russian views of Persian Gulf War. Contained in two large black binders with small print (already in chronological order). Analysis would be some aspect

of the war from the Soviet/Russian point of view. Recommended for someone wanting to specialize in Persian Gulf war or future of Russian armed forces.

Collection of translations about the Soviet military reforms of 1924-1925 to be analyzed in connection with the Svechin book (recommended text).

Class Schedule

Tuesday, September 29: COURSE INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW

- Instructor pass out provided texts, loaned texts and provide course overview.
- Pre-test.
- Videotapes: *Nightline: General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Minister of Defense* (July 25, 1991) - 10 min.; *War and the Soviet Union: Background to Soviet Military Thinking* - (1988) - 45 min.
- Students without clearances see their Curricular Officer and attempt to obtain one - bring certification from Security Manager prior to next class.

Thursday, October 1: MILITARY THOUGHT & METHODOLOGY

- Read: "Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices" by John Collins (1973), pp. 12-20, & "Clausewitz Condensed" by Patrick Cronin (1985), pp. 84-93, in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Read: "The Vocabulary of the Soviet Military Theorist," pp. 74-76, "Laws of War and Laws of Armed Conflict," pp. 94-97, "The Soviet Military Services - Basic Structure," pp. 141-144, in *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "Introduction," pp. 13-14, and "The Structure of the Soviet Armed Forces," pp. 145-149, in *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988).
- Read: "Foreword" & "Introduction," *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp. vii-viii, 1-5.
- Lecture on how to analyze Russian military writings, exercises, & equipment, and how to think about military thought.
- Assignment of books for analysis (students may turn in choice to instructor in form of written request prior to 0800.
- Students go to library and obtain books (check them out).

Tuesday, October 6: MILITARY DOCTRINE & STRATEGY

- Read: "Geography and Strategy" by W.N. Ciccolo (1973), pp. 67-81, and "The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine" by C.N. Donnelly, pp. 422-428, in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Read: "The Shape of the Land and the Shape of the Army," pp. 17-35, "The Roots of Russian Political and Military Tradition," pp. 36-51, maps on p. 61, "The Military as a Tool of Policy," pp. 62-63, and "The Development of Soviet Military Art," pp. 199-212,

in *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988).

- Read: "Deterrence and Prevention of War: American and Soviet Perspectives," *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp. 6-28.
- Videotape: *War and the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of War* (1988) - 45 min.
- Lecture on fundamental U.S. military doctrine, strategy to be contrasted with Russian concepts.
- First written assignment due by COB this date.

Thursday, October 8: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY

- Read: "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," by Bernard Brodie (1978), pp. 284-292 in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Read: "Deterrence in Soviet Political-Military Policy," *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp. 34-37, 40-48; and "Prevention of Nuclear War in Soviet Policy," pp. 49-93.
- Lecture on concepts of nuclear deterrence, strategy, & war termination, from both U.S. and Soviet/Russian perspective.

Tuesday, October 13: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR & DEFENSIVE FORCES

- Read: "The Strategic Rocket Forces," pp. 144-151, "Troops of Air Defense," pp. 159-164, "Long-Range Aviation," pp. 167-168, "Air Defense," 232-234, "Troops of Civil Defense," pp. 262-265, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "Civil Defense," *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988), pp. 163-169 and map on p. 146.
- Suggested Reading: *Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Forces Conflict Through the Late 1990s* (U), NIE 11-3/8-88 (Dec 88), 17 pp. (S-238,138).
- Lecture on Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear and defensive forces and how they appear to be evolving in future.

Thursday, October 15: EARLY SOVIET MILITARY HISTORY

- Read: "Prologue: The Red Army," pp. 1-21, "Pre-World War II Development of Soviet Military Science," pp. 77-78, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "The Forging of a Soviet Military Tradition," *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988), pp. 64-78.
- Read: "Deterrence in Soviet Political-Military Policy," *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp. 29-34.
- Lecture on early Soviet military history.
- Second written assignment due by COB, Friday, October 16.

Friday, October 16: OPTIONAL BROWN-BAG LUNCH

- Root 202D.
- Optional lunch discussion by students and instructor who visited Russia, Estonia, and the Ukraine during July 1992. Discussion

will focus on overview, politics, economics, and general observations from the trip.

Tuesday, October 20: THE 2ND GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

- Read: "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-5," *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988), pp. 78-86.
- Read: "The Great Patriotic War: 1941-1945, pp. 21-29, "Pre-World War II Development of Soviet Military Science," pp. 78-79, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Videotape: *The Unknown War: War in the Air* (extracts - 1978) - 18 min.
- Lecture on 2nd Great Patriotic War.

Wednesday, October 21: OPTIONAL BROWN-BAG LUNCH

- Root 202.
- Optional lunch discussion by Russian Captain Vladimir D. Pan'ov, "Naval Cooperation in the Pacific."

Thursday, October 22: STRATEGY ACCORDING TO SVECHIN

- Read: "Foresight (General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War)," by A.A. Kokoshin and GEN V.N. Lobov, *Moscow Znamya* in Russian, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 170-182 (JPRS-UMA-90-009, April 13, 1990, pp. 15-24).
- Videotape: *The Unknown War: Battle of Kursk* (extracts - 1978) - 24 min.
- Lecture on the relevance of Svechin's book *Strategy* to an understanding of the Civil War, the 2nd Great Patriotic War, and emerging military doctrine and strategy for the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Tuesday, October 27: MILITARY SCIENCE

- Read: "The Political Side of Soviet Military Doctrine," pp. 65-69, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "The Theory and Practice of Military Doctrine," pp. 101-113 and "Soviet Military Art Today," pp. 213-219 in *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988).
- Read: "Deterrence in Soviet Political-Military Policy," *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp. 37-40.
- Read and bring to class handouts on military thought.
- Lecture on Soviet/Russian view of military science (see handouts).

Thursday, October 29: REVIEW/MID-TERM EXAMINATION

- First hour will be course review.
- Second hour will be exam (open book).

Tuesday, November 3: HIGH COMMAND, GROUND, & AIR FORCES AND OPERATIONAL ART.

- Read: "The Soviet High Command," pp. 105-129, "The Ground Forces," pp. 151-159, "The Air Forces," 164-167, "Frontal Aviation/Transport Aviation," 169-171, "Deployment of Soviet Military Forces: TVDs, Military Districts, Fleets, Border Guards, and MVD Troops," pp. 183-192, "Groups of Forces Abroad," pp. 213-224, "Troops of the KGB and MVD," pp. 234-239, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).

- Read: "Arming the Soviet Military Machine," pp. 114-117, "Running the Soviet Military Machine," pp. 135-145 & 149-161, "Operational Art," pp. 219-225, "Allies and Alliances," pp. 233-251 in *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988).

Read: "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," by David Jablonsky (1987), pp. 52-63 in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.

- Review mid-term examination.

- Lecture on combined arms and joint warfare, the operational-level of warfare, and general purpose land and air forces in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.

Thursday, November 5: GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

- Videotapes: *War and the Soviet Union: The Current Structure of the Soviet Armed Forces* (1988) - approx. 45 min.; *The High Threat Environment* (1978) - 9 min.; *Soviet Air Power* (1987) - 50 min.

- Instructor on travel; class still meets to watch videotapes.

Tuesday, November 10: NAVAL FORCES AND THE NWTVD

- Read: "Opening Era of Power Projection: 1974-1982," pp. 57-62, "The Navy," pp. 171-178, "The Fleets," pp. 224-232, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).

- Suggested Reading: *Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Towards the 21st Century* (U), NIE 11-15/89 (1989) (S-243-986).

- Videotape: *The Unknown War: War in the Arctic* (extracts - 1978) - 27 min.

- Guest presentation during the first hour by Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Pan'kov, Russian Navy.

Thursday, November 12: POST-WAR SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE & STRATEGY THROUGH THE END OF THE BREZHNEV ERA

- Read: "Postwar Development of Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," pp. 37-57, 63-65, "Military Science," pp. 79-93, 97-98 *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).

- Read: "1945-53 - The First Post-War Period," pp. 86-87 and "The Face of Future Battle in Europe," pp. 252-284. *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988).

- Read: "Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts" by MSU V.D. Sokolovskiy (1962), pp. 401-413 and "Military Strategy" by MSU N.V. Ogarkov (1979), pp. 414-421, in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S.

Army War College.

- Lecture on Soviet military strategy from the end of the 2nd Great Patriotic War through the mid-1980s.

Tuesday, November 17: SPECIAL SEMINAR WITH STUDENTS WHO VISITED RUSSIA & UKRAINE IN JULY

- First hour is a special seminar with 4 students who visited Russia and the Ukraine this past July. Seminar will focus on military strategy and not duplicate information from optional brown-bag lunch.
- Second hour is a special seminar with 2 thesis students who will discuss recent developments in Soviet and Russian military policy, military doctrine, military strategy, and force structure.
- Instructor on travel.

Thursday, November 19: SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE & STRATEGY IN THE GORBACHEV ERA

- Read: "Gorbachev's New Thinking," pp. 94-148 and "What if Deterrence Fails? Soviet Views on Waging and Ending War," pp. 149-185 in *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990).
- Suggested Reading: *Whither Gorbachev: Soviet Policy and Politics in the 1990s* (U) NIE 11-18-87 (Nov 87) 47 pp. (S-232,013).
- Suggested Reading: *Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev Challenge* (U) NIE 11-4-89 (Apr 89) 21 pp. (S-240,446).
- Lecture on 1985-1990 Soviet military strategy.

Tuesday, November 24: EMERGING RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE, STRATEGY, AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

- Read: Donnelly, "Evolutionary Problems in the former Soviet Armed Forces," *Survival*, Autumn 1992, 15 pp.
- Read: Tusa, "Soviets Feared Battle for Berlin Might Have Pushed Allies Toward Minsk," *Armed Forces Journal International*, February 1992, 1 p.; & Surikov, "Warsaw Pact Planned 14-Day Push to Atlantic," *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1992, 1 p.
- Read: Tritten, "The Changing Role of Naval Forces: The Russian View of the Persian Gulf War," June 1992, 27 pp.
- Suggested Reading: *Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from Moscow* by Ben Lambeth (1992), 93 pp.
- Lecture on post-DESERT STORM and post-coup union/republic emerging military doctrine & strategy.
- Third written assignment due by COB this date.

Thursday, November 25: HOLIDAY

Tuesday, December 1: POSSIBLE MILITARY SCENARIOS TODAY

- Read: Rogov, et. al., *Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International Security*, 82 pp.
- Guest presentation by Pavel Felgengauer, Russian newspaper correspondent for military affairs.
- Portions of discussion to include discussion of nuclear and

WTVD military scenarios for future and role of military forces of Belarus and the Ukraine.

Thursday, December 3: THREAT AND NET ASSESSMENTS

- Read: "Analysing Operational Experience," *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* by C.N. Donnelly (1988), pp. 224-232.
- Read: "Weighing the Balance," *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984), pp. 396-404.
- Read: handouts on "Quantifying Military Terms."
- Lecture on assessments based upon scenarios developed in previous lecture.
- In-class problems on how to construct a ground forces net assessment.

Tuesday, December 8: SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL

- Read: "Why Arms Control has Failed" by E.N. Luttwak (1978) & "The Realities of Arms Control" by The Harvard Nuclear Studies Group (1983), pp. 383-398 in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Lecture on nuclear and conventional arms control agreements between the U.S. and USSR/Russia and Belarus and the Ukraine.

Thursday, December 10: COURSE WRAP-UP/SOFs

- Read: "Implications for U.S. Policy and Strategy," *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp. 186-201.
- Where is Russian and republic military strategy going?
- Review for exam.
- All projects or analyses due by close of business this date. If late, they are subject to a **five point penalty**.

Thursday, December 17: FINAL EXAMINATION

- Root Hall rooms 240 & 242, 1300-1500
- Open book - bring all **required** texts/materials to the test.
- Return all loaned materials to instructor's office.

cc: NS, NS/Gt, NS/Tk
 CAPT Ed Smith, OP-922
 LCDR Bruce Ingham, NIC-12
 Dr. Kipp, FMSO
 SMC 1300, 1669, 1929, 2381

Notes for Lecture on Svechin's *Strategy*

by
James Tritten

INTRODUCTION.

- General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin, *Strategy*, 2nd Ed. 1927, Eastview Pubs., 1992, 374 pp. \$44.95 + \$3.00 s/h.
- [available in entirety for first time in English.]
 - [previously Scotts had provided extracts.]
 - [need to read entire book to get full flavor.]
- [earlier citations by Kokoshin & Larionov, then Lobov, etc. were indicative of major shift in what Soviet military was thinking.]
 - [first detected in an end note vice major statement.]
 - [book seen in Russian military offices this past summer.]
 - [reforms of 1924-1925 were "most instructive" for today.]
 - [special analytic introductions by Kokoshin & Larionov, Lobov, Kipp.]
- [not easy to read, lacking organization & conclusion.]
 - Published form of a series of lectures at the General Staff Academy.
 - [similarity to Mahan.]
- [easier to understand if think about World War I or Russian Civil War and Delbrück writings.]
- [does not follow embryonic Communist rhetoric/philosophical construct of theory of war.]
 - explains that he will not use notes or refer to others.
 - states you cannot build an army except on basis of patriotism.
 - [implies army based on class identity will fail.]
- [obviously causes major criticism of him even if he is brilliant in his analysis and recommendations.]
 - [book contains reprints of three critical reviews from 1920s.]
- [since Svechin is liquidated during the purges, his model of direct criticism and not following party line is not one to be followed for future strategists who want to say something controversial.]
 - [use of historical or Western surrogates in future for criticism or articles that do not follow "party" line.]

HOW TO STUDY MILITARY ART?

- starts here vice with substance.
- must include military history.
 - argues that truths of history should remain untarnished.
 - problem is "...the scientific prostration of our military history."

- directly criticizes Red Army performance in Civil War.
- study of classics has strong value.
 - done best in seminars and discussions.
- analysis of own operational-level exercises is essentially worthless.
 - impossible to test logistics & wartime conditions.
 - worse at strategic level.
- war games good only for education.
 - Russians avoided hard questions in games.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN WAR & ARMED CONFLICT.

- war includes political/diplomatic, economics, and ideological as well as armed conflict.
 - [compare to similarity of traditional Soviet view of war.]
 - exploit these weak points as well.
 - military must represent needs of armed forces in consideration of these other forms of warfare.
 - [how to do this if only study armed conflict?]
- direction and coordination is by politics.
 - including decision of political offensive or defensive.
 - [although this is not new, he obviously felt that the point needed to be made again.]
- therefore war and armed conflict are subordinate to politics.
 - strategy cannot exist in a vacuum.
 - politics affects strategy after war has commenced.
 - [still an issue when Sokolovskiy wrote his book.]
 - if you have bad politics, you will have a bad war.
 - due to the nature of politics, compromise will permeate the preparation for war [and ending of war?].
- purpose of war is to win a peace whose conditions are set by state.
 - political directions may change during a war.
 - [review recent wars/campaigns.]
 - purpose of armed conflict is to destroy hostile army.
 - [similarity to Mahan.]
 - wars are generally not terminated successfully by the use of armed forces alone.
 - diplomacy and politics needed in crafting the peace.
- political goals of war must be appropriate to one's war-fighting capabilities.
 - important to understand this prior to outbreak of hostilities.
 - [whose fault is it if the politicians do not understand the limits of armed force?]
- impossible to end up with an apolitical army.
 - [is this true today as well?]

PREPARATION FOR WAR & ECONOMIC WARFARE.

- preparation **before** war ultimately pays for itself by lowering the costs of actual war.
 - [similarity to Mahan's view on War of 1812.]
 - do not fall for trap of quantity in lieu of quality, even if the state is poor.
 - operational reserve forces near fronts do work.
 - irregular forces will never substitute for regular army.
 - do not waste large amounts on fortifications (some O.K.).
 - [somewhat inconsistent with favoring of positional warfare.]
- need economic intelligence.
 - [similarity to needs of today in reconstitution scenario.]
- need an economic general staff as well.
 - [how have nations worked around this?]
- economic conflict may not coincide with armed conflict.
 - [Desert Shield/Storm example.]
 - economic conflict is double-edged sword.
- long-term economic mobilization in stages.
 - commence while armed forces remain on peacetime footing.
 - cannot totally ignore civilian needs.
 - [implies must plan for this as well.]
 - [we used this argument for SLOC protection].
- during the war, innovate and test directly on battlefield.
 - [this comment is out of place in book.]
 - [hidden agenda?]


ALLIANCES & DIPLOMACY.

- alliances only of value if complemented by military convention.
 - ignores the value of allies who have other values.
 - [Portugal and Iceland in past.]
 - [Bahrain in more recent past.]
- small states often have relatively high numbers of armed forces but no support or sustainability.
 - [this probably is of value today with armed forces of former Soviet republics.]
- violence often employed to change neutrals into allies.
 - [example?]
- object of diplomacy is to avoid armed conflict at **unwanted times**.
 - [interesting definition that implies conflict inevitable.]

STRATEGY.

- preparation for war and management of operations.
- strategy determines starting moments for operations and end points.
- role of the general staff.
- strategic theory cannot exist for single services.
 - [major issue in 1980s as well.]
- not all good operators make good strategists.
 - [true today and in U.S. forces?]
 - [if true, then does this require a general staff?]
- Red Army deficient in area of strategy.
 - "initiative in the army can only exist on the basis of extensive initiative in civilian society."
- need truly national view to overcome local/regional desire to defend territory at expense of victory in war as a whole.
- politician must understand what is feasible and how politics affects military situation.
 - sometimes politics determines the sequence of operations rather than strategy.
 - [examples?]
- strategist is a national or coalition quartermaster.
 - allocation in space and time.
- lines of communication most important task of strategist.
 - retain most outstanding and reliable officers to direct the rear during war.
- strategic art places operations in the best possible communications conditions.

MILITARY-TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WAR
According to Svechin



Strategies of Destruction.

- Description;
 - quick wars with decisive battle against centers of gravity.
 - encircle or entrapment.
 - defeat the most important enemy first.
 - not generally geographically oriented.
- Examples;
 - [Initial Central powers view of World War I.]
 - [Desert Storm or initial Axis view of World War II.]
 - [old NATO/WTO war on central front.]
 - [new Bush strategy for crises.]
 - preventive wars generally wars of destruction.
 - [if Entente did not do this during Civil War, then foreign intervention was not serious since it was so limited.]
- Necessary conditions;
 - requires extensive land boundaries crossed by good lines of communications.
 - requires significant superiority in forces.
 - cheat secondary theaters to mass forces.
 - requires opponent "whose political structure resembles a giant with feet of clay."
 - [Czarist Russia was like this.]
 - requires smoothly functioning manpower system.
 - [strong implication is that Russia is not ready for this.]
- Benefits;
 - speed.
 - minimal loss of material and life.
 - less complex plan.
 - war can be conducted only with existing stockpiles and standing armies with operational reserves.
 - defending side is forced to prepare for this type war if attacker chooses destruction.
 - if defender fails to prepare for destruction, can lead to an easy victory.
 - opponent with major class contradictions vulnerable to quick destruction of his army.
 - [Czarist Russia was like this.]
- Drawbacks;
 - does not work without overwhelming superiority.
 - based upon offensive and ability to conduct two simultaneous operations (required for encirclement) which is technically very difficult.
 - [example of Russian war plans prior to World War I.]
 - no strategic reserves.
 - no back up if failure.
 - narrows perspective of strategic thinking.
 - does not work with all opponents [see attrition below].
 - opponent with no class contradictions cannot be defeated by destruction.

- assumes that one starting position is enough to achieve ultimate objective.
- if concentrate on 1st and 2nd echelons, opponents lines of communications may be given a free ride.
- [Implied recommendation;]
 - [do not require destruction strategy for defense against foreign intervention.]

Strategies of Attrition.

- Description;
 - description all encompassing from bloodless maneuvers to a series of major battles.
 - [criticism for being all encompassing.]
 - longer wars with many steps to ultimate victory.
 - total mobilization occurs.
 - must keep long-term goals in mind during operations.
 - first secure rear and flanks prior to engaging opponent.
 - national reserve is men/material not formed yet.
 - strategic reserve is men/material not tied to operation.
 - operational reserve is men/material tied to sector but not yet committed.
 - limited goals until final crisis does not mean that overall goals of war are limited.
 - may be more geographically oriented.
 - struggle for positions from which to make attacks.
 - economic and political efforts may continue well after the culmination of armed conflict.
- Examples;
 - [World War I as fought by Entente.]
 - [World War II as fought by United Nations.]
 - [new Bush strategy against resurgent/emergent global threat (REGT).]
 - major dissimilarity between opponents, i.e. land and sea power, leads to attrition (UK and Russia).
 - large distances between opponents leads to attrition (Japan and Russia).
 - importance of lines of communication leads one to attrition.
 - military parity leads to attrition.
 - [situation building towards today?]
 - opponent with no class contradictions leads to attrition.
- Necessary conditions;
 - requires comprehensive war planning, total mobilization, and militarization of society.
 - strategic intensity of war? has shifted from 20th day to several months due to logistics, economics, & politics.
 - [does he really mean operations or war?]
 - [is this true today in post-Desert Storm environment?]

- if state poorly prepared for land war, strategic intensity may be postponed 1-3 years.
 - [reconstitution scenarios of today.]
- [inconsistency of time lines not important.]
- Benefits;
 - does not require major standing armed forces.
 - [clearly this is where we are all headed.]
 - opens perspective of strategic thinking.
 - ability to engage greater menu of opponents.
 - if opponent engages in destruction, own lines of communication may have a free ride.
 - opponent with major class contradictions vulnerable to slow destruction of his army.
 - even went so far as to point out that Lenin advocated policy of attrition (vice destruction) in 1920 booklet *Disorder of Leftism in Communism*.
- Drawbacks;
 - requires support of people over extended period.
 - requires time to build capability.
 - if opponent prepares for destruction and you do not, can lead to cataclysmic failure.
 - requires industry and transportation infrastructure.
 - [Russia did not have this either.]
 - costs more.
 - [but costs spread out over time].
 - constrains the opponent's actions less.
 - concerns for defense of locally important areas can divert attention from the major issues of the war.
- Recommendations;
 - navies and air forces primarily weapons of economic pressure.
 - problems in executing economic warfare successfully.
 - industrial locations might be major vulnerability (Sevastopol and Leningrad).
 - military bases might be major vulnerability (Kronshtadt).

Offensive Strategies (positive goals).

- methods.
 - encirclement.
 - breakthrough.
 - envelopment or flank attack.
 - does not agree that need to go on offensive immediately.
- prerequisites.
 - major forces and expenditure of effort.
 - speed in sequential operations to avoid pauses between.
 - operational surprise.
 - tactical surprise nice to have.
 - starting place as close to enemy as possible.
 - hence need to have good defense as starting point.

- problems.
 - if overextend self, can lead to adventurism.
 - eventually you will wear self down and defender will build up sufficient for a successful counterattack.
 - must know when to end the offensive.
 - sometimes cannot mass for major battle with all assets.
 - [Soviet Navy dilemma.]
 - simultaneous offensive operations rarely successful.
 - since this is the basis for encirclement, these are high risk.
 - destruction strategists drawn to this method and do not realize how difficult it is.
 - small separate attacks may be more economical than one big one.

Defensive Strategies (negative goals).

- methods.
 - does not mean passive actions only.
 - tactical counterattacks is the main idea.
 - job of strategist is to find the time and place to shift to positive goals.
 - if not engaged in an offensive, military should immediately adopt a defensive posture.
- claims that Clausewitz considered defense as the stronger form of warfare without "perverting" the German army.
- prerequisites.
 - expendable territory.
 - time must be on side of defense for it to work.
 - requires less expenditure of effort.
 - requires quick concentration of effort at decisive point.
- problems.
 - opponent maintaining status quo in class struggle may require superior effort rather than less effort.

Maneuver Warfare.

- if both sides set positive goals, they maneuver, and battle is series of meeting engagements.
- Soviet Union could afford withdrawal in western border areas.
 - operational and tactical scale.
- high command can only react three days after events happen.
- type of warfare required for most small countries.

Positional Warfare.

- if both sides set negative goals, military operations become positional.

- can pursue positive goals.
 - apply pressure on enemy from position.
 - switch from positional to maneuver.
 - starting point for next attack.
- can force the enemy to deploy disadvantageously.
- high command can respond more quickly to events in this type of warfare.
- sometimes almost forced into this type warfare.
 - coalition wars generally more positional.
 - [true today? or during the Civil War?]
 - important of lines of communication lead to positional war.
 - the normal mode of defense against invasion from the sea.
- easy to get stuck in this (World War I).
- Soviet Union needs to prepare for this type of warfare.

OPERATIONS.

- uninterrupted acts of war with theater-level goals.
 - [experience of Russo-Japanese War of 1905 is basis of concept of this level of warfare.]
 - [Civil War also discussed in terms of separate theaters.]
- if understand basic strategy, will intuitively make correct operational-level decisions.
- operational art is the highest level theory for single service or for individual theater.
 - [credited with creation of concept of operational art.]
 - places troops in best tactical position.

TACTICS.

- individual battles.
- high command cannot be indifferent to battle tactics.
 - [hence minor discussion included in book on strategy.]
- the correct tactics are those dictated by the strategy.
- only the high command can properly judge them.
- should not determine force structure.
 - or strategy.
 - Delbrück lessons of Germany in World War I.

WAR & CAMPAIGN PLANNING.

- province of the general staff during peacetime.
 - [what Svechin calls war planning is what we now term program planning.]
 - [what Svechin calls operational planning is now what we term war and/or campaign planning.]
 - [early distinction between these two.]

- probably should routinely do this against all possible enemies.
 - [similarity to Rainbow plans.]
- need flexible plans with options to choose at time.
- plans need to cover entire period of an extended war.
- assessment of own forces needed to be based upon truth.
 - need independent source of information.
 - [Stavka representative idea.]
- need to ask what is the nature of the forthcoming war?
 - [similarity to what was later termed military doctrine.]
- need to ask what is the nature of the opponent?
 - grasps the basis of net assessments; "...grasp war as it is perceived by the opposing side..."
 - attacker must compare own present with defender's future (since lines of communication better for defense).
 - study of opponent not limited to military side.
 - requires best and brightest officers!
 - "intelligence primarily requires persons of the highest qualifications in the economic, political, historical and strategic sense, truly refined scholars who have immersed themselves in the study of a certain state. All the prewar general staffs suffered from a lack of such people. Without them intelligence work on a war plan is reduced to a kind of Pinkerton joke."

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Initial Distribution List

CDR Bruce Ingham, USN Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12) 4600 Silver Hill Road Washington, D.C.	5
Lane Aldrich Intelligence Plans & Integration Directorate DAMI-PII-T, Pnt Room 2C475 Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Headquarters, Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310-1063	1
Dr. Robert Slater DIA/DIC/R Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20340-5485	1
LTC James D. Willis, USAF Chief, Force Management Division Directorate of Resource Management - AF/IN/RF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Washington, D.C. 20330-5110	1
CAPT Ed Smith, USN Director, Intelligence Division OP-922, Pnt Room 5B711 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, D.C. 20350	3
Chris Rosenberg Naval Maritime Intelligence Center NAVMIC Code OOCF 4301 Suitland Road Washington, D.C. 20395-5170	1
LCDR Jeff Kuipers, USN Assistant Naval Attache American Embassy - Moscow PSC 77 - DAO APO AE 09721	1
U.S. Military Attache American Embassy - Kiev Washington, D.C. 20521-5850	1
Chairman Department of National Security Affairs Code NS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1

Curricular Officer National Security Affairs and Intelligence Programs NPS Code 38 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	3
LT Sandra Jamshedi, USN Code 38B Special Security Officer Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1
Naval Investigative Service (NIS) Attn: D. Geoffrey Yeowell Suite 200 301 Lighthouse Avenue Monterey, CA 93940	1
Navy Liaison Unit Attn: Y.J. Kostal Bldg. 1, Room 02B Naval Station Treasure Island San Francisco, CA 94130-5000	1
Captain Ralph N. Channel, USN (Ret.) Adjunct Professor Code NS/Ch Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1
Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin Associate Professor Head of Russian and Eastern European Area Studies Code NS/Tk Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1
CAPT Robert Bathurst, USN (Ret.) 7240 ABS PSC 69 Box 0091 APO AE 09707	1
Dr. Jake Kipp Foreign Military Studies Office Attn: ATZL-SAS U.S. Army Command & General Staff College Ft. Leavenworth, KS 60027-5015	1
LTC Stephen H. Franke, USA Attn: DAAR-ZXP-M Office of the Chief, Army Reserve Headquarters, Department of the Army Washington, DC 20310-2400	1

Andrew Marshall Director, Net Assessment OSD/NA Pnt Room 3A930 Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301	1
LTC Stephen Freeman, USA Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/Policy Russian, Eurasian, Eastern European Affairs (OUSD/P/REE) Pnt Room 1D479 Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301-2000	1
CAPT Jeremy C. Clark, USN (Ret.) Deputy Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Policy) Pentagon Room 2C252 Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301	1
Betsy Brie DIA-DIR-1E1 Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20340-5485	1
Dr. Joseph P. Longo, Jr. Dean, School of Intelligence Information Systems Defense Intelligence College Washington, D.C. 20340-5485	1
Dr. James Tritton Associate Professor Code NS/Tr Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	5
LCDR Scott Stanley, USN CINCUSNAVEUR (N-2) PSC 802 Box 7 FPO AE 09499-0159	1
LT Mark Admiral, USN SMC 1929 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1
LT James McIlmail, USN SMC 1669 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1
LT Dave Hanson, USN SMC 2381 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1

CPT James Jaworski, USA SMC 1300 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1
CPT Evelyne Conlon, USAF 484 Tiger Lily Way Henderson, NV 89015	1
CPT Jay Warwick, USAF 8305 Ari Ct. Jessup, MD 20794	1
CPT Francis McGuigan, USAF 696 Inter GP, Det 3, OL-AU Meunchen AIN, Germany APO, AE 09245	1
Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	1

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY



3 2768 00342975 4